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Editors’ Introduction
Indigenous peoples—those people who consider themselves, or are considered by
others, to be Aboriginal, ‘‘First Nations,’’ native peoples, Fourth World peoples, or
‘‘original occupants’’ of specific places on the planet—have faced genocide, cultural
destruction, and forced removal from their ancestral areas for thousands of years. Over
the centuries, colonization—the expansion of populations into new areas and the
exploitation of natural and human resources there—has led to significant declines in
the populations of indigenous groups. As Patrick Brantlinger notes, ‘‘One of the main
causes for these declines is not mysterious: violence, warfare, genocide.’’1
In its headlong rush toward ‘‘progress,’’ ‘‘civilized’’ society has inexorably gobbled
up land and resources for its own benefit, not caring a whit about crushing, destroying,
or wiping out anything in its path—be it flora, fauna, or people (particularly
indigenous peoples).2 Instead of being stewards of the Earth, a large proportion of
humanity has blithely and ignorantly become the destroyers of the Earth, seemingly
with little or no thought of the ramifications, let alone the morality, of their actions.
An estimated 350,000,000 to 600,000,000 indigenous people live in the world today.
A significant number of governments, however, do not recognize peoples within
their borders as indigenous. In Asia, for example, only one country, the Philippines,
has officially adopted the term ‘‘indigenous peoples,’’ has a law aimed specifically
at protecting the rights of indigenous peoples, and has a National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). India recognizes some 645 ethnic groups as ‘‘Scheduled
Tribes,’’ many of whom see themselves as indigenous.3 In Africa, most sub-Saharan
countries, including Botswana and Zimbabwe, argue that all their citizens are
indigenous.
Governments sometimes refuse to recognize groups within their borders as
indigenous because they do not want those groups to be able to appeal to international
agencies such as the United Nations or the International Court of Justice for
assistance. Governments also have significant concerns about the possibility that
indigenous groups might seek self-determination, and, in fact, genocides of indigenous
peoples are often directed at groups that are challenging the state for greater
recognition of their rights or that are seeking autonomy.4
In numerous cases, indigenous peoples have actively resisted incursions by other
peoples as well as assimilation and cultural modification efforts by outside agencies.
Their cultural distinctiveness and their desire to maintain their lands, resources, and
distinctive identities, combined with their lack of power relative to state systems,
resulted in indigenous peoples’ being prime targets of genocide.
It is apparent from history that those ‘‘in need’’ (actually, in want) of land,
resources, and minerals will do whatever is necessary to obtain these goods, in spite of
the social, economic, and environmental damage they may cause.5 Because many
indigenous peoples live in areas containing substantial wealth in resources, and
because some of them have been pushed farther and farther into the hinterland, their
mistreatment and decimation often go unchecked. Were it not for certain organizations
whose express purpose is the protection of indigenous peoples, and the efforts of
indigenous peoples themselves, there is little doubt that most of the smaller indigenous
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groups still managing to eke out an existence would be in far worse situations than
they are at present.
It is extremely difficult to get accurate statistics on indigenous peoples, especially
if they reside in remote places, are mobile, or live in areas where there
is conflict. Getting information on the deaths of indigenous peoples is even more
difficult, in part because of the concerted efforts of perpetrators to destroy any evidence
of their actions.
What to call the ill treatment of indigenous groups is a contentious issue, as is
discussed in this special issue. Some analysts see the entire 500-year-long history of
the expansion of European states into what are now called the Americas, Africa, and
Asia—and, more recently, the Pacific and the Arctic—as a genocidal enterprise.6
As Ronald Niezen points out, ‘‘Indigenous peoples, like some ethnic groups, derive
much of their identity from histories of state-sponsored genocide, forced settlement,
relocation, political marginalization, and various formal attempts at cultural
destruction.’’7 Several researchers have labeled actions taken against indigenous
peoples as genocides if they included destruction of a people’s culture or, as some
analysts have termed it, ‘‘cultural genocide’’ or ‘‘ethnocide.’’8
Arguments also continue over who is responsible for the destruction of indigenous
groups. Governments of nation-states such as Paraguay, Indonesia, and the United
States, for example, categorically deny that they intentionally destroyed indigenous
peoples.
There has been considerable debate over whether the actions of the United States
with respect to indigenous peoples constitute genocide. Brenden Rensink, in his article
‘‘The Sand Creek Phenomenon: The Complexity and Difficulty of Undertaking a
Comparative Study of Genocide vis-a`-vis the Northern American West,’’ addresses
this issue, drawing on the example of the Sand Creek Massacre of Cheyennes and
Arapahoes by the Colorado Militia in southeastern Colorado on 29 November 1864.
The killings and mutilations of hundreds of American Indians, many of them women,
children, and elderly people, sparked a firestorm of protest, investigations, and debate
that continue to this day.9 The varying interpretations of the facts of the case, and of
its causes and consequences, raise important questions about the ways in which
scholarship on the North American West and on genocides of indigenous peoples
should be pursued and about the importance of documenting the various perspectives
of the individuals and groups involved.
Genocides of indigenous peoples sometimes take place when groups of people are
identified by the state as secessionists or terrorists. The Herero of German South West
Africa, in what is now Namibia, were targeted by the German military, following their
revolt against the colonial government in 1904, in the first genocide of the twentieth
century.10 The Bushmen, or San, of Namibia were subsequently targeted for
destruction in the period 1912–1915, in part because they were seen as responsible
for ‘‘banditry’’ and attacks on farms and groups of laborers returning from the mines,
in a genocide that, as Robert Gordon notes in his article in this issue, has largely
been ignored by scholars. Bushmen, like indigenous peoples in other parts of the world,
were all too frequently labeled ‘‘vagrants’’ and treated harshly. One response to
the labor shortage in South-West Africa was to round up Bushmen and put them to
work on the farms or in the mines; if they resisted in any way, they were beaten,
incarcerated, or even killed. As Gordon notes, in a number of instances farmers
and soldiers who tortured or killed Bushmen were never arrested or tried for their
actions.
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In his article on Canada, Andrew Woolford reports that the impact of colonialism
on indigenous peoples is often described as ‘‘cultural genocide,’’ a characterization he
sees as problematic. He describes the heterogeneity and diversity of Canadian
Aboriginal peoples, stressing the variability that existed in their experiences of
colonialism. While many Aboriginals in Canada were exposed to processes of cultural
assimilation, there were also those who died at the hands of settlers or as a result of
disease and starvation. As Woolford points out, some Aboriginals characterize the
treatment of Canadian indigenous peoples as genocide not only in the hope of
harnessing the term’s symbolic power but because they genuinely believe that they
and their ancestors experienced physical destruction.
Like indigenous peoples in other parts of the world, Aboriginal Canadians
employed numerous strategies to resist cultural and physical domination. The
reproduction of group identity among Canadian Aboriginals includes regaining land
and resources, seeking restitution for mistreatment, and successfully obtaining an
apology from the government of Canada for the practice of removing Aboriginal
children from their families and placing them in residential schools. Woolford
concludes with a useful analysis of the limitations of the UN Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) in terms of the way it
categorizes and draws boundaries around peoples, which has the potential to downplay
Aboriginal notions of identity and space.
While missionaries, human-rights advocates, politicians, and historians have
discussed and sometimes decried genocides of indigenous peoples for centuries, it was
not until the latter part of the twentieth century that comparative analyses of
genocides of indigenous peoples were attempted. Part of the reason for the expansion of
interest in genocides of indigenous peoples was the massive increase in conflicts
between states and indigenous peoples, characterized by Bernard Neitschmann as ‘‘the
Third World War.’’11
Conflicts between governments and indigenous peoples arose during the 1950s and
1960s, and continued into the 1970s, in many parts of the world, including Bangladesh,
Brazil, Burma, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Laos, Malaysia, Peru, the
Philippines, and Vietnam.12 Beginning in the 1960s, scholars and activists
began paying greater attention to the struggles between Fourth World peoples and
First, Second, and Third World states, because of what they saw as illegal actions
of nation-states against indigenous peoples, indigenous groups’ passive and active
resistance to top-down development, and concern about exploitation by transnational
forces.13
It was in the late 1960s that the indigenous peoples’ rights movement began to
take shape, in part as a response to the widespread mistreatment of indigenous
groups. Several of the major indigenous peoples’ human-rights organizations were
founded during this period, including the International Work Group for Indigenous
Affairs (1968), Survival International (1969), and Cultural Survival (1972).14 There
was a proliferation of organizations formed by indigenous peoples themselves, such as
the American Indian Movement (AIM), founded by Indian activists in 1968, and
various indigenous regional organizations such as those in Ecuador and Bolivia.15 The
objectives of these groups varied considerably, but one overarching goal was the
protection and promotion of the human rights of indigenous peoples.
Social and political movements in the Third World picked up steam in Southeast
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific in the latter part of the twentieth century.
Governments opposed to these movements frequently took the position that the
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activism was secessionist in nature, something that, in fact, was rarely the case.
In Central and South America, as Jean Jackson and Kay Warren note,
During the past three decades, armed conflict, especially in Guatemala, Peru, and
Colombia, has produced severe political repression, hundreds of thousands of
indigenous deaths, and over a million indigenous refugees and internally displaced
persons.16
As mentioned above, there have been debates and disagreements among analysts,
governments, indigenous peoples’ support groups, and indigenous peoples themselves
as to whether specific sets of events constitute genocide. Some of these debates have
revolved around issues of intent. This was the case, for example, in the discussions
surrounding the treatment of the Ache in Paraguay, who were reported to have been
victims of genocide as a result of the actions of the Paraguayan state and various non-
state actors, including settlers.17
In May 1992, a declaration was issued by representatives of indigenous peoples
from around the world who attended the World Conference of Indigenous Peoples on
Territory, Environment, and Development, held in Brazil prior to the Earth Summit
(the World Conference on Sustainable Development of the United Nations) that took
place in June 1992. The Kari-Oka Declaration and the Indigenous Peoples Earth
Charter state specifically that ‘‘[w]e continue to maintain our rights as peoples despite
centuries of deprivation, assimilation, and genocide.’’ The Earth Charter notes, ‘‘There
exist many examples of genocides against indigenous peoples’’; the text goes on to
conclude that the UNCG must be changed to include a discussion of the genocide of
indigenous peoples.18 Questions were also raised about the impacts of transnational
corporations on indigenous peoples.19 Subsequently, indigenous peoples in a number of
countries—including Australia, New Zealand, and Canada—sought apologies and
restitution from the governments of the states in which they resided.20
Katherine Ellinghaus, in her article ‘‘Biological Absorption and Genocide:
A Comparison of Indigenous Assimilation Policies in the United States and
Australia,’’ examines the issue of whether or not policies aimed at assimilating
indigenous peoples constituted genocide, focusing specifically on the issue of biological
absorption, the process by which indigenous identities theoretically would disappear
through interracial sexual liaisons. This process, which underlay numerous aspects of
Australia’s and the United States’ dealings with Aboriginals and Native Americans,
respectively, was a controversial one. Ellinghaus points out that the pervasiveness of
the process blurs the boundaries between genocide and ethnocide. Her article
examines the contentious issue of the removals of Aboriginal and Native American
children from their families and explores whether or not removals and other
assimilationist policies are a form of genocide.
At one time, the ethnocide and genocide of indigenous peoples was simply
considered part and parcel of colonization.21 Today international laws and agreements
outlaw such practices, but this has not brought to an end the decimation of indigenous
peoples. In many ways, the almighty dollar (or euro, yen, pound, rand) is still valued
above the lives of indigenous peoples.
The plight and fate of certain indigenous groups have been the focus of various
human-rights organizations and genocide scholars over the years, but many more
indigenous groups have not been assessed in terms of their human-rights situations.
Thus, while many are somewhat familiar with the fate of the Ache of Paraguay and the
Maya of Guatemala, and may know something about the Yanomami of the Amazon or
the San of southern Africa, many, if not most, are unaware of even the names or locales
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of the vast majority of indigenous groups scattered across the world today. Even this
special issue on indigenous peoples largely mirrors this fact. That is, many of the
articles in the issue focus on one or another of the better-known cases involving
indigenous peoples: the Native Americans of the United States (Rensink, Ellinghaus),
the San of southern Africa (Gordon), the Aboriginals of Australia (Ellinghaus), and the
Aboriginal peoples or First Nations of Canada (Woolford). This was not our original
plan as editors. In fact, we attempted to solicit articles on numerous indigenous
peoples who are not, so to speak, in the limelight; but those scholars who submitted
proposals chose to write on some of the better-known groups. Be that as it may, the
articles assembled here tackle significant issues, and readers should find them highly
informative and thought provoking.
Nevertheless, there is a clear message here for genocide scholars and others
concerned with crimes against humanity and with genocide: greater attention must be
paid to the plight of all indigenous groups around the globe, no matter how small, how
little known, how hidden from view. If such attention is not paid to them, some, if not
many, could disappear or be absorbed into the sizable populations of rural and urban
poor who themselves have few rights. ‘‘Invisible’’ and ‘‘silent’’ genocide is just as much
genocide as those cases that claim the attention of the mass media or the outrage of the
masses across the globe (when, in fact, this happens at all). Part and parcel of being
human-rights or genocide scholars, or so it seems to us, is to be our brothers’ and
sisters’ keepers. This view fits with the very title and focus of this journal, Genocide
Studies and Prevention.
Robert K. Hitchcock
Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University
Samuel Totten
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
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The Sand Creek Phenomenon: The
Complexity and Difficulty of Undertaking a
Comparative Study of Genocide vis-a`-vis
the Northern American West
Brenden Rensink
PhD candidate, Department of History, University of
Nebraska—Lincoln
This article explores various issues germane to the field of the history of the North
American West and the struggle to integrate these issues into the broader field of
genocide studies. The primary historiographic example of the 1864 Sand Creek
Massacre of Cheyennes and Araphahos in southeastern Colorado by the Colorado
Militia illustrates the difficulties of producing objective research on such morally
charged historical events. Specific attention is dedicated to understanding the
potential value of integrating Native American history into the broader field
of genocide studies and to explaining why comparative scholarship has yet to
be undertaken in any substantial way. Building on this foundation, the article
reveals the challenges facing genocide scholars in integrating the history of
the North American West into the field of genocide studies, particularly in a
comparative sense.
Keywords: Native American, American Indian, Sand Creek Massacre, genocide,
American West
Introduction
On the morning of 29 November 1864, the Colorado Third Cavalry launched an attack
on Chief Black Kettle’s Cheyenne and Arapaho encampment at Sand Creek, with
dramatic and horrific results. Commonly known as the Sand Creek Massacre,
the ensuing conflict resulted in the death of hundreds of Native Americans and,
most strikingly, the killing and mutilation of many women, children, and elderly
individuals. The gruesome scene launched an immediate firestorm of public,
congressional, military, and historical debate that has continued unresolved to the
present day. As is to be expected, the apparent injustice of the event was not lost
on contemporaries or on subsequent historians. However, the complex events that led
up to and help explain the massacre have often been marginalized by authors trying
either to condemn Colonel John M. Chivington, the Colorado Third Cavalry, and
Governor John Evans for their actions or to absolve them of any guilt. Herein lies the
foundational crisis in integrating Native American history into the field of comparative
genocide studies.
John M. Chivington, colonel and leader of the Colorado Third Cavalry, the primary
military unit at the Sand Creek Massacre, was originally a Methodist minister.
Arriving in Denver from Omaha in 1860, Chivington was appointed presiding elder of
the Rocky Mountain District of the Methodist Church.1 With the outbreak of the Civil
War soon thereafter, Chivington offered his services as a regimental chaplain for the
Brenden Rensink, ‘‘The Sand Creek Phenomenon: The Complexity and Difficulty of
Undertaking a Comparative Study of Genocide vis-a`-vis the Northern American West.’’
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Colorado volunteers, but was instead appointed major of the regiment.2 He served in
this capacity, combating Confederate threats in the area, until 1862, at which time he
was appointed commander of the Military District of Colorado. In August 1864, a new
volunteer unit, the Colorado Third Cavalry, was raised, with Colonel Chivington as its
leader. The Third Cavalry’s term of service was to last 100 days, and the unit was
given the express mission of quelling any Indian hostilities in the region.3 The unit
more closely resembled a local militia than a US Cavalry regiment, and it was largely
untrained in military maneuvers and discipline. By late November, the unit’s term of
service was nearly up, and it had not yet engaged in battle. As a result they earned the
moniker ‘‘The Bloodless Third,’’ and thus they were eager to see action when they
arrived at Fort Lyon, near Sand Creek, where Black Kettle’s band had originally come
to make peace.
Overseeing all of these activities was John Evans, who had served as Colorado’s
territorial governor since the fall of 1862. Originally trained in medicine, Evans had
become involved in politics while supporting Lincoln’s 1860 campaign and was offered
first the governorship of Washington, which he turned down, and then the same
position in Colorado.4 Seeking to resolve the escalating conflict with the Plains tribes,
Evans issued a series of proclamations authorizing the destruction of all ‘‘hostile
Indians.’’5 The objective of these proclamations was to separate the Natives into two
discernible groups, which would be dealt with accordingly. It was in this context that
Chivington’s Third Cavalry was organized and charged with the duty of dealing
with those Indians still at war. Because he had to report regularly to the commissioner
of Indian affairs and to the US War Department, Evans had political motivations to
end the hostilities in his territory quickly.
Under these circumstances, in the late fall of 1864, a camp of Cheyennes, led
by Chief Black Kettle, approached Major Edward Wynkoop at Fort Lyon and sued
for peace. Wynkoop was not a career military man, but had risen in rank during
the Confederate struggles with neighboring Texas. When Chivington was promoted to
colonel, Wynkoop was promoted to major, placed in command of Fort Lyon, and
assigned control over Union troops stationed to protect against an attack from the
south.6 When approached by Chief Black Kettle, Wynkoop instructed him to have his
people camp temporarily on nearby Sand Creek, where, Wynkoop promised, they
would be protected and provided with provisions.7 Subsequently, Wynkoop took
Cheyenne Chief Black Kettle and Arapaho Chief White Antelope to Denver to present
their case to Governor Evans. As will be discussed later, Evans was less than eager to
accept peaceful terms from these chiefs, who were well known to have allowed some of
the younger members of their tribes to engage in violence in the recent past.
Ultimately, both chiefs were sent back to Sand Creek. Soon afterwards Wynkoop was
replaced by Major Scott Anthony, who displayed a less conciliatory attitude toward the
Natives. When Chivington and his Third Cavalry arrived unannounced at Fort Lyon
on 27 November 1864, they quickly began preparing to attack the encampment at
Sand Creek. On the morning of 29 November, Chivington’s troops attacked Black
Kettle’s sleeping encampment. The attack lasted for most of the morning and early
afternoon.
Investigations into the event revealed an array of conflicting facts that should be of
interest to scholars interested in comparative genocide studies. Was Chivington’s
proclaimed policy to ‘‘kill all and scalp all, little and big’’ an example of genocidal
policy, or is it to be understood in the broader military context of an ongoing struggle
between the United States and Plains Indians?8 While the term ‘‘genocide’’ was not
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part of Chivington’s lexicon, some twentieth-century scholars (including Ward
Churchill, Annette Jaimes, and David Stannard) have applied this term to his actions
and those of the Colorado Third Cavalry.9
Such tragic events and violent rhetoric should prove fertile soil for comparative
genocide research. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Instead, contemporary
reports and accounts, as well as scholarly commentary and historiography, represent a
disarray of diametrically opposed interpretations of the historical facts of this conflict,
not to mention its causes and consequences. Eyewitnesses and subsequent scholars
describe identical events and interpret identical documents with striking disparity.
The controversy exemplified by the Sand Creek Massacre encumbers objective
scholarship and plagues much of North American West history.
The tragedy so vividly manifest in the Sand Creek Massacre is an inescapable
undertone of North American history. The word ‘‘inescapable’’ is appropriate here
because it is truly impossible to ignore or disregard the inherent sorrow and loss that
accompany so many historical events in the continent’s past. For every step forward of
Euro-American development and triumph, there was a mirrored reaction of regress
and loss for the indigenous inhabitants of North America. America’s history of
geographic expansion and cultural achievement must be tempered by the constant
reminder of the unseen or even ignored costs it exacted from Native Americans. This
dichotomy is inescapable. Euro-American contact led to the decimation of indigenous
populations, a disastrous alteration of their culture, and a permanent change to their
physical world.10 Those who escaped death and disease suffered the imposition of a
foreign culture, will, and identity. To speak in such terms can be dangerous, as it may
appear to relegate Native populations to the status of mere objects to be acted upon—to
constrict them in a straitjacket of victimization, offering them no voice and denying
them agency within their own history. Indeed, historian Patricia Limerick has warned
against histories that portray ‘‘Indians as victims, passive people who stood frozen in
place as a great wave of white expansion crashed down on them and left them broken
and shattered.’’11 Even with this consideration in mind, however, one cannot escape
the overarching misfortune that befell Native Americans.
There are various worthy reasons for studying Native American history and
attempting to resolve, or at least to contextualize, its many controversies. Rectifying
inaccuracies in past accounts, building awareness of one’s ancestors, and simply
increasing and disseminating knowledge are important goals. Yet another goal is to
contribute to the field of genocide studies, and particularly the comparative study of
genocide. Throughout world history there are examples of atrocities, massacres, and
genocides that merit careful study. As Israel Charny notes, this field of study seeks to
demonstrate that man’s genocidal destructiveness can be seen as a process to be
studied, charted, and managed correctively. . . . If ever we are to curtail holocausts of
human life, we must understand the cancers we are fighting.12
The history of the North American West clearly includes many examples of the
destructive tendencies of human nature that typify the cancers of which Charny
speaks.
If one accepts the reality that contact between Europeans/Euro-Americans and
Native Americans led to the continental demographic collapse of North America’s
autochthonous populations, it is readily apparent how the place of Native American
history in comparative genocide studies is significant; but it is equally significant that
it has not played a more prominent role in such comparative scholarship. The
demographic collapse of an entire continent’s population surely involves events and
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trends that can be profitably compared with other aspects of world history; however,
this has not been done. If properly approached, with careful and objective
methodology, North American history may reveal a wealth of valuable comparative
topics for global application. Comparative genocide research in North America is a
promising field awaiting proper development.
An examination of the Sand Creek historiography illustrates the problems that
hinder such comparative research and enables the subsequent explanation of such
problems. It is hoped that such analysis will point to ways of correcting negative
trends and will help move forward the eventual integration of the history of the
North American West and genocide studies.
Sand Creek Historiography and the Struggle for Objectivity
Because the 1864 Sand Creek Massacre is a prime candidate for comparative genocide
research, the need for objective scholarship into what does and does not constitute
genocide in the history of the North American West is especially pressing.
One difficulty in examining those events that might be considered genocide is the
biased nature of the primary documents themselves. The majority of the sources
available to historians document a series of congressional hearings and investigations
on the matter that took place between 1865 and 1867. The reports of these hearings
contain the testimonies of all the military leaders involved in the massacre, as well as
numerous eyewitness accounts from others present—military, civilian, and Indian.
Given the severity of the accusations and the investigation at hand, the testimonies all
reflect individuals’ vested interests in either condemning or justifying the event. Some
eyewitnesses and soldiers strove to clear their own names by condemning what
occurred or by pinning guilt on others, while others described a series of events that
largely excused their own, and their colleagues’, wrongdoings—if any were admitted at
all.13 Statements about the massacre made after the fact by Governor Evans and
Colonel Chivington also reflect attempts to justify the attack on Black Kettle’s
encampment. Thus, the primary sources available are, by their nature, acutely biased.
Not surprisingly, controversy and extreme interpretations of events have dominated
the historiography of Sand Creek Massacre from the outset.
Immediately after the attack on Black Kettle’s encampment by Chivington’s Third
Cavalry, public reactions polarized and the conflict became the subject of an official
inquiry by the Department of War and Congress. The first words written on the subject
were part of an open debate as to whether the events at Sand Creek constituted a
battle or amassacre.14 Given the divisive foundations of the historiography, it comes as
no surprise that this has been described as ‘‘one of our most controversial Indian
conflicts.’’15 The inherent bias of the sources, with their conflicting perspectives, has
had direct consequences for the secondary literature analyzing the events. Coupled
with the political legacies of Native American activist scholarship, the resulting
historiography understandably proves problematic for comparative genocide research.
This does not imply that the events at Sand Creek and its historiography are
representative of the whole of white–Indian interaction and the related fields of
historical study. However, even in the uniqueness of the event and how it has been
written about, those interested in the comparative study of genocide should find this
case to be of interest. It is extremely difficult for historians to ascertain which of the
many conflicting testimonies relating to this case are most valid. That said, regardless
of the many inconsistencies in the testimonial accounts, certain facts can be
established. First, the massacre did occur. Second, women, children, and the elderly
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were killed, and many bodies were mutilated. The uncertainty, self-serving prejudice,
and biased opinions present in Sand Creek’s primary documents, however, have
provided ample ammunition for modern scholars to engage in debate over even such
incontrovertible facts. Likewise, the documents have offered more than enough
evidence to support both those who vilify Chivington and emphasize the innocence of
the Indian victims and, conversely, those who wish to exonerate Chivington and
‘‘prove’’ that his actions were warranted. These motives and biases, present in the
primary documents, are now manifest in the historical analysis as well.
Addressing a wide range of factual questions, historians of the Sand Creek
Massacre have used various primary sources to arrive at very different conclusions.
A thematic presentation of the primary debates at hand can be framed upon a set of
introductory questions posed in William R. Dunn, Jr.’s I Stand By Sand Creek:
! Were the Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians camped at Sand Creek hostiles or
friendlies?
! Were these Indians under protection of the United States Government?
! Was the fight at Sand Creek a massacre or a battle?
! Were excessively large numbers of women and children killed at Sand Creek?
! Did Colonel Chivington permit the scalping and mutilation of the
Indian dead?16
While Dunn’s own answers to these questions are a prime example of unbalanced
and biased research, his questions do provide a useful road map for a subsequent
discussion of the matter. The opinions of those who defend Chivington will be
examined first, followed by the opinions of those who condemn him. This thematic
comparison will lay bare not only the conflicting historical analyses but the conflicting
primary sources upon which they rely. The historiography of the Sand Creek Massacre
thus illustrates how historians selectively using conflicting portions of the documen-
tary evidence can come to diametrically opposed conclusions.
Were Cheyennes and Arapahos camped at Sand Creek at peace or
at war?
According to William R. Dunn, Reginald Craig, and J.P. Dunn, the tribes encamped
at Sand Creek had long been in a state of violent war with the region’s settlers.17
All three authors assert that Indian attacks against settlers had taken place in the
spring and summer of 1864 and that Black Kettle’s supposedly admitted such attacks.
Opposing this depiction, though not denying Cheyenne involvement in the violence on
the Plains, others have sought to at least qualify Native actions. In her history of the
Cheyenne, Mari Sandoz explains that they ‘‘had tried to keep peaceful’’ but were
repeatedly driven by starvation to join with Comanche, Kiowa, and Sioux in their
campaigns.18 Others have stressed that the Cheyenne involvement was limited to a
small number of young warriors who were outside Black Kettle’s control; the Indians
camped at Sand Creek thus represented a peaceful band and should not be linked with
Indian actions during the previous months and years.19
The motives behind the violent activities of both Native Americans and
Chivington’s Third Cavalry are another important issue that relates to the status of
Black Kettle’s band at Sand Creek. By painting a detailed picture of the Indians’
misdeeds on the Plains, Craig presents the attack on Black Kettle’s camp as a
necessary, though regrettable, action (basically, a case of retaliation), meant to ‘‘teach
them’’ a lesson and move them toward desiring peaceful relations.20 Craig reinforces
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this justification by insisting that Chivington was ‘‘appalled at the outbreak of full
scale war,’’ whereas the ‘‘Indians enjoyed savage torture and killing . . . entirely
without provocation.’’21 His juxtaposition of such portrayals makes clear his under-
lying desire to exonerate Chivington and lay all blame upon Native shoulders. Taking
an opposite stance, historians seeking to condemn Chivington and Evans have found
plenty of sources that portray them as eager to use violence prior to November 1864,
the implication being that they would attack Indians regardless of their hostile or
friendly status. One of the most infamous statements attributed to Chivington displays
his acutely vengeful attitude toward Indians. S.E. Browne, a Colorado resident and
attorney questioned at the congressional hearings on the event, stated that Colonel
Chivington had publicly announced in August or September of 1864, that his policy
was to ‘‘kill and scalp all, little and big; that nits made lice.’’22 Authors such as Ralph
Andrist, Dee Brown, Thom Hatch, and Duane Schultz all highlight similar evidence to
assert theses diametrically opposed to that of Craig.23
The Indians at Sand Creek and the Position of the US Government
Were the Indians at Sand Creek under the protection of the US government?
In answering, ‘‘No, they were not,’’ William R. Dunn takes obvious direction from his
predecessor, J.P. Dunn.24 In Massacre of the Mountains, the latter argues that Black
Kettle’s camp had received no authorized promise of protection from either Governor
Evans or Colonel Chivington, who commanded the region’s troops.25 Dunn asserts that
promises made by Wynkoop and possibly by his successor, Anthony, were outside their
authority. Reginald Craig sees it differently, asserting that while Black Kettle had
sued for peace, he had done so only as a ploy to gain time to regroup and strengthen his
people’s resistance.26 In Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, Dee Brown sees the
situation from yet another perspective, arguing that Black Kettle’s camp was under
government protection and that not only had Black Kettle sent most of his warriors off
to hunt buffalo but the encampment was so confident of ‘‘absolute safety, [that] they
kept no night watch except of the pony herd which was corralled below the creek.’’27
Attempting to corroborate this position, Brown cites the testimony of Edmund
Guerrier (the mixed-blood son-in-law of frontiersman William Bent), who was
encamped at Sand Creek on the morning of the attack. Of that morning Guerrier
remembered the following: ‘‘I heard, at first, some squaws outside say there were a lot
of buffalo coming into camp.’’28 Brown paints the encampment as completely unaware
of the possibility of an attack. By carefully selecting from among the disparate sources,
Brown and Craig were able to come to well-documented but opposite conclusions.29
Sand Creek: A massacre or a battle?
Did the events at Sand Creek constitute a massacre or a battle? In his answer to this
question, William R. Dunn emphasizes the preparedness of Black Kettle’s encamp-
ment: they had dug rifle pits and, according to Dunn, were caught by surprise only as a
result of Chivington’s secretive operations.30 Yet Dunn provides no other evidence to
support his conclusion that the events at Sand Creek were a battle and not a massacre,
and offers no discussion of the conflict itself. Most other participants in the debate have
provided more evidence to support their claims. Instead of arguing that the Indians
fled from battle, Craig contends that the hand-to-hand combat the Indians engaged in
constituted an organized retreat and a simple extension of the battle to predetermined
defensive strongholds.31 Craig even cites examples of Black Kettle himself engaging
in the battle.32
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To emphasize Black Kettle’s pacifist desires, others offer accounts describing the
Cheyenne chief holding aloft an American flag he received from President Abraham
Lincoln in hopes of convincing the approaching troops not to fire.33 Not only does this
paint a scene of cruel irony and betrayal, it suggests that Black Kettle’s band had no
desire to fight. Indeed, the very vocabulary that many authors use to describe Sand
Creek suggests a very different story from the notion that the Indians were itching
for a battle. Peter Matthiessen has described the events of 29 November 1864 as
‘‘the slaughter [of] an unsuspecting Cheyenne camp by an armed mob of Colorado
irregulars’’; Duane Schultz uses such terms as ‘‘primate,’’ ‘‘unrestrained,’’ ‘‘crude,’’
and ‘‘barbaric’’ to describe the mob.34 Again, these authors’ analyses are based on
conflicting sets of primary documents. The primary sources depict Sand Creek as both
a battle and a massacre. There are, in fact, scenarios that cite the presence of both
many Indian warriors and almost none—and mortality levels follow a similar pattern
of disagreement. One account states that ‘‘[t]he Indians returned our first fire almost
instantaneously,’’ whereas another tells of a defensive group that ‘‘just flocked in a
promiscuous herd, men, women and children together.’’35 Another suggests that
women and children were in fact being used as a shield while the warriors organized a
counter-offensive.36 Testimonies can be found to support either side, and, by using only
one side of the testimonial evidence and ignoring the half that contradicts their thesis,
authors can conveniently present evidence fitting the story they wish to convey.
Whether or not the Cheyennes were prepared for battle or offered serious resistance,
however, they were nevertheless slaughtered. For this reason, the term ‘‘massacre’’
has largely been accepted.
Were excessively large numbers of women and children killed at
Sand Creek?
Of all the aspects of the Sand Creek Massacre, the report that large numbers of women
and children were killed has proved among the most inflammatory. William R. Dunn
attempts to disarm this accusation by quoting Acting Battalion Adjutant Stephen
Decatur, who testified that ‘‘I counted 450 warriors (dead), and do not think there were
any more women and children killed than would have been killed in attacking a village
of whites of the same number.’’37 Dunn offers no corroborating evidence. Decatur’s
testimony is similarly used by Craig to explain that ‘‘[s]everal squaws were shot
while fighting beside the men, using spears, bows and arrows and muskets with as
much dexterity as the warriors; and several children were struck by stray bullets.’’38
Craig therefore concludes,
From all the circumstances, it appears that probably not over one-fourth of the dead
were women, most of whom were killed fighting the troops, and that there were
few children killed and most of them by accident.39
Craig adds the testimony of Robert Bent, who claimed that ‘‘noncombatants had every
opportunity to escape.’’40
Other authors present numerous testimonies to the contrary. Duane Schultz cites
accounts of women surrendering and begging for mercy but being shot nonetheless; of
a six-year-old girl who was shot while holding a white flag; and of a five-year-old girl’s
being shot as she tried to hide in the sand.41 David Stannard relates Major Scott
Anthony’s testimony, which tells of a three-year-old child’s being shot for sport.42 The
testimony of one James P. Beckwith is cited by Dee Brown to counter views like Craig’s
by asserting that the slaughter of women and children not only occurred but was
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intended.43 Beckwith testified that Chivington instructed the troops as follows: ‘‘I don’t
tell you to kill all ages and sex, but look back on the plains of the Platte, where your
mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters have been slain, and their blood saturating the
sands on the Platte.’’44 Chivington’s statement implies a possible planned retribution.
Further, Beckwith testified that among those killed ‘‘[t]here were all sexes, warriors,
women, and children, and all ages, from one week old up to eighty years,’’ and that
‘‘about two-thirds’’ of those killed were women and children.45 Clearly, there is ample
testimony that authors on both sides can use to make opposing claims. However, the
claim that no unarmed women or children were killed constitutes little more than
denial. The primary documents disagree on many facts, but the killing of numerous
unarmed Cheyennes is irrefutable. Although Craig, J.P. Dunn, and William R. Dunn
attempt to justify some of these facts and simply deny others, the historical record is
clear on the broader issue of these killings, despite some confusion about the details.
Did Chivington permit the scalping and mutilation of the Indian dead?
William R. Dunn writes, ‘‘There were some Indian scalps taken, and probably some
mutilation of the Indian dead, but certainly this was done without Colonel
Chivington’s knowledge or approval.’’46 This statement raises two important
questionsWere bodies scalped and mutilated? and, if so, Was Colonel Chivington
aware of such atrocities? Reginald Craig either denies such mutilations outright,
quickly discrediting the sources that describe such events, or justifies them by saying
that it was common frontier belief that scalping or mutilation was the only way to truly
strike fear into the hearts of Indians.47 In addition, he argues that the overwhelming
spirit of vengeance felt by Colorado citizens as a result of Indian attacks on settlers
explains away their guilt.48 In either case, Craig vehemently defends these actions by
emphasizing documents that support his thesis and quickly discarding those that do
not. Dunn cites the testimony of Irving Howbert (one of the most supportive of the
Third Cavalry’s actions) as justifying any misdeeds in light of the horrors of the Indian
depredations from the previous summer. Although he had not personally seen anyone
in the act of scalping Indian bodies, when faced with the fact that it had occurred,
Howbert reasoned that
[t]hey had probably been scalped by some of the reckless persons referred to, or possibly
by some of the many men in the regiment whose relatives or friends had been killed and
brutally mutilated by the savages during the preceding summer. I am not apologizing
for the acts of these people, but every fair-minded person must admit that there may
have been extenuating circumstances connected with the offense, and no one unfamiliar
with the horrors of savage warfare can appreciate the feelings of those who have
suffered from their attacks.49
In other words, both Howbert and Dunn claimed that if any soldiers actually did scalp
or mutilate Indian bodies, their actions were due to the psychological trauma they
had suffered themselves. On the numerous first-hand accounts and testimonies that
condemned the Third Cavalry’s actions, Craig is largely silent. Even though there is
ample documentary evidence to oppose his claims, Craig highlights only those that
bolster his thesis.
Even those elements of the secondary literature that largely support the views and
actions of the Third Cavalry admit that some scalping and mutilation of bodies
occurred. Accounts that condemn the Third Cavalry focus largely on such mutilation,
ostensibly in order to cast the entire event in such a light. The accounts of Duane
Schultz, Thom Hatch, Ralph Andrist, and others all feature excerpts from testimonies
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that describe live captives—as well as those already dead—being scalped and
otherwise mutilated. These testimonies describe women being raped and then shot,
Indians wandering blindly around the battlefield with their scalps missing, men’s and
women’s genitals being cut off and placed decoratively on the soldiers’ horses’ bridles
or taken to be used as tobacco pouches, women’s breasts being cut off and worn as caps,
fingers being cut off to facilitate the theft of jewelry, and Indian women killing
themselves and their children in order to escape a more brutal death.50 Duane Schultz
reports that the ‘‘orgy of murder and mutilation’’ was so tiring that many soldiers had
to lie down and rest before continuing.51
While the testimonies that describe these horrific scenes assert that such
depredations did occur, Chivington’s involvement is another issue entirely. The
evidence cited by both Duane Schultz and Dee Brown to prove that Chivington was
aware of such atrocities comes from Lieutenant James Connor, who testified that
‘‘according to the best of my knowledge and belief these atrocities that were committed
were with the knowledge of J.M. Chivington, and I do not know of his taking any
measures to prevent them.’’52 Since opposing authors cite either Connor to condemn
Chivington or Howbert to exonerate him, it is difficult to draw a firm conclusion as to
the ‘‘truth’’ of the matter. As with so many aspects of the Sand Creek Massacre, the
historian must decide to which testimonies he or she should give credence. Whichever
side these historians’ conclusions fall upon, they represent incomplete histories.
Though scholars are certainly not obliged to use testimonies that contradict their
interpretation, a discussion of why the author has discounted such sources would
strengthen his or her conclusions. The biased approach used in these studies devalues
them and calls their conclusions into question. The result is a murkiness as to how the
Sand Creek Massacre, a potential topic of insightful study, fits into the wider backdrop
of genocide in the world.
Citing Sand Creek: The Historiographic Casualty
Because the Sand Creek Massacre is a prominent event in the history of the North
American West, its unbalanced portrayal in the historiography is deleterious in
several ways. Most immediately, it perpetuates the problem of unbalanced research
and polemical conclusions. Relying on Ward Churchill’s emphasis on Chivington’s
supposed bloodlust and its gruesome outcome,53 for example, M. Annette Jaimes has
drawn a conclusion that epitomizes the troublesome end result of biased research.
First, based on Churchill’s statement that all of the Colorado Third Cavalry, like the
Nazi SS, was a ‘‘criminal organization, formed solely for criminal purposes and
composed of criminal individuals,’’ Jaimes concludes that the Sand Creek Massacre
and other like events typify American West history.54 In other words, instead of
viewing such events as anomalies in America’s westward expansion, she sees them as
representative of the region’s history. Jaimes’s and Churchill’s claim that Sand Creek
is the ‘‘normative expression’’ of American civilization is striking. While this view
represents an extreme interpretation of the historiographic record, it highlights a
significant concern: a historiography dominated by biased literature can lead to
extreme conclusions.
Such broad generalizations about all of the American West, or all of American
history, constitute a fatal flaw. There is no argument that the Sand Creek Massacre,
the Wounded Knee Massacre, the Sappa Creek Fight, the Bear Creek Massacre, and
the Washita River Massacre were pivotal in the history of the West, but to suggest
that they represent America as a whole is not a little troublesome. If the events at
The Sand Creek Phenomenon
17
Sand Creek did indeed represent the desires of all Americans and constitute
government policy, then why were they followed by widespread public outcry?
The extensive military and congressional inquiries into the event, not insignificant
occurrences, also imply a lack of government approval.
In their effort to explicitly tell the Native American side of American history,
studies such as Jaimes’s exemplify a general reaction to past scholarship that
primarily portrayed the Euro-American perspective on the history of the American
West. There is no doubt that this earlier Eurocentric emphasis was in dire need of
revision; but some scholars have swung the pendulum so far that they now present
history from a different but equally biased and ethnocentric perspective.
In his review of David Stannard’s American Holocaust, Samuel R. Cook of the
University of Arizona claims that it is ‘‘necessary to counterbalance the ethnocentri-
cities of past historical works on Natives.’’55 However, the claim that works such as
Stannard’s accomplish this goal stands on a precarious and ultimately hypocritical
foundation. To attempt to right the wrongs of past ethnocentric scholarship by writing
new ethnocentric scholarship is academically irresponsible. The cliche´ that two wrongs
do not make a right has never rung clearer. Clear evidence of this is the work of
William R. Dunn, which explicitly sought to swing the pendulum of historical
interpretation in the opposite direction; a struggle has now emerged in which
competing ‘‘sides’’ with competing perspectives attempt to ‘‘balance’’ the historiogra-
phical record by using non-objective methodologies and drawing biased conclusions.
Incessant vilification or single-minded defense of either Euro-Americans or Native
Americans by some historians is counterproductive and interferes with efforts to
establish a solid historical record of the history of the American West, particularly with
respect to whether and what type of genocidal activity may have taken place. To
suggest that events like the Sand Creek Massacre were typical of Indian–American
relations, or to stubbornly justify such events without admitting any American
wrongdoing, is to place oneself largely outside the realm of objective scholarship.
The Sand Creek Massacre can provide important information for those conducting
research into the origins of genocidal actions. For example, while the ill-treated subject
of intercultural miscommunication and confusion does not explain away the obvious
elements of rancor and revenge exhibited by Evans and others, it could at least foster a
more complex explanation for events surrounding Sand Creek than the monocausal
reasoning requisite for simply assigning guilt. Understanding what caused such
confusion, acrimony, and friction among these groups, and how these problems led to a
series of violent events, including the Sand Creek Massacre, would be a more
productive avenue of research. While there are numerous examples of contempora-
neous violent outbreaks, none of these devolved into such wholesale butchery—in
quantity or in quality. The historian’s task, therefore, involves determining whether
Sand Creek was a tragic massacre or a justified battle, as well as attempting to
discover how and why the events of 29 November 1864 unfolded differently from other
contemporaneous events and resulted in such catastrophe. The polemics and politics
engaged in by many of the authors whose work is explored above have resulted in
many weighty and significant questions’ being left underexplored. With few
exceptions, the resulting historiography is a confusing, confrontational body of
scholarship that makes comparative genocide research just that much more difficult.
More careful analysis of the Sand Creek Massacre could certainly prove useful to
genocide scholars. Though not without its faults, one of the stronger works currently
available is Stan Hoig’s The Sand Creek Massacre, published in 1961. Unlike the other
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studies discussed here, Hoig’s interpretation is supported by a fair selection of
documents from both sides of the historical record. The Sand Creek Massacre should
not be placed on a pedestal or touted as a paragon of objective research, but Hoig’s
study does exhibit a much greater degree of objectivity than most others do. Hoig’s
contextualization of the Sand Creek Massacre shows the faults and merits of both
Native Americans and whites. In his initial six chapters, Hoig relates the series of
bloody conflicts and the resulting escalation of tensions that led to the massacre on 29
November 1864. To accomplish this task, Hoig selected a wide range of documents—
including newspapers, personal correspondence, government reports, and secondary
analyses—that reflect both sides of the conflict. For example, in laying out
the situation of Indian affairs in 1863, Hoig has been careful to detail Cheyenne,
Ute, Comanche, Kiowa, Sioux, Caddoe, and Arapaho offensives along with attempts by
various United States military units to suppress these attacks. In addition to
describing the events themselves, his documentation delineates the motives and
reasoning behind each group’s actions. In his analysis Hoig shows that some conflicts
were initiated by Indiansand others by whites.56 In stark contrast to other accounts
that display an eagerness to assign sole blame to one side or the other, Hoig’s more
careful analysis does not excuse either side for their aggression and assigns guilt and
innocence much more judiciously.
This more careful analysis continues as Hoig follows the history through to the
Sand Creek Massacre. Whereas other texts show a bias in the author’s choice of
sources, Hoig consulted a fair selection of testimonies from both sides of the debate. He
cites the testimonies of Irving Howbert, John Smith, Colonel John Chivington, James
P. Beckwith, Major Scott Anthony, Major Hal Sayr, Major Edward Wynkoop, and
many others. For example, in describing the death of the prisoner Jack Smith, Hoig is
careful to offer both testimonies that describe the death as an accident and others
claiming that it was murder.57 Though Hoig comes down on the side of murder, he first
offers evidence supporting the counterargument. Again, unlike the other accounts
described above, The Sand Creek Massacre includes an analysis of a wide range of
sources, more thoroughly presents the different perspectives of the different sides in
the conflict, and attempts to provide a more holistic context for the event. The resulting
text is much more valuable for comparative research than the other works discussed
thus far.
The Challenge of Integrating the History of the North American
West into the Field of Genocide Studies
Ultimately, regardless of whether the depopulation of America’s autochthonous
peoples is officially defined as genocide, mass murder, casualties of war, or simply
the unfortunate consequence of post-Columbian contact, careful study of such events
can be of great benefit. The fact remains that, for millions of Native Americans,
European contact brought violent conflict and violent death, and the cataclysmic
events that followed merit careful study. The value of understanding this history lies
not only in enabling Native American groups to understand their regional, cultural, or
ethnic history but in helping the world to understand its own.
Unfortunately, events and incidents of the North American West have too seldom
been examined in the context of comparative genocide studies. Efforts to expand the
study of such events are needed, but they must be as objective as possible, for only then
will the insights and new knowledge gleaned be of value.
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It is also true, however, that the political foundation from which many authors
draw is a major obstacle to the development of more objective research in the field and
to subsequent integration with the field of genocide studies. The political roots of many
in the field of Native American studies help explain the apparent dearth of objective
comparative scholarship. The temptation for some has been to deny any academic or
historical value to activist literature; such a stance, however, fails to appreciate the
important social trends that such literature represents. To dismiss such scholarship as
nothing more than political rhetoric is to deny contemporary Native Americans a voice
in their own history. Furthermore, this dismissive attitude fails to recognize that the
legacies of North American history have brutally real effects on the day-to-day life of
indigenous people, effects that extend far beyond the realm of mere political posturing.
As in any other field, each study must be assessed on its own merits.
In the late 1960s, amidst myriad other social and civil-rights movements, the
American public witnessed one of the first manifestations of a large-scale Native
American activist movement. Through the years this movement took on many shapes
and foci.58 Some of the primary struggles dealt with issues of political autonomy,
religious freedom, control over self-image, and traditional Indian land rights. The
historical literature that emerged represented an attempt by Native American
scholars to revise what they viewed as one-sided, biased, Eurocentric histories
of their past. Their historical analyses were aimed not only at re-establishing control
over their own past but also at justifying contemporary political, social, economic, or
religious reform. It should be no surprise that much of their work took on a political
and impassioned tone.
Perhaps the most influential of the early Native American activist writers was
Vine Deloria, Jr. Deloria was born a Standing Rock Sioux; in 1969, his first major
publication, Custer Died for Your Sins, sent shockwaves through both Native and non-
Native communities and established an ideological framework of topics and themes
that can be traced throughout the subsequent years of the movement.59 As some of the
titles and subtitles of his books suggest (We Talk You Listen; An Indian Manifesto; An
Indian Declaration of Independence), Deloria’s writings strongly voiced Native
frustration and issued a vigorous call for reform.60 Deloria’s prolific writing covered
such foundational topics as treaty making, the ins and outs of political sovereignty,
and self-government, and broadened out to encompass issues of religious freedom,
community solidarity, social autonomy, and cultural self-determination.61
Throughout his writings, Deloria’s response to previous scholarship on the Native
American experience is clear: Native Americans must stop looking outward and start
looking inward for their sense of identity, political autonomy, and spiritual under-
standing. Ultimately, this response came to encompass the whole of the Indian activist
movement: a reaction against a long history of Native Americans’ being forced (though
in some cases they did so of their own volition) to look outside of themselves and their
communities for their well-being. While Deloria played a valuable role in articulating
the justifiable frustrations and grievances that Native Americans felt about their past
and present conditions, uniformly applying his reactionary and politically based
methodology and perspective to objective comparative genocide scholarship presents
problems.
The mass of Deloria’s work—and that of many who have followed him—focused on
analyzing historical events for the purpose of advocating contemporary political and
cultural change. This is the same goal that some have proposed for studying possible
genocide in general. While the dividing line between scholar and activist is one that
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proves difficult to clarify, some individuals from both groups use the study of the past
to bring about change in the present world. However, genocide studies’ goal—to better
understand genocide as a phenomenon in order to prevent its future reoccurrence—is
fundamentally different from Deloria’s goal of using historical analysis to demonstrate
ongoing injustices toward Native Americans and to justify changing fundamental
tribal relationships with the US government. When authors admit that their historical
research is fueled by ‘‘unequivocally political’’ motives and declare no more than an
‘‘abstract allegiance’’ to academic issues, as Ward Churchill does in his 1997 A Little
Matter of Genocide, there is cause for concern.62 While Churchill’s admittedly polemic
treatise may represent the extreme, the phenomenon of politically fueled research is
widespread. One manifestation of this phenomenon is the high number of indigenous
authors who list their tribal affiliation in their publications, seemingly in an attempt to
add political and cultural weight to their views.63 There is no fundamental problem
with writing from a political standpoint, but such biases must be acknowledged
and analyzed in order to determine a study’s overall usefulness, particularly if it is to
be used in the realm of comparative genocide studies.
In his review of Marc Bloch’s theorizing on comparative studies, William Sewell
explains that comparative methodology, by design, should reduce our personal biases
by forcing us to confront alternative views.64 The underlying assumption is that our
comparative analysis is objective enough to consider alternate views. If authors are
unwilling to devote fair attention to opposing views and explanations of historical
events, then what use is there in searching for greater historical insight by attempting
to compare events in the first place? This does not imply, for example, that Holocaust
historians must devote significant time to the issue of Holocaust denial; however,
it does suggest that, in analyzing historical events, they should discuss a wide
spectrum of primary source evidence—including alternative views that may run
counter to their arguments (a classic case being the functionalist versus intentionalist
argument of years past). If nothing else, such open and frank discussion will
strengthen their arguments; readers are less likely to feel as though the proverbial
wool is being pulled over their eyes, and all interested parties will gain a more
informed understanding of the subject.
In the study of possible genocidal events, historical characters are bound to be
labeled as victims and perpetrators. In the case of the Holocaust, it is fairly clear who
committed murder and who the victims were; but the history of white–Indian violence
is more complex. Not only does the history of their interactions span centuries, involve
innumerable disparate groups and individuals, and cover widely different geographi-
cal zones, it is also a fact that atrocities were committed by both sides. Highly selective
and unbalanced presentation of primary documents cannot hope to produce a solid
understanding of why and how such atrocities were perpetrated. Indeed, ultimately, it
may prove impossible to discern how and why contentious cross-cultural interactions
escalated into genocide if scholars are more focused on condemning or exonerating the
parties involved than on conducting a sophisticated analysis of the facts.
The negative impact of overt bias on history is well described by anthropologist
Bruce Trigger: ‘‘such biases may simply add harmless colour to a dry story, but they
can [also] turn historical study into a dangerous piece of propaganda.’’65 Robert
Athearn similarly complains, in his review of Ralph Andrist’s The Long Death, ‘‘It is all
right for an author to have a point of view, but in this case it is waved in the reader’s
face at every turn.’’66 To some degree, Athearn is correct.67 With his usual candor,
Ward Churchill mused that his study A Little Matter of Genocide would not be well
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received in the academic community because it contains similar extreme posturing.68
In his review, sociologist Kurt Jonassohn absolves Churchill of such misdeeds:
‘‘The reader should not be distracted by errors and interpretations that seem to
weaken the overall argument, an argument that is far too important to be dismissed on
such grounds.’’69 Nevertheless, the work is too obviously biased to be taken at face
value.
As heirs to either the Native American or Euro-American legacy of such events,
authors are likely to find their personal feelings for or attachment to the subject
difficult to escape. Conducting objective research is difficult as it is, and such
difficulties are only exacerbated by cultural ties to historical characters and events.
These considerations have led James Axtell to theorize further on the role of historians
in retelling the past:
The serious historian may not wrap himself in judicial robes and pass sentence on high;
he is too involved in both the prosecution and the defense . . . the [historian’s] goal is not
to punish or rehabilitate historical malefactors—who are morally incorrigible—but to
set the record straight for future appeals to precedent.70
Emphasis should be duly placed on Axtell’s use of the term ‘‘serious historian.’’ As the
historiography shows, it does not take an incredible amount of skill to scrutinize the
historical record and point fingers; however, to research and present a balanced
portrayal of past events that is useful for comparative research or produces insights
to inform future government policy is much more difficult. With respect to the focus
of this article, then, it takes the most serious and objective historian to make any
balanced sense of the complex and violent interactions between Native American and
Euro-American groups.
Another troublesome characteristic of scholarship in this field is a tendency to
speak in broad generalizations and oversimplified dichotomies, damaging historical
understanding of both the individual and the group in their complex interactions with
one another. On the group level, complex historical processes and events cannot be
broken down into simple binaries (e.g., ‘‘whites versus Indians’’). Patricia Limerick
argues that
Only in rare circumstances were the affairs we call ‘‘white–Indian wars’’ only matters of
whites against Indians. More often, Indians took part on both sides, tribe against tribe
or faction against faction, and whites sometimes played surprisingly peripheral roles in
the working out of relationships between and among Indian groups.71
Yet some scholars insist on framing historical conflicts in such simple terms.
For example, to provide a historical background for his arguments on contemporary
affairs, Robert Burnette offers a brief survey of 400 years of Euro–Indian relations.
In doing so, he suggests that all early Europeans were personified by the Puritan
leader Cotton Mather, labeling them ‘‘bloodthirsty missionaries,’’ while Native
Americans are grouped together and referred to collectively as ‘‘The Indian.’’72
Broad generalizations erase the historical intricacies of individual and group
interactions, dismissing the complexity not only of relations between various groups
of Native Americans and Europeans but also of relations between individuals.73
Conclusions
As peoples across the world struggle to understand and cope with tragedies in their
own histories, many look to similar cases from other time periods or other parts of the
world. Scholars, of course, do the same thing. By conducting comparative studies,
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scholars seek to further and deepen understanding of key events in history. This is
certainly true of those genocide scholars who engage in the comparative study of
genocide.
In surveys of modern history, the depopulation of America’s autochthonous peoples
offers an unparalleled variety of comparative examples. The diversity of situations,
events, and actors allows for valuable comparisons and contrasts.
If the historiography of one of the North American West’s most prominent
examples of possible genocide, the Sand Creek Massacre, is any indication of the state
of the field, it is obvious that in-depth and solid study of a host of single events is
critically needed; only with the benefit of such detailed studies will scholars be able to
carry out solid comparative studies. Beyond the Sand Creek Massacre, the history of
the North American West and the conflicts between the various empires, cultures, and
peoples offer a wealth of material for comparative research. Though such research is
not a simple task by any means, the possible results are well worth consideration and
further discussion.
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Hiding in Full View: The ‘‘Forgotten’’
Bushman Genocides of Namibia
Robert J. Gordon
Department of Anthropology, University of Vermont
This article examines the Bushman genocide of 1912–1915 which, despite
overwhelming evidence of its having occurred, has been largely ignored by both
scholars and the local population. It invokes the Durkheimian distinction between
necessary and sufficient conditions. Necessary conditions are akin to Marxian
notions of ‘‘primitive accumulation’’ or Weberian ‘‘booty capitalism,’’ but in
addition, the author emphasizes the demographics of the settlers, largely (aspiring)
middle-class single men, and suggests that notions of the Rechtsstaat—code-based
rather than case-based rule of law—represented an important, if not distinctive,
sufficient condition in facilitating genocide, especially in tandem with the
legitimation activities of turn-of-the-century scholars. The article concludes with
a brief examination of the ‘‘bureaucratization’’ thesis.
Keywords: colonial state formation, San, Germans, South Africans, demographics
In 1914, while the numerically superior and better armed South African forces were
invading German South West Africa, the seriously outmanned German commander,
Major Viktor Franke, had to send a company of sixty Schutztruppe (‘‘protection
troops’’) to the Grootfontein district to deal with troublesome Bushmen. The
unpublished journal/memoir of one of these troopers, Gunther Walbaum, provides
vivid documentation of what happened on these ‘‘Bushman patrols.’’ His commander
instructed him as follows: ‘‘I would be glad if you will not kill too many [Bushmen] if
possible. Only kill them when there is an attack, but use your own discretion.’’1
The banality of these hunts is obvious from Walbaum’s description:
After three kilometers we reached an open field where Jan [the guide] showed us to go
down. One kilometer in front of us some Bushmen were busy digging out uintjies
[tubers]. Now Jan did not want to walk in front anymore, because he did not want to
have anything to do with the shooting. We discussed our next step for a moment so that
we could encircle them. We had to sneak up to them like one does with game. On a sign,
we all got up with our guns ready to shoot. We were about fifty to seventy meters away
from them. The Bushmen stood in astonishment. When we approached them, ten
or twelve men ran away. Falckenburg and one of our natives shot two. Unfortunately,
I missed.2
Indeed, death was often preferable to capture:
Jonas [a prisoner] said he did not know Sus [a farm that had been raided recently by
Bushmen], well, he did not want to know Sus, but the women said they saw him as he
cut the boy’s heart out. [Note: This is not verified by court records.] The people were
asked how many people were involved and how many guns they had, as well as who had
killed the other [white] farmer. They said nothing. I hit them until the blood was
running down [in streams]. They behaved badly and said their brothers would kill us
all. I told them I would get them all. At night I tied each one naked to a tree. It was ice
cold and they stood far from the fire; they tried to untie themselves with their feet.
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The watchman hit them all over with a sjambock [hippo-hide whip]. At four o’clock in
the morning—the coldest time of the night—they started begging: ‘‘Mister, if you bring
us to the fire we will say everything.’’ I told them that they had to wait because I was
sure they were not mistreated enough.
At five o’clock we untied them. Jonas told us everything, but his bad behavior he did not
change. The woman stayed near the fire with her child during the night. All the men
had bad lacerations on their shoulders from trying to untie themselves by rubbing their
shoulders on the bark of the tree.
At eight o’clock we took the scoundrels to the bush where we found the right trees in no
time. A few boxes were piled up, ropes were tied onto branches—the men were put on
the boxes with their hands tied and ropes placed around their necks. We kicked
the boxes over and they were dead in seconds, because their necks were broken. All four
of them had burst veins in the lower leg after they died. In twenty minutes they were
dead. The women we took to Wiesental [a farm].3
One of the first orders of business of the newly installed South African
administration in 1915 was to ban ‘‘Bushman hunting.’’ The instructions of the
secretary for South-West Africa were explicit:
It is necessary in the interests of all to secure a truce and bring the belligerents back to
reason. The farmers must be told that shooting of Bushmen will no longer be permitted
and will be prosecuted with all the rigour of the law. The Bushmen must be informed in
like manner.4
But so traumatic was Bushman experience of German brutality that, three years after
the German defeat, the South African military magistrate of Grootfontein felt duty
bound to break protocol and write directly to the secretary of the Protectorate.
Magistrate Gage described how he encountered some Bushmen prisoners who
were trembling so much that I remarked on it to the Gaoler. Later they were brought
before him under an escort with fixed bayonets, and their terror was pitiful to
behold. . . . It is like catching a bird in your hand when you can see its heart throbbing
against its breast and you know that unless it is soon released it will die of sheer terror.5
Walbaum’s acts were not those of a few miscreants; they were systemic.
This article focuses on genocide in Namibia. Not the much-heralded, if
problematic, Herero genocide of 1904, but one that is more invidious because it has
effectively been made invisible and forgotten. While German mistreatment of the
Herero provoked a public outcry in Germany and Europe and led to large-scale
government reforms—moving the colonial apparatus from naked coercion to scientific
colonialism, epitomized by the founding of the Colonial Institute in Hamburg in 1908—
the genocide with which this article is concerned was hardly heeded, apart from one or
two isolated voices of protest. Indeed, so successful has this process of ‘‘invisibilization’’
been that even scholars with expertise on those labeled Bushmen or San, when
discussing the vulnerability of indigenous peoples to genocide, ignore this earlier
history.
Contemporary anthropologists specializing in the San6 have largely overlooked
the long history of denigratory academic involvement with those labeled ‘‘Bushmen.’’7
Even genocide scholars specializing in Namibia ignore the Bushman or San
case, ostensibly on the grounds that no one has done research on this issue.8
Popular histories of the destruction of tribal or indigenous peoples also seem to forget
this dark moment. Ironically, nowadays Bushmen themselves do not recall this
genocide.9
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This silence might have serious consequences. Recently the prominent and
influential Herero historian Dr. Zedekia Ngavirue weighed in on the debate about
Herero genocide and the claims for German reparations; he reportedly
dispelled the confusion of ‘‘other people’’ having suffered. He said it is true that the
numbers of Namas were reduced with some having been taken to countries like Togo
and Cameroon. He said it was equally true that some Damaras were on the side of
the Ovaherero and that some Oshiwambo fought on the side of the Ovaherero like
Chief Nehale ka Mpingana of Ondonga.
However, Ngavirue said the German army only issued the Genocide Order against the
Ovaherero, only Ovaherero land was confiscated wholesale and only Ovaherero leaders
were hanged. All these, he said, pointed out to a clear German agenda against
the Ovaherero.
He said the German government keeps referring to ‘‘others’’ to avoid facing
the Ovaherero squarely while purporting to acknowledge the atrocities inflicted on
the Ovaherero.10
It is not that the Bushman genocide in Namibia was unknown. Indeed, the
(in)famous 1918 Blue Book detailing Germany’s treatment of the indigenes made much
of it.11 Lawrence Green, a South African journalist who did much to create the popular
settler image of Namibia in his numerous books (which were reprinted many times and
carried such romantic titles as Lords of the Last Frontier and Where Men Still Dream)
frequently mentioned that Bushmen were shot on sight by the Germans;12 American
travelers such as Sidney Legendre and Negley Farson aver the same.13 German
settlers and travelers all acknowledged the genocidal actions. Lydia Ho¨pker,
reminiscing about her days as a farmer in the Grootfontein-Otavi area writes of a
neigbor, Frau Keller, showing her a Bushman child in her care, the result of a punitive
expedition against Bushmen that had killed many and taken numerous prisoners.
Ho¨pker includes a photograph of ‘‘captured Bushmen’’ in her book, and writes
that ‘‘orphaned Bushmen children were divided among German farmers wives
who cared for them and later used them as personal servants.’’14 In outer districts,
she avers, one could never be certain about one’s life when meeting Bushmen, who
hid and shot poisoned arrows at both whites and native shepherds; she then goes
on to detail numerous instances of settler paranoia concerning Bushman attacks,
including an experience of her own when her tea was ostensibly poisoned. Others
concurred.15
Ghosts in the Graveyard: Apparitions beyond the Limelight
Part of the reason for this invisibilization is precisely the narrow focus on the so-called
Herero Genocide, often touted as the ‘‘first genocide of the twentieth century’’ or the
‘‘first modern genocide.’’16 A closer examination shows that hostilities did not break out
in January 1904 and cease in 1907 but started in 1903 and petered out into continuous
police action that persisted right up to the South African invasion in 1915. This focus
has led to such a single-minded emphasis that events slightly out of focus are ignored.
This article is concerned with the turbulent wake or afterglow of the ‘‘official war.’’
This is where things get interesting, if not scary.
Once we remove that ethnocentric framing device called ‘‘the twentieth century,’’
it is obvious that the ‘‘Herero Genocide’’ had more in common with the late-nineteenth-
century colonial wars of annihilation—such as the Mashonaland wars of 1897 and
some of the ‘‘Zulu’’ wars17—or even with what was happening contemporaneously in
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the Belgian Congo and with the US invasion of the Philippines, than with the
classic defining genocides of the twentieth century. It was a defining moment in
Namibian history, however, insofar as it led to the transformation of a ‘‘weak’’
colonial state into a ‘‘strong’’ one, and it was under the latter, with its laws and
bureaucrats and pretensions to scientific colonial administration, that the machinery
was put in place for implementing genocide against ‘‘bandits’’ and other ‘‘forager’’
groups such as the so-called Bushmen. It was in the context of a Musterstaat
(‘‘model state’’), as Zimmerer18 felicitously calls it, that a lot of the dirty work of
genocide got done.
In Germany, some of the major objections to the war had been its high cost to
the German taxpayer and its destructive impact on the supply of cheap labor.19
Colonies had to be made to pay for themselves, which contributed directly to further
exploitation of indigenous peoples. To facilitate this economic self-sufficiency, decision-
making power gradually devolved from Berlin to the settlers. In 1909a Landesrat, an
advisory body consisting of fifteen elected and fifteen appointed members, was
established in Windhoek. The Landesrat had to jointly approve any regulations
concerning ‘‘Native Affairs.’’20 Horst Drechsler has famously termed the period after
the 1904–1907 war the ‘‘peace of the graveyard.’’21 Yet, for all the deathly silence of
historians on this age, it was a time when many ghosts were abroad. It was a period
of economic boom for the settlers. Diamonds were discovered in Luderitzbucht in 1908;
the fabulously rich Tsumeb copper mine was expanding, and the completion of
railroads leading to the mine made access much easier for settlers and entrepreneurs.
Between 1907 and 1911 the settler population almost doubled, from 7,110 to 13,962.22
Transfer of resources continued apace. Land placed under settlers’ control increased
from 4.4% of total landmass in 1903 to 13% in 1910. To put it differently, the number of
European farms increased from 458 farm units totaling 4.8 million hectares (mil ha) in
1904 to 1,331 farm units totaling 13.4mil ha in 1913. Settlers were also amassing
animal wealth: the number of cattle owned by Europeans increased from 52,531 in
1907 to 205,643 in 1913, while small stock under European ownership increased
from 208,480 to 1,011,697.23 While farmers and smallholders numbered only 1,390 in
1911, there were also some 2,572 artisans and miners; 1,035 merchants, shopkeepers,
and innkeepers; and slightly fewer than 900 civil servants.24
Both the mining industry and settlers demanded cheap labor, a rather scarce
commodity given the infamous Vernichtigungsbefehl (‘‘annihilation order’’) issued
by Lothar von Trotha in 1904. Indeed Moritz Bonn, a young liberal economist
who had gone out to South Africa in 1906 to field-test Hobson’s theory of imperialism
and subsequently made a three-month trip to explore conditions in Namibia,
complained that
though the country has regularly been called a white man’s country, most manual work
is carried out by native labour. . .. the real problem . . . has always been not only how to
find the white man to settle the country, but quite as much how to find coloured
labourers to support them when settled.25
So desperate were settlers for inexpensive labor that larger employers were forced to
recruit laborers from South Africa, while efforts to recruit labor from other German
colonies failed and importing Chinese and Indian labor was seriously considered.26
In such a situation, recruiting labor from Owamboland, an area to the north of
the Etosha Game Park, became a major priority. The number of Owambo contract
laborers tripled from about 4,000 in 1908 to 11,764 by 1914.27 These laborers, however,
had to traverse an area inhabited by San or Bushmen.
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The German administration did its utmost to facilitate the ‘‘internal’’ labor supply
as well, by way of a series of draconian Verordnungen (ordinances) issued by Governor
Friedrich von Lindequist in August 1907, which allowed for indigenous inhabitants to
be stripped of their property (largely land and livestock). Once they were deprived
of their ‘‘traditional livelihood,’’ it was assumed that they would be forced into
the colonial workforce. Indigenes had to apply to the governor for permission to
own livestock. Another set of regulations sought to control their movements through
‘‘pass laws’’: people were required to wear brass tokens around their necks, a central
register of natives was to be developed, and work contracts were regulated. Settlers
were given the right to engage in ‘‘fatherly chastisement’’ of their workers. Lastly, and
ominously for Bushmen, it was decreed that ‘‘natives who are loitering, may be
punished as vagrants, when they can show no means of support.28 These three sets
of regulations locked together in a mutually supporting way to forcibly incorporate
indigenous people into the settler-controlled economy. In September 1907, commenting
on the Eingeborenen-Verordnungen (‘‘Indigenous Ordinances’’), the Windhuker
Nachtrichten said,
The native must be made aware that he has a right to exist only in direct dependence
on the territorial authorities; without this, he is in a certain sense an outlaw: a
livelihood outside of working for whites is not available to him.29
Directly and indirectly, this legislation facilitated the genocide of a people whose
mode of existence was defined by the state as vagrancy or outlawry.
The bitter reality for settlers was that they were faced with a critical labor crisis of
their own making and had to make do with Bushman labor, no matter how
unsatisfactory they alleged it to be. By 1908 police and military patrols were rounding
up Bushmen and allocating them to farmers as laborers. The mines also required
labor: a military patrol from the Waterberg rounded up some fifty Bushmen in the
vicinity of Tsumeb and transferred them to the mines as laborers.30 In 1910, the Outjo
District Council decided that all Bushmen in the district should report for work, and,
ultimately, police succeeded in rounding up more than 100.31 Of the 2,829 Bushmen
enumerated in the 1912 Grootfontein census, some 997 were already listed as working
for settlers. Trooper Walbaum also observed that most of the farm laborers in the
district were Bushmen.
As part of the effort to implement these laws, the territory underwent
administrative re-organization and the formalization of the bureaucracy. The
number of administrative districts increased from six in 1903 to sixteen in 1914.
The establishment of a police zone in the north and a Sperrgebiet (‘‘prohibited area’’) in
the Namib Desert served to concentrate the settler population in the center of the
country. While the military was reduced in size from 3,988 in 1907/1908 to 1,970 in
1912, a police force was created in 1905 to fill the vacuum. In 1907 it consisted
of eighty-four Europeans at thirty-two stations;32 by 1913 the police force consisted of
at least twenty-eight sergeant majors, 532 Europeans, and 370 native police based
at 111 stations.33
Not only the significant expansion in European settlement after the official ending
of the 1904–1907 war but also the location of these settlers is important. One of the
magnet areas was the northeastern district of Grootfontein, where a higher rainfall
and many springs made the area attractive to smallholders. The extension of the
railway line to the nearby Tsumeb copper mine, with its ready market, further
served to enhance the area’s appeal for settlers and speculators. Of the various
towns and districts in Namibia, Grootfontein displayed the most rapid growth
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between 1911 and 1913. More telling, though, was the expansion of European farms in
the district, from twenty-five in 1904 to 173 in 1913, encompassing 777,077 ha.
The number of settler-owned cattle in the district increased from 7,600 in 1908 to
13,611 in 1912.34 Outjo District, lying directly adjacent to Grootfontein experienced a
similar expansion with some 431,125ha occupied by farms. This area was not terra
nullius but, rather, the traditional habitat of Bushmen. If police are stationed where
the trouble is, then these two districts were clearly the epicenter. By 1907 Grootfontein
already boasted the single largest contingent of police—some eighty-two personnel,
including one warrant officer and nine sergeants. In 1912 that dubious honor fell to
Outjo.35
These developments were indicative of, and led to, violence. As Stals points out, by
1910 the only real security problems for settlers in the colony were the Bondelswarts,
part of the legacy of the 1904–1907 war in the far south, and the Bushmen in the
north and east.36 A few murders of Owambo and German settlers by Bushmen led to
an outcry in the settler press. Headlines like ‘‘Bushman Pestilence,’’ ‘‘Bushman
Plague,’’ and ‘‘Bushman Danger’’ were common coinage. Powerful forces, namely the
Luderitzbucht Chamber of Mines and the various farmers’ organizations, called on the
government to act. Especially egregious to the mining industry was an attack on some
sixty-nine returning Owambo contract workers, which they felt would disrupt the
labor supply. Energetic disciplinary action was called for, thundered the Su¨dwest-
Zeitung, claiming that it was outrageous that two Bushmen armed with bows and
arrows could put to flight a group of thirty Owambo contract workers, with an obvious,
if unstated, impact on labor recruitment.37 Reinforcements and ‘‘mobile’’ police
stations were necessary.
Similarly, the Deutsche-Kolonialzeitung complained in of attacks on Owambo
migrant-contract laborers and reported that the Grootfontein District Council had, by
a large majority, voted to place non-working Bushmen on a reserve on the other side of
the Police Zone, an area beyond that recently occupied by European settlers.38
Captured Bushmen were to be sent to work in the diamond mines in Ludertizbucht.
These suggestions received a sympathetic hearing in the colonial press and among
officials.39
The supposedly liberal Governor Theodor Seitz, advised by Native Commissioner
Kurt Streitwolf, also a ‘‘liberal,’’40 opted for a strong-arm strategy, increasing the
number and power of police and military units in the troubled area and proclaiming,
inter alia,
1. When patrol officers of the police are searching Bushmen areas, breaking up
their settlements or searching for cattle thieves and robber bands, they must have
their weapons ready to fire at all times, using of course the utmost caution.
2. Firearms are to be used in the slightest case of insubordination against officials.
When a felon is either caught in the act, or when being hunted down, ‘‘does not stop
on command’’ but tries to escape through flight.
3. The native police servant who is accompanying or guiding a patrol may carry a
firearm, model 71 (Mauser rifle) with full responsibility in all areas where the
Bushmen live.
The way in which State officials are to act towards Bushmen is regulated by the
following rules. Even though it may be difficult, one should strive to keep the Bushmen
at work. Forced dislocation of a Bushman werft [encampment] may only take place
if they have been stealing stock or robbing or have attacked Europeans or their native
workers . . .
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If some of the male Bushmen who have been arrested are strong enough to work,
they should be handed over to the district authorities at Luderitzbucht to work in the
Diamond Fields.41
Seitz’s immediate subordinates felt that these draconian measures did not go
far enough. More specifically, the commander of the Schutztruppe felt that the
Verordnung was unsatisfactory because the term ‘‘felon’’ would raise problems;
he urged that the proclamation be amended to state that any Bushman who did not
stop on command could be shot. Since it was impossible to say from which werft
(loosely, ‘‘encampment’’_) the alleged culprit came, he said, ‘‘it was nearly futile not to
break up and arrest the members of all the settlements in the area where the patrol is
operating.’’ The district commandant of Outjo went even further: he wanted to include
women in the definition of Bushmen, as they ‘‘were just as dangerous.’’ Only one
district commandant, Beringar van Zastrow of Grootfontein, felt that Seitz’s measures
were too draconian, but even his protests were muted.
Given the broad interpretation of what constituted the ‘‘slightest case of
insubordination,’’ or even the Germans’ dubious linguistic capacity to tell Bushmen
to stop ‘‘on command’’ and the fact that it was common knowledge that Bushmen fled
at the sight of any patrol, this Verordnung constituted, in effect, as later events
were to show, a warrant for genocide. Insofar as it was crucial in providing a legal
underpinning for sustained purposeful action by officials and settlers to carry out a
policy referred to in the settler press and administration as ‘‘Ausrottung’’ (extermina-
tion), this was more than simply an episodic massacre or pogrom; it was embedded
within settler society. Of course, the creation of the United Nations Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was still several decades away
at the time of these events, but, like genocide scholar Helen Fein, I treat this as
a sociological genocide. All the facilitative characteristics for genocide were present—
deep structural divisions, identifiable victim groups, legitimating hate ideology and a
breakdown of moral restraints, and what we might call ‘‘audience obliviousness’’
(toleration by local, national, and international communities).42
Action was indeed thorough. The governor’s annual report for 1911–1912 notes
that in that year alone police, often supported by soldiers, undertook more than
400 Bushman patrols in the Grootfontein, Outjo, Rehoboth, and Maltahohe districts,
covering some 60,000 km2. Attempts at controlling vagrants, mostly Bushmen,
by issuing metal ‘‘dog tag’’ passes were so unsuccessful that settlers, the press, and
the Landesrat discussed the possibility of tattooing Bushman vagrants, but this
suggestion was dropped, largely because of ‘‘technical difficulties’’ and the possibility of
public outcry in Germany.43
Still, the ‘‘Bushman problem’’ did not go away. In April 1912, Seitz addressed the
Landesrat, acknowledging that there were still many difficulties because of robberies
committed by Bushmen in the Grootfontein, Outjo, and Maltahohe Districts and
that there was a need to further increase punishment.44 By early 1912, the area
west of the Etosha Pan had been ‘‘cleansed’’ of Bushmen and the police station at
Okakeujo reinforced with additional personnel. Attacks on Owambo migrant workers,
however, continued to such an extent that the Luderitzbucht Chamber of Mines
urgently requested the government to ‘‘please be so kind as to immediately
start with the sanitization of the Bushman hordes in that area.’’45 The Chamber
of Mines was supported by the Outjo district head, Dr. Schultze-Jena, who proposed
that all Bushmen in his district be forcibly removed to the coast. The
governor vetoed this suggestion, both because of the cost, which was estimated at
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between 50,000 and 60,000 marks per annum, and out of concern that such a strategy
might draw unwelcome public criticism in Germany; more specifically, there would be
a ‘‘very undesirable public discussion if natives who have not broken the law were to be
removed as prisoners to an area where the climate would kill many of them.’’46
The troops sent to deal with these raids found it almost impossible to control the
Bushmen, who could easily escape into the thick bush with its many hidden springs.
The only workable solution, the governor believed, was to provide military escorts
to Owambo workers.47
A short while later, the acting head of Grootfontein District, Otto Link, urgently
requested that the governor deport all the collected Bushmen to the Luderitzbucht
diamond fields. Moreover, he urged, the military should assist, as the police were too
few to undertake preventive patrols. Now was the time for raids against the Bushmen,
he felt, as they were congregated around waterholes for the winter prior to the rains. A
negative response from Windhoek did not stop Link from proposing the same total
deportation or ‘‘cleansing’’ policy for his district the very next year, in response to a
unanimous petition from the local Farmers Union, which begged the Kaiser to
undertake the ‘‘most stringent possible measures to end the present situation’’ because
life and possessions of farmers were in ‘‘high danger’’ from ‘‘every Bushman from the
Otjijita Mountains to Nurugas who are nomadic.’’48 This time the governor, angered by
the murder of two white settlers by Bushmen, agreed, and thirty additional troops
were seconded to deal specifically with the ‘‘Bushman danger.’’ A short while later,
Link reported that the Army’s 4th Company had managed to kill ten Bushmen and
capture thirty.49
Official documentation is suggestive about the atmosphere reigning in
Grootfontein settler circles. In a sworn deposition in a court case tried by the
South Africans, one Farmer Thomas averred,
In 1911 I had a fight with Bushmen. I shot one and wounded, I believe, three or four.
I was never tried by a German court for having shot these Bushmen. I have
accompanied the German police and troops when they used to hunt Bushmen but I do
not know how many Bushmen I shot then.50
In early 1915, Farmer K. Boehme of Kakuse West wrote to Governor Seitz
concerning the problem of labor and the ‘‘more burning question’’ of how to protect
settlers from Bushmen. Although he had given his Bushman laborers meat, they had
run away and then attempted to drive off livestock, but he and some Herero tracked
them for about 7km:
There we found a fire with five Bushmen sitting around it. Unfortunately, they ran
away too soon because of my dogs. But one was grabbed by my dogs and prevented from
fleeing. He then grabbed for his bow and arrows but was stopped by my twelve-year-old
Herero helper who called for help whereupon I fired. I recognized the corpse to my
astonishment as [illegible] the Bushman [illegible] who had been taken to Tsumeb
about three weeks ago. My two Herero assistants claimed to recognize all five Bushmen
[illegible]. . . . (Included a ca. seven-year-old) . . . I have repeatedly requested the
competent District Office to deport the Bushmen or to kill them off [abschiessen].
It seems that I will only get an answer to the Bushman question if I write directly to the
Imperial Government or to the Colonial Office.51
Boehme was friendly with another farmer, Karl Wilhelm Becker, who in 1916 was
charged with murder, having killed two male and four female Bushmen (two of them
children) when he surprised them eating his ox. He was accompanied by a farm
laborer, a Bushman named Max, who said he had ‘‘not reported the matter to the police
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because I was afraid the Boss would have killed me if I did so. I ran away when we got
to the house. I ran to the Sandveld because if I went towards the Police Station the
master might have found me on the road and shot me.’’ Becker openly boasted about
his Bushman-hunting exploits to the police. The South Africans found him guilty of
murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment, citing as mitigating circumstances
the fact that the German administration had condoned such killings.52
Captured Bushmen were usually deported to the coast to work in cold and damp
conditions at Swakopmund and Luderitzbucht, and sometimes in the mines at
Tsumeb.53 Hard statistics are difficult to come by, but some indicators are available.
A letter from the Grootfontein District secretary reports twenty-seven Bushman men,
twenty-four women, and twenty-four children captured. Of these, twelve men, two
children, and two women were being sent to Swakopmund. The women were wives of
men killed in skirmishes with troops, and it was assumed that they would hate settlers
and perpetuate acts of brigandage. One survey of Bushman prisoners in Swakopmund
lists thirty-two, of whom fifteen died within a year.54
Booty Capitalism
Karl Marx, of course, called this process of accumulation by dispossession ‘‘primitive
accumulation.’’ Noting the contemporary ubiquity of ‘‘primitive accumulation,’’ , David
Harvey prefers the term ‘‘accumulation by dispossession.’’55 Max Weber was also
concerned with social processes of this nature, which he termed ‘‘booty capitalism’’
or ‘‘adventure capitalism,’’ a rather daring and ruthless predatory form of capitalism in
which profit is made possible by direct force or domination. It was, said Weber, a
largely unethical capitalism, inspired by the ‘‘inner attitude of the adventurer, which
laughs at all ethical limitations. . . . Absolute and conscious ruthlessness in acquisition
has often stood in the closest connection with the strictest conformity to tradition.’’56
A characteristic emphasized by neither Marx nor Weber—nor, indeed, most
works on colonial genocide—concerns demographics.57 In such booty-capitalist or
‘‘primitive accumulative’’ moments, there is typically a severe gender imbalance.
Men overwhelmingly predominate. Leaving aside the sizeable male military presence
in German South West Africa in 1912, there were 9,046 adult male Europeans over
fifteen, of whom only 2,438 were married. Of those claiming to be married, 1,970 had
European wives living with them, 421 claimed absentee European wives, and forty-
seven were married to ‘‘coloreds.’’58 Immediately before World War I, settler gender
balance reached its most equitable, with one woman for every five men.59
During this period, there were five factors relevant to a proclivity to violence,
factors that, in certain combinations, can produce a lethal cocktail for potential
violence, including genocidal violence. First, and most importantly, as David
Courtwright has shown, wherever there are large concentrations of single men,
violence in its various manifestations is endemic.60 Colonial writers often took a
certain pride in the violent colonial ethos.61 Violence was both action and attitude.
After a visit to Luderitzbucht, prospector Fred Cornell described the treatment
of Herero and Nama prisoners:
I had seen something of this myself, and had heard more from ex-German soldiers
themselves, who with extraordinary callousness used to show whole series of illustrated
postcards, depicting wholesale executions and similar gruesome doings to death of these
poor natives. One of these, that enjoyed great vogue at the time, showed a line of ten
Hottentots dangling from a single gallows. And each and every German soldier in the
photo was striking an attitude and smirking towards the camera in pleasurable
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anticipation of the fine figure he would cut when the photo was published.
This, I repeat, was only one of many that enjoyed a big sale in German South-West
for the delectation of admiring friends in the Father-land. Absolutely no mercy was
shown to these unfortunate creatures . . .62
Such everyday visual acceptance—and, indeed, active encouragement—to treat the
other as decidedly inferior was an important factor in creating and sustaining the local
Zeitgeist in which genocide could occur.
The second factor relates to sex. Some contemporary accounts estimate that 90% of
all white men lived in so-called concubinage relationships; while such relationships
might have dampened disorder and violence, it was government policy to actively
discourage them, especially after 1904.63 At the same time, such relationships
precipitated violence. The first South African military magistrate in the Grootfontein
District admitted, ‘‘It seems that the Bushmen have lost all faith in the white man’s
methods [of justice], more especially as their women were being constantly interfered
with by both farmers and police.’’64 Major T.L. O’Reilly, the military magistrate who
drafted the Blue Book on Germany’s treatment of the natives, concluded that, based
on evidence from missionaries and German officials and statements by natives,
‘‘The chief cause of all the trouble between Germans and Bushmen was that the
Germans would persist in taking the Bushwomen from their husbands and using them
as concubines.’’65 He also cited Johannes Kruger, described as ‘‘an intelligent Cape
Bastard,’’ who in 1895 was appointed by Governor Leutwein as ‘‘Chief of the natives of
Grootfontein,’’ as claiming that ‘‘the whole district is full of these German-Bushwomen
cross-breeds.’’66 This, in turn, generated fears of Bushman ‘‘Retribution,’’ which
settlers believed was best pre-empted by killing.
A third factor relating to the demographic imbalance concerns alcohol, the misuse
of which is generally a valid indicator of social disorder. Alcohol consumption among
settlers was striking. In 1903, of the 167 firms and companies licensed in the
Schutzgebiet, one-third were involved with the alcohol trade. By 1913, there was one
commercial drinking establishment for every seventy-eight Europeans; Windhoek,
with a population of 500 Europeans, had fourteen public bars—approximately one bar
for every forty-one settlers.67 Tellingly, there was some criticism of settlers’ excessive
alcohol consumption, especially from the so-called moral purity movements in
Germany.68 A Dr. Warneck, for example, complained that beer consumption in the
Schutzgebiet was 50% higher than in Germany.69 Others noted complaints that
farmers would consume champagne for any slight occasion, despite having to pay
twenty marks for a bottle; they drank it like soda water and called it ‘‘Farmer
Weisse.’’70 Discussing unsuccessful horticultural smallholders, Clara Brockmann
suggested that many failed not only because of ‘‘inactivity’’ and ‘‘stubbornness’’ but
also as a result of ‘‘playing the great gentleman’’ and ‘‘drinking themselves to ruin by
buying rounds of champagne.’’71 Alcohol numbs the sense of bourgeois decency;
the breakdown of ‘‘moral restraints’’ in facilitating mass killing is well known, and
excessive alcohol consumption is generally associated with such breakdowns.72
Fourth, the socioeconomic background of all these rather virile male settlers
needs to be considered. This is important, given Weber’s insight about
the connection between adventure capitalism and its ‘‘closest connection with the
strictest conformity to tradition.’’ Recalling his visit to the Schutzgebiet, Moritz Bonn
observed,
In South-West Africa, we have created a kind of manorial system with a European
lord of the manor and an African serf. . . . You quickly drift into European problems . . .
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but whatever you do on African soil will always be merely ‘‘semi-European.’’
The democracies you create are not a people, but merely a class, whose progress,
existence and safety depends on the services of a subject race which they cannot
amalgamate, but which they must rule. There lies . . . the labour foundation of the
African society.73
Most of the junior officials Bonn encountered
were scions of the Prussian nobility who had not learned much and who were suspicious
of every kind of learning. They had come out to Africa because it offered them a chance
of bossing on a scale no longer available even in darkest Pomerania.74
The Schutztruppe contained a high proportion of officers descended from distinguished
military families,75 and their legacy lives on in the form of the fake Rhenish castles and
massive monuments that are so popular with tourists nowadays. Even the
missionaries Bonn found disappointing: ‘‘Their small-town minds had been trained
in that docile obedience which was a distinctive feature of German Lutheranism; they
did not dare to stand up for the rights of the natives or even for their own work.’’76 This
mindset of arrogance combined with unquestioning acceptance of orders, or of the
dictates of science, helped facilitate the exercise of killing people defined as ‘‘lesser,’’
whether for the purposes of massacre or of genocide.
The fifth consequence of the demographics of settler society, as Courtwright
suggests, concerns the important role of widespread rumors.77 Rumors were especially
apt to generate insecurity when the settlers were thinly scattered on the ground.
Paranoia was widely recognized. As Walbaum’s commander advised, ‘‘The people out
there will have some gruesome stories to tell you, but only half of them are true.’’78
Undoubtedly the situation bred a remarkable paranoia. Indeed, Jan-Bart Gewald sees
paranoia as a major factor leading to the German–Herero War, and Isobel Hull reports
that even General von Trotha suffered from fantasies in which he doubted the
magnitude of the dying and believed that the Herero had simply vanished and would
return to fight.79 Paranoia manifests and infiltrates the business of living in various
subtle ways. While the laws were draconian, their effectiveness was constantly
doubted, and attempts to ensure more regularization through the plethora of rules
and regulations controlling indigenes served only to exacerbate the situation.80
The administration soon realized this:
[I]t will frequently be found that natives who are actually vagrants are in possession of
registration badges, these are obtained from other natives or stolen. Care should
therefore be taken that proper proof of employment is produced and that the native is in
possession of his own registration badge.81
The colonial wars in Namibia between 1903 and 1907 were subject to extensive
media scrutiny,82 at least in the early stages, or until the conflict began to drag out into
a long and costly low-intensity guerrilla war, largely in the south and in the northeast.
Abuses by settlers and officials led to sufficient public outcry that the Social Democrats
and the various Catholic parties in the Reichstag were able to impose some controls on
colonial affairs. Colonizers became acutely conscious that their actions were subject to
careful scrutiny and criticism in the metropole. Comments like those made in 1906
by one Dr. Schaedler in the Reichstag obviously had an impact on settlers:
The story of our colonies contains a whole series of events of a not too pleasant kind;
embezzlements, falsifying of evidence, senseless cruelties, assaults on women, horrible
ill-treatment—things that do not contribute to a laurel wreath. The colonies must be no
dumping ground for second-rate people.83
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Fear of criticism influenced how they treated strangers who might be critical.
Bonn, for example, found that on his 1907 visit, officials and many settlers refused to
assist him in his inquiries until he threatened to make their lack of cooperation a
matter of public record.84 Settlers and officials had reason to be suspicious of meddling
metropolitan types because of the claims made in the Reichstag by one of its leading
members, August Bebel, in 1905 to the effect that it was difficult for people to send
unpopular reports to Europe and Germany about the administration there because if it
became known who the individual was, ‘‘his entire existence is placed in jeopardy.’’85
Similarly, for economic reasons, colonial civil servants, unlike their metropolitan
counterparts, lacked tenure and thus were discouraged from questioning or taking
a stand against abuses, and from criticizing their superiors, by the fear of losing
their jobs.86
The Musterstaat as Ceremonial State
The situation in German South-West Africa was rife with contradictions. Settlers
hated the indigenes yet depended on them; they disliked the government but relied
heavily on it. In such circumstances, there was a strong emphasis—indeed, some
visitors felt, an overemphasis—on ritual and ceremonialism. On a 1913 visit, South
African anthropologist A. Winifred Hoernle complained, ‘‘It is awkward having
anything to do with the Germans because rank counts so much and one can’t get to
the individual direct.’’87 Excessive formality can disguise many features, including
ignorance. The Weltanschauung of such persona, I suggest, had two important
consequences. First, it produced an excessive reliance on the letter of the law; second,
it meant that the words of academics and scholars carried a certain, often exaggerated,
authority. Both were crucial factors in the Bushman genocide.
Ritual plays a crucial role both in coping with uncertainty and insecurity at
the individual level and in state formation at the collective level. The casual observer
of colonial photographs88 is struck by the immense time, money, and effort spent on
secular ritual. Many have argued that inculcating awe and respect for the colonizer
was more important than force as a means of ruling, and here ‘‘invented traditions,’’
such as commemorative events, frequently justified by monuments, were especially
important. Certainly they were deployed for such purposes in Namibia, given the
fractured and politically divisive nature of the Namibian settler community. While
Helmust Bley is undoubtedly correct in noting their emotional and political impact
upon indigenes,89 my concern here is to note their impact on the colonials as well.
Often ignored but crucial were the day-to-day rituals, and, indeed, this was where
natives experienced the state. There was a veritable industry for socializing intending
settlers, which covered the gamut from Handbucher fu¨r Auswanderungslustige
(handbooks for those intending to travel abroad) to special schools in Germany, and
‘‘proper’’ interracial etiquette featured prominently.90 Laws underwrote seemingly
trivial daily interaction rituals of subordination for indigenes, such as prohibiting
indigenes from walking on sidewalks and forcing them to greet settlers respectfully
and not to make loud noises. Laws also reinforced certain stereotypes. Consider the
va¨terliches Zu¨chtigungsrecht, the law of paternal chastisement. This meshed well
with the notion that indigenes were like dependent children who had to be disciplined
in order to become well brought up, a notion lent added credence by the fact that in
Germany corporal punishment was allowed only in schools and in the home.
Given the shortage of personnel to enforce compliance, interaction rituals between
colonizer and colonized took on an added dimension. The colonial situation calls forth
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exaggerated etiquette from both colonizer and colonized. According to Albert Memmi,
‘‘formalism is the cyst into which colonial society shuts itself and hardens, degrading
its own life in order to save it. It is a spontaneous action of self-defense, a means of
safeguarding the collective consciousness.’’91 Memmi has noted the profound
ambivalence that permeates the colonial project: How could the colonizer look
after his workers while periodically gunning down a crowd of the colonized? For
the colonizer, to think about the contradictions inherent in colonialism was
to undermine it. The panoply of legislation and the activities of scholars represented
a mechanism for the colonizers to grant themselves self-absolution.
This image of a smoothly functioning social order creates the capacity for fascist
self-delusion. As Erving Goffman has noted:
A performer may be taken in by his own act, convinced at the moment that the
impression of reality which he fosters is the one and only reality. In such cases
the performer comes to be his own audience; he comes to be performer and observer of
the same show. Presumably he intracepts or incorporates the standards he attempts to
maintain in the presence of others so that his conscience requires him to act in a socially
proper way. It will have been necessary for the individual in his performing capacity to
conceal from himself in his audience capacity the discreditable facts he has had to learn
about the performance; in everyday terms, there will be things he knows, or has known,
that he will not be able to tell himself.92
Recht Machen mit Rechtsstaat (Making Right with a Rechtsstaat)
Settlement involves not only physical movement but also a psychic domain: angst and
other anxieties must be allayed for settlers to be settled. Law is crucial in this
operation, creating what Ju¨rgen Habermas has termed ‘‘facticity.’’93 Settlers, while in
a position of domination, suffer the unbearable powerlessness of ‘‘waiting’’94 and
seek to stabilize their situation through the magical use of law. As an ideology, law
contributes to the social construction of the social world by creating images of social
relationships as natural and fair to the settlers because they are endowed with
legality.
The emphasis on the instrumentality of legislation has diverted attention from the
contradictions inherent in it. We must look not only at what the law says but also
at what it does. In particular, the cultural and attendant ‘‘moral’’ meanings of this
legislation have been ignored. The 1907 Native Regulations were important for the
settlers not only on an instrumental level but also on a symbolic level. For the first
time, the distinction between ‘‘whites’’ and ‘‘indigenes’’ was legally recognized,95 and
thus the issue of sovereignty was touched upon. Sovereignty is not about determining
the law but about determining who is exempt from it, as Giorgio Agamben has
argued.96 But there are two types of exemptions: first, those whereby those with power
can ignore the law and foist their will upon the less powerful; and, second, those
whereby the vulnerable and less powerful are defined as beyond the law, as Vogelfrei
(literally, ‘‘free birds’’). The latter is obvious, if frequently overlooked, in von Trotha’s
infamous ‘‘extermination order,’’ the very first sentence of which is ‘‘you have ceased to
be German subjects’’—the implication being that, as non–German subjects, they are
beyond the realm and protection of German law. This idea meshed well with the
German jurisprudential notion of Rechtsstaat (roughly translated as ‘‘constitutional
state’’), which, essentially, makes everyone equal who is subjugated by the same
law within the bounds of the state. According to the Native Regulations, indigenes
without labor contracts were without legal rights and could be punished as vagrants.
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It also validated the ability of settlers to engage in private policing. The Musterstaat
survived by franchising its legal use of violence to its settlers.
Authorization or legality displaced legitimacy as a key concern. In the
Schutzgebiet, as in apartheid South Africa, oppression occurred not so much through
terror per se as by the routinization of terror in day-to-day interaction. ‘‘Lumping it’’
(ignoring the state officials) or ‘‘redressive self-help’’ (do-it-yourself justice) were
apparently common settler strategies on the outlying farms, especially in the
Grootfontein and Outjo Districts.97 Indeed, these strategies led to a sub-genre of
German colonial literature, epitomized most notably by Hans Grimm, author of the
influential Nazi-era bestseller Volk ohne Raum (‘‘A People without Space’’). Such
misguided settler self-help was not seen as mistreatment but justified as ‘‘discipline’’
(Zu¨chtigung).
Another level at which the Rechtsstaat played a role was the quality of the formal
judicial structure. Even while en route to Swakopmund from Germany, General von
Trotha issued orders empowering every commanding officer to suspend preliminary
judicial proceedings and to shoot any enemy. Other ‘‘colored’’ inhabitants, if suspected,
were to be tried by field courts.98
In 1912 a Dr. Mu¨ller complained in the Reichstag,
Our civil and military administration of justice is simply indefensible. . .. With regard to
native justice and administration there exists an incredible uncertainty concerning the
powers of the administrative authorities. . . . One judge uses the German penal code
without further ado. . . . Another does not use the penal code at all. In short, our criminal
proceedings leave the natives entirely without rights.99
The courts were lenient when forced to take action against settlers for killing
indigenes; homicides were invariably justified as ‘‘accidental’’ or as necessary for
‘‘public safety.’’100 Settlers frequently justified their own actions and mistreatment of
indigenes by referring to the actions of von Trotha and other (quasi-)legal officials.
In Namibia, Harry Schwirck concludes, ‘‘a whole legal discourse and law itself enabled
rather than restrained colonial abuse.’’101
Bleibt da etwas anderes ubrig als Erschiessen? Soft alternatives
to genocide?
The infamous 1911 Verordnungen were not the result of a unanimous decision. Rather,
policy makers had to accommodate different stakeholders, and the results must be
seen as part of a larger policy debate about the ‘‘Bushman Danger,’’ which drew upon
historical and ‘‘scientific precedent’’ and which produced three options in addition
to direct extermination. The first of these involved ‘‘cleansing’’ the area by deporting
captured Bushmen to the coast or driving them into the vast sandy waterless area to
the northeast of Grootfontein, known as the Kaukauveldt (an area deemed unsuitable
for European settlement). This was the option favored by many settlers. A second
option was to ‘‘civilize’’ Bushmen by habituating them to work. This option was given
lip service by occasional settlers but did not form part of settler ideology; on the
contrary, settlesr were very suspicious of attempts to link education with labor
laws.102The main proponents of this option appear to have been missionaries and some
humanitarian-oriented officials. The third option was the creation of special
‘‘reserves’’—what were known in Europe as ‘‘ghettoes’’—for Bushmen. In a sense,
this was a compromise favored by officials as a way to circumvent criticism from the
metropole, even though most believed it to be unworkable, given the Bushmen’s
alleged inherent Wanderlust.
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The reserve option was given official credence in a memorandum drafted by
Dr. Seibert, the government’s chief medical officer:
[Bushmen] are unsuitable as settled employees, and the relinquishment of their
nomadic lifestyle spells their doom. While they are of little economic value, they are
of large scientific value. And even the Cameroons have a law, which protects gorillas
by placing them in reserves.103
Copies of Seibert’s letter were sent to all the relevant district heads for comment;
all the comments were negative, with the notable exception of those of Beringar von
Zastrow, the Grootfontein Bezirkamtmann (district head), in this case supported by
the farmer-dominated Grootfontein District Council, which had requested that all
‘‘non-working’’ (?!) Bushmen be placed on a reserve. Von Zastrow felt that the area
northeast of Grootfonetin, beyond the police zone (an area settlers could only enter
with special permits), already constituted a de facto reserve. Objections raised by the
other Bezirkamtma¨nner included the following: that reservations would lead to a
concentration of stock thieves and vagabonds; that it was impossible to keep the
Bushmen within a demarcated area; that the landscape would be damanged through
their hunting methods and veldt-fires; and that this policy would hinder efforts to
educate ‘‘Bushmen through labor.’’ The Maltaho¨he Bezirkamtmann characteristically
replied that it was debatable whether there were any full-blooded Bushmen left, and a
reserve would simply be a hiding place for runaway servants. Bushmen had excellent
potential to serve as herd-boys. He concluded that
[a] wild animal (or gorilla) can be held captive for breeding in which case the race would
not become extinct by the process of natural selection. It is not possible to hold a
Namib Bushman captive because they are still human beings, but they have no pride
in their race, in fact they are without racial consciousness.104
His Outjo colleague argued that the scientific value of the Bushmen was minor
compared to the security threat they posed to Owambo contract workers and white
settlers.
The notion of a reserve was first mooted in 1906, when the prominent Berlin
ethnologist Felix von Luschan suggested the creation of a South African Bushman
reserve in the ‘‘interest of science.’’105 The Deutsche Kolonialzeitung took up the theme,
arguing that the suggestion was also applicable to Namibia.106 The Kalahari was the
last asylum of the ‘‘vertreibenen Ureinwohner [expelled Aboriginals].’’ The following
year, Lt. P. Gentz, an officer with many years’ field experience, made a strong plea:
With the death-knell of these people ringing, one wishes that there was a reserve for
them, as there are for the lazy Herero and Hottentots. A reserve where they can live
in peace and where they can maintain their lifestyle so important for scholarly
research.107
Most officials with experience in Grootfontein, including von Zastrow and
Hauptmann Mu¨ller, felt that a Bushman reserve already existed, created by the
Bushmen themselves, in the Kaukauveld, but that forcibly moving Bushmen there was
problematic not for ethical or ethnographic reasons, such as infringing on the territory
of others, but—as Mu¨ller put it in 1912—because ‘‘I have never heard of anyone being
successful at driving jackals before dogs.’’108
At present, data are scanty, but it is surely more than coincidental that, at the time
when missionary Heinrich Vedder of the Rhenish Missionary Society and von Zastrow
the Grootfontein Bezirkamtmann were expressing concern about the wholesale
decimation of Bushmen, Reinhard Mumm, a leader of the Moral Purity Movement
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and recently elected member of the Reichstag, made an eloquent plea for a reserve for
the ‘‘poorest of the poor . . . the slaves of the slaves.’’ Bushmen, he claimed, were a
product of a tragic history, dispossessed by farmers and railroad companies and
riddled with venereal disease. As a reserve, Mumm suggested the area stretching from
the Grootfontein farms to the Kavango River. He repeated his call for a Bushman
reserve in 1914.109 While Mumm’s plea did not have much impact, it is clear that there
was an important information network linking the colony to the metropole.
The issue of whether Bushmen could be ‘‘habituated’’ to work also provoked much
discussion among academics. The academic who provided the immediate reference
point for the debate was the geographer Siegfried Passarge who, in 1907, published a
compilation of his contributions to theMitteilungen aus des deutsches Schutzgebiets as
a book. His research was based on a sojourn of a few months in the Kalahari on an
expedition led by Lord Lugard and accompanied by a Dutch-speaking Bushman. Most
of his information was derived from white traders or Bechuanas, since he found it
difficult to get information directly from Bushmen: ‘‘Nothing is more changeable,
undependable, and unpredictable than the character of the Bushman; it combines
within itself the greatest imaginable contrasts, virtues, and vices.’’110 As a race,
Bushmen were on a closed development path, he claimed; they were incapable of
adapting to agriculture or pastoralism. Passarge concluded that the only viable policy,
in a settlement situation, was extermination:
What can the civilized human manage to do with people who stand at the level of that
sheep stealer? Jail and the correctional house would be a reward, and besides do not
even exist in that country. Does any possibility exist other than shooting them?111
Passarge’s efforts were sufficient to get him appointed, in 1908, to the inaugural Chair
of Geography at the Hamburger Kolonial-Institut, the only geography department
devoted solely to colonial geography.
Franz Seiner, an Austrian geographer, also participated in this discussion.
He argued that adult male Bushmen were incorrigible, and thus best deported from
the area where captured. The way to make Bushmen into reliable laborers was to start
with the children and re-socialize them from an early age, divorced from their
traditional milieu and from their parents. Bushmen were in no danger of extermina-
tion by farmers, he argued, because they had a vast ‘‘natural reserve’’ in the Kalahari.
At the same time, Seiner felt that if women were placed on settler farms they would
begin miscegenating with local blacks, leading to an overall superior labor force. He
suggested that all the northern Bushmen—that is, those north of Grootfontein—were
‘‘Bastard Bushmen’’ (hybrids), and thus not an Urrace worthy of protection.112
In reality, as Lydia Ho¨pker’s memoir attests, all these options were being practiced
simulanteously. Bushmen were hunted, shot, and driven out of their areas, and their
children were press-ganged into serving as cheap labor for farmers. Many officials
used the belief that the Bushmen were already a ‘‘Bastard race’’ to argue against any
need to ‘‘preserve’’ them.
Seiner’s and Passarge’s were not isolated academic voices. On the contrary, we
should consider, for example, the remarks made by Leonard Schultze, a renowned
geographer-anthropologist with extensive field experience in both Namibia and
New Guinea. Schultze’s study of the Nama113 is widely regarded as definitive, and
he coined the term ‘‘Khoisan,’’ which lumps ‘‘Bushmen’’ and ‘‘Khoi’’(or Nama) together.
Schultze undertook his research in Namibia during the notorious wars of 1904–1907.
He profusely acknowledged the assistance given by General von Trotha, lauded as a
fellow Naturforscher (natural scientist). Indeed, Schultze accompanied the German
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troops in their last great flanking movement, which led to the death of Nama leader
Hendrik Witbooi, and then accompanied Hauptmann Ludwig von Estorff in his famous
tracking expedition, which pursued fleeing Nama and their allies to Rietfontein in the
southern Kalahari. Obviously the war situation restricted his travels, and his research
was carried out only in a small part of southern Namibia. The sample on which his
famous classification is based was neither random nor large; it consisted of measuring
twenty-six people in Walvis Bay and the rest, some fifty prisoners, almost exclusively
in Keetmanshoop. Schultze measured some ninety characteristics, including such
arcana as breast circumference, while the genitalia of his twelve female subjects
enjoyed special emphasis. Six people measured in southern Botswana (Lehututu or
Letlake Pan), together with three Namib Bushmen, constituted the ‘‘Bushman’’
sample. Given what we know about naming practices and theories of the time, it seems
likely that his ‘‘Bushmen’’ were impoverished ‘‘Nama,’’ and thus his new term simply
reinforced conventional dogma.114 There was economic value in such ‘‘lumping.’’ A few
years after undertaking fieldwork that led to this formulation, he inveighed as follows:
The ethnologist may lament the fact that a portion of humanity with such strongly
developed characteristics as displayed by the tribes of German South West Africa . . .
will one day become wholly melted down in order to be put into circulation again as
common day labor coin, stamped with the imperial eagle and the Christian cross, with
the inscription ‘‘colored laborer,’’ to constitute an economic value. But the struggle for
our own existence allows no other solution. At the same time, work is the only solution
for them: he who doesn’t want to work perishes here with us as well; we have no reason
to be more sentimental in Africa than in Europe. We who build our houses on the graves
of those races must, however, take twice as seriously our obligation to avoid
no sacrifices for the purposes of civilization, that is, for the greater development of
all means of existence in this new land.115
Given such a Weltanschauung, Schultze’s views on Bushmen are not surprising.
He considered them the lowest of the low:
If we consider the natives according to their value as cultural factors in the
protectorate, then one race is immediately eliminated: the Bushmen. The Bushman
lacks entirely the precondition of any cultural development: the drive to create something
beyond everyday needs, to secure or permanently to improve systematically the
conditions of existence, even the most primitive ones like the procurement of food. In
the course of centuries he has come into contact with cultures of all levels; in conflict
with them he has often enough had the knife put to his throat; tireless missionaries
have attempted to save him from such struggle, to protect and to join him as the modest
member to a civilized community; but the Bushman has always run away. He feels
better out in the Sandveld behind a windscreen of thin-leaf thornbush than in a solidly
built house with a full pot and regular work—as long as he is free. Colonists cannot
count on such people; they let them live as long as at least they do no damage. But when
they do not fulfill this requirement, they have been killed off like predatory game. The
idea has been considered to preserve the Bushmen in reservations as the last remnants
of the primordial past of the human race, just as elsewhere attempts are made to save
endangered animal species. But we will not be able to afford the luxury of leaving fallow
the required land areas and everything else which man requires for the maintenance of
the species without inbreeding.116
Even scholars defined as ‘‘liberal’ supported this view. Paul Rohrbach, for example,
suggested that ‘‘in Africa the extermination or the decay of the natives is impossible,
excepting perhaps the few Bushmen in the southwest who at present are giving us
serious trouble.’’117 To be sure, there was some criticism of this position from the
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slightly more liberal anthropologists centered around the Zeitschrift fu¨r Ethnologie in
Berlin, who in 1914 published von Zastrow’s 1912 memorandum dismissing proposals
calling for ‘‘shooting or deporting whole tribes as so absurd as not to deserve any
consideration’’118 and opted instead for economic integration and education. But this
was decidedly a minority view. More typical was George McCall Theal, the leading
South African historian, who carefully studied the available evidence and concluded
in 1919,
It can now be asserted in positive language that the Bushmen were incapable of
adopting European civilization. . .. To this day there has not been a single instance of a
Bushman of pure blood having permanently adopted the habits of the white man.119
The relative importance of science and the practice of science in Germany vis-a`-vis
other colonial powers should be noted. German anthropology dominated its English
and French counterparts; as early as 1885, von Luschan could already boast that the
‘‘Berlin collection is seven times as big as the ethnographic department of the British
Museum.’’ As late as 1920, with Germany stripped of its colonial possessions,
the Berlin Gesellschaft fu¨r Anthropologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte had more
members than the Royal Anthropological Institute and the American Anthropological
Association combined. Even smaller German societies outdrew their British and US
counterparts. In 1906, the Vienna Anthropological Society, for example, could claim
459 members.120 Given the mandarinate nature of German academe, this meant in
practice that academic and scientific pronouncements enjoyed a much wider currency
and authority in Germany than in the other metropolitan centers. Even critics
of colonialism, such as Moritz Bonn, conceded that German scientific colonialism was
more advanced than the British or French versions. It is within this context that one
can appreciate von Luschan’s claim that he was ‘‘entirely convinced that our late war
in South-West Africa might have been avoided, and that it was simply the result of
neglect of the teachings of ethnology on the part of leading officials.’’121
Certainly officials took scholars seriously. In November 1912, Franz Seiner wrote a
letter concerning Bushman prisoners to the colonial secretary and enclosed photo-
graphs to illustrate his point about their mistreatment. His letter was forwarded
to Governor Seitz for comment. Ten months later, after investigating the matter,
the governor replied that he had no doubt that, if published, Seiner’s photographs
would provide ‘‘unpleasant agitation material against the Territorial administration.’’
He then added, in a trope familiar to science, that
a more objective view of the situation must take into account the fact that the Bushmen
are by no means only harmless children of nature, but constitute a serious danger to
more intensive settlement of the fertile northern districts. Weakness cannot therefore
be justified by any means in the treatment of the Bushmen.122
These photographs are important—indeed, damning—for what is not discussed in the
resulting correspondence. Two of the prisoners have amputated arms; this was a
common way of dealing with Bushman ‘‘theft,’’ yet neither then nor later did such
practices merit discussion, let alone criticism.123
While sweating at their uneconomical smallholdings in the Grootfontein district,
many inexperienced and underfinanced settlers projected their wildest fantasies upon
the ‘‘vagabond Bushmen,’’ and their fantasies often meshed with those of academics.
The same can be seen in the numerous reports written by officers and officials that
were published in quasi-academic journals. With the exception of Seiner, the scholars
whose material and ideas were so eagerly read and used by officials and settlers were
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not in Namibia during the period when these Bushmen ‘‘hunts’’ were carried out.
They were still involved in Bushman issues, but they seem to have been exclusively
concerned with Bushman penises! A major question troubling some of the finest
scholars was how to distinguish between ‘‘Bushmen’’ and ‘‘Hottentots.’’ Craniometrical
differences between the two were insignificant, and thus the issue had to be resolved
by other means. Within a few years the focus had shifted to penises as the
differentiating trait. Especially influential were Seiner’s research on and photographs
of Bushman prisoners; Seiner argued that the semi-erect penis of the Bushman was a
distinctive racial characteristic and that Bushmen could be identified by the angle of
the penis: ‘‘Exceptionally interesting is the circumstance that Bushmen do not have
pendular penises like the other human races, but are in non-aroused circumstances
horizontal like four-footed mammals.’’124
So intense was the debate over the Bushman/Hottentot distinction that Eugen
Fischer, later to achieve a certain notoriety in Nazi Germany, wrote to Governor Seitz
in 1913 requesting a Bushman penis. His letter contains detailed instructions about
how to preserve the organ and the suggestion that if the governor had a condemned
Bushman, the prisoner could be sent to Freiburg, where the cold climate would soon
kill him and the good professor would have a fresh cadaver to work on. Bushmen’s
genitalia seem to have transfixed many physical anthropologists, and this fascination
continued to be a popular trope in German physical anthropology. Fischer, too,
associated the genitalia of Bushmen with attributed animality. Genitalia were seen as
clinching their intercalary role between humans and animals—a belief that lasted into
the 1950s.125
Seiner appears to have played a key role not only in stimulating this debate but
also in directly and indirectly influencing official policy on Bushmen. Indeed, a closer
reading of newspaper headlines featuring ‘‘The Bushman Danger’’ or ‘‘The Bushman
Plague’’ indicates that all seem to be traceable to Seiner’s pen. Some felt that his claims
were exaggerated—so much so that Seiner tried to sue an experienced settler
newspaper editor and member of the Landesrat, Rudolf Kindt, for libel after the latter
accused him of presenting reports laced with fantasy. Kindt obtained sworn
statements from Pater Bierfort, a Catholic missionary on the Kavango River, who
pointed out Seiner’s numerous elementary linguistic faux pas. Other expert witnesses
testified to Seiner’s ‘‘u¨bernervoes’’ and overanxious state: he was prone to take
exception to the smallest thing, and once punished his bambuse (factotum) with
twenty-five lashes. Bierfort, who served as Seiner’s interpreter, called his article
on the ‘‘Bushman Danger’’ pure ‘‘invention.’’126 Seiner left the country before the case
was settled. The fact that other observers disputed his claims of danger raises an
intriguing question: Were Seiner’s (and, indeed, Passarge’s) statements about
Bushmen based on scientific observation, or were they generated from his interactions
with settlers, and, having been given scholarly credibibility, did they then return
to reinforce settlers’ fantasies and nightmares? This interpretation seems not only
possible but likely.
Conclusion
What was a small war for Germany was genocide for Bushmen. E´mile Durkheim’s
distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions, first made in his classic study
Suicide, is useful in examining this genocide. Sufficient conditions relate to intent
(typically phrased in terms of policy), the focus of liberal analyses, while necessary
conditions relate to structural features necessary for the genocide to occur.127
The ‘‘Forgotten’’ Bushman Genocides of Namibia
47
These conditions are not mutually exclusive but must be analyzed synthetically, since
the problem in examining colonial genocide is not to explain it so much as to
understand the variations that occur. As I have pointed out, structurally German
South West Africa was a classic case of Marxian ‘‘primitive accumulation’’ or Weberian
‘‘booty capitalism.’’ Seeing the situation as one of resource competition would appear
attractive. Ecological pressure most certainly might have been a factor: as well as
settlers’ having moved into Bushman territory, 1910 had also been a bad drought year,
with only 42% of the average annual rainfall.128 The fact that four of the following five
rainy seasons also saw below-average rainfall aggravated the situation. In addition,
the 1907 proclamation of the Etosha Game Park, in prime Bushman territory north of
Grootfontein, and 1908 proclamations outlawing hunting out of season or without a
written license conceivably added to the pressure. The Blue Book detailing Germany’s
treatment of the indigenes cites approvingly an earlier official report dealing with
Bushmen in the northern Cape in which Major J. Herbst (secretary for South West
Africa at the time of the Blue Book) states that ‘‘the strict enforcement of the game
laws has made the country unsafe for them. They profess to be unable to understand
by what right Government protects the game and invariably ask to be shown the
government brand on the animals.’’129
The problem with the ecological approach is that this was a case of genocide by
long-term stealth. Bushmen, farmers, and officials occupied different ecological niches
on the same terrain, and thus were not in direct or immediate competition. Rather, as
in other parts of the Kalahari, a symbiosis emerged, and direct resource competition
became an issue only much later. With respect to the game laws, it is obvious that state
forces were thinly spread and had little chance of implementing these laws.
Theories on colonial genocides, those situations of brute ‘‘booty capitalism’’
or ‘‘primitive accumulation,’’ often ignore the importance of demographics and of
psychologically pacifying settlers. In Namibia the settlers were spread thinly and came
from a strong German tradition. Had they been less ‘‘tradition-bound,’’ they would
probably have sought their fortunes in regions beyond German hegemony. In pacifying
the colonizers, ceremonialism, and particularly the Rechtsstaat, played an important
role. This emphasis fits the facts well and complements Isobel Hull’s recent argument
about the role of German military culture (understood as a complex of habitual
practices and basic assumptions embedded in its doctrines and administration).130 In
addition, German society valued the opinions of scholars to a far higher degree than
other Europeans did. Indeed, the structure of both academia and the military had
strong nationalistic overtones. This had important implications in facilitating the
Bushman genocides.
Perhaps one of the most insightful analyses, not only linking Germany’s colonial
experiences with the rise of the Nazis but also delving into the nature of genocide, is
that of Moritz Bonn, who, unlike Hannah Arendt and other intellectuals, actually had
first-hand experience of the colonies. An unpublished, undated paper titled ‘‘End of the
Colonial Discussion’’ (probably written in the 1930s, when Bonn was in exile) provides
the following analysis:
[Nazis] accept and amplify the racial theories by which General von Trotha had
justified his policy of extirpating the rebellious Hereros by making them die of thirst in
the Omaheke desert:—that according to the law of nature inferior races must die out
when brought in contact with superior races. The Nazi creed is based on the same cheap
conception of Darwinism, and like their colonial predecessors, they do not believe in the
unaided working of this supposed law of nature[.]
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The great Nordic race, as represented by Nazism, cannot defend itself against the
Jews by its own superior values, except by closing all avenues of a living to them and by
stealing their money. They are now doing on a much larger scale to the Jews what had
been intended as punishment for the Hereros. The Hereros had undoubtedly rebelled—
though they had been sorely tried—they murdered many German settlers; they had
successfully outmaneuvered the rather theatrical German Army chief, who was
ignorant of aboriginal warfare and in his wrath decided to inflict collective destruction
on those who would not play the game of war in accordance with scientific rules. The
Nazis hold German Jewry collectively responsible for the criminal act of a non-German
Jew, who their own brutality had goaded into frenzied crime. His evil deed served
them as a pretext, for a policy of expropriating, Jewish property . . . the Commander in
South West Africa had hidden himself behind the law of nature in order to justify his
brutal reprisals; the Nazis are trying, as they have done all the time, to dress up their
arbitrary, violent acts in the form of legality . . .
As long as they express such doctrines there should be no discussion of returning the
colonies because to them justice is not an ethical conception, but a mere legal quibble.
Germany must learn that recognition of the right of self-determination for a majority
does not include the right of extermination of an alien minority.131
This unpublished document is cited for a number of reasons. To begin with, it
establishes that Bonn rather than Arendt was the first to see the connection between
the colonial experience and the rise of Nazi totalitarianism.132 There may be a
connection between colonialism and totalitarianism, as Arendt suggested, but it is
necessary to note that the critique of totalitarianism may also have some colonial roots,
as in Bonn’s case. Bonn’s central insight, however, is to highlight the importance of the
manipulation of legal ideology in setting the stage for genocide, directing attention to
the importance of the Rechtsstaat.
In this case, the Rechtsstaat facilitated two outcomes. First, it franchised coercive
power to settlers while at the same time empowering them psychologically. It had
magical qualities. Rohrbach, formerly settlement commissioner for German South
West Africa, complained, ‘‘The conviction has gained ground that without the formality
of the law and the juristic atmosphere of our high Prussian-German officials, nobody
can administer anything.’’133 Nevertheless, such formality was a crucial factor in
giving settlers a self-confidence that, Rohrbach believed, rendered them ‘‘spiritually
more effective than any average million of people at home.’’134 Second, the Rechtsstaat
attempted to create a supply of pliable labor by removing key elements of the
means of production from a sizeable number of indigenes, especially Herero and
Khoekhoegowab-speakers, by confiscating their lands and livestock and then
attempting to tie them down to colonial employers through the permit system.
Indigenes not on the reservations or carrying a pass were defined as criminal and
punished as vagrants. Bushmen by definition, then, were vagrants and subject to
punishment.
Justification for the Labor Regulations was couched in two ways: as a senior
official told Colonial Secretary Dernberg during his visit to Windhoek, ‘‘If the natives
ever become rich in cattle again, the safety of the country will be threatened.’’ It was
equally important that settlers, officials, and scholars shared a dominant view that
the object of the laws was to create an indigenous proletarian working class.135
The official rhetoric of this milieu is rife with references to indigenes as ‘‘economic
use units,’’ as in Schultze’s twisted phraseology, mentioned above, about the
circulation of common labor coin stamped with the Imperial eagle and the Christian
cross. Similarly, Rohrbach believed that indigenes had rights only if they could prove
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that they could work.136 In his popular Herero war novel, Peter Mohr’s Fahrt nach
Su¨dwest Afrika, Gustav Frenssen has one of his soldiers exclaim, ‘‘These blacks
deserved to be killed in the eyes of God and men; not because they murdered two
hundred farmers and rose up against us in rebellion, but because they built no houses
and dug no wells.’’137 The attributes of Bushmen epitomized the critical distinction
between Herero and Bushman: in the hierarchical typology developed by academics,
Bushmen ranked even below Herero and Nama because, it was alleged, they had no
property. It is not enough to recognize this hierarchy as neo-Darwinian; crucially, we
must consider the basis on which the hierarchy was constructed. According to many
colonials, Bushmen were Vogelfrei, precisely because they owned no property or had
laws. Their alleged incapacity to work was also tied to notions of property. Most
importantly, having no property meant that their territory was seen as Herrenlos, or
terra nullius, and thus available for the taking by settlers.138
For all the problems settlers claimed to have with them as workers, Herero and
Nama could still be massaged into the system by manipulating their love of
livestock.139 While indigenes were prohibited from owning livestock, farmers used
this love as a means of ensuring labor. According to the Landesrat, indigenes owned
about 25% of all small stock and more than 20,000 head of cattle.140 Most of this
stock ownership was ‘‘informal,’’ facilitated by settlers, since officially, between 1911
and 1914, the governor received only thirty-four applications for such licenses and
approved thirty.141 Bushmen, believed to have no concept of property or wealth, could
not be manipulated in this way, which gave emphasis to their ‘‘worthlessness’’ in
settlers’ eyes. As foragers, they were not dependent upon their colonial masters and
could ‘‘drop out’’ or disengage from the colonial economy when they wanted to. This
fact also facilitated the settlers’ ability to project their worst fantasies and nightmares
onto the Bushmen and explains why Bushmen served as convenient scapegoats to
cover the incompetence of novice, and invariably underfunded, farmers. The Bushmen
could not be controlled or integrated, and thus they had little ‘‘economic value.’’
While much effort has been expended in understanding that coterie of genocides
known variously as ‘‘frontier’’ or ‘‘colonial’’ genocides, one of the major problems
underlying these efforts is the issue of false comparisons. Invariably, the comparison is
between Herero and Australian Aborigines. Alison Palmer, for example, distinguishes
between ‘‘state’’ and ‘‘societal’’ genocides, the former referring to the Herero and
the latter to Queensland, where genocide was not the product of direct state policy but,
rather, the result of settler vigilantism tolerated by a state that lacked the resources to
impose its will on the settlers.142 As the Bushman case shows, however, the boundaries
between state and societal genocides are rather blurred. A comparison between the
genocides of the Bushmen and of the Aborigines suggests several important
similarities. Not only were both groups foragers living in mobile small groups with
no clear-cut hierarchy, both had to deal with a sparse, mostly male, settler population.
In terms of intellectual classifications concerning humans, it is no accident that, going
back to the ‘‘Great Chain of Being,’’ the two groups that were seen as most primitive
were the Aborigines and the Bushmen.143
Perhaps the most important recent contribution to understanding colonial
genocides has been that of Ju¨rgen Zimmerer,144 who elaborates on Palmer’s insights
to make the case that such genocides occurred by way of pre-modern and incompletely
bureaucratized states that could not control their unruly citizens (thus paving the way
for vigilante action) and, at most, could only produce massacres, since they did not
have the requisite organizational complexity. Zimmerer’s analysis raises an important
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question: How does one understand the end of the Bushman genocide that occurred
when the South Africans took over? Certainly the Afrikaner settlers who slowly but
surely supplanted the German settlers were believed to be far more racist, even in
German times,145 and the first South African administrators were notoriously
unsympathetic toward Bushmen. Administrator A.J. Werth, for example, asserted
that
We make no attempt to civilize the Bushmen. They are untameable. . . . The territory is
so large and the Bushmen so cunning that an army might seek them in vain. But it is all
fine country, splendid for sheep and cattle farming . . .146
In addition, the territory had undergone significant, if not massive, de-bureau-
cratization. In 1923, the administrator complained that the administration consisted of
only 311 officials, of whom 212 were temporary employees, and that there were
massive morale problems because of anomalies in pay and allowances. (In contrast,
1,226 German officials were deported.) Similarly, the police force decreased from
440 European and 330 native police to 284 European and 239 native police in 1923,
while the number of police stations decreased from 113 to thirty-nine.147 Poor quality
of personnel and woeful under-financing of transport was a constant administrative
refrain—a situation conducive to vigilante-style actions against Bushmen, one would
expect.
Bushman numbers belie the facile explanation that they had already been ‘‘tamed’’
by then. Nor is there any evidence that they were negatively affected by the great
influenza epidemic of 1918. Three factors, I suggest, may be significant. The first
relates to the notion of Rechtsstaat. For all the brute racism of the South African
regime, there was no Rechtsstaat that could promote the grown of fascist self-delusion.
Second, the South Africans deported most of the recent German settlers and left the
alte Afrikaner who, like the racist but experienced Boers, realized that they had to live
with the consequences of their actions and could not expect much state support.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the South Africans did not want to be
embarrassed at the League of Nations. They had painted the Germans as barbaric in
making their claim for a Mandate, and thus could not afford to be accused in their turn
of ‘‘barbaric atrocities.’’ The so-called Bondelswarts Affair of 1922 had been a source of
acute international mortification. The way in which the South African administration
responded to even the most vague accusation that might reflect on their reputation as
a competent Mandatory authority always seemed to involve a high-powered
investigation and spin-doctoring.148 Public embarrassment by way of a free press, as
a potential deterrent to atrocity, had already demonstrated its potential in Germany.
Now it flowered. Clearly, the international politics of embarrassment as a means of
genocide prevention can work in unanticipated ways.
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Biological Absorption and Genocide: A
Comparison of Indigenous Assimilation
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This article examines biological absorption (the imagined process by which
indigenous identity would disappear through interracial sexual liaisons) and its
relationship to the assimilation policies of the United States and Australia. In the
debates about whether or not indigenous assimilation policies constituted genocide,
biological absorption has often been pointed to as a particularly salient example of
genocidal thinking. US and Australian historians, however, have mostly seen
biological absorption as only a minor aspect of assimilation. This article argues
that biological absorption should be recognized as a pervasive construct underlying
many aspects of Australia’s and the United States’ dealings with Aborigines
and Native Americans, respectively. Acknowledging its pervasiveness blurs the
boundaries between ethnocide and genocide, demonstrating that strict definitions
are not always useful for historians attempting to understand the actions of settler
societies.
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The statistics of all attempts to civilise and convert the savage show that the savage
dies out sooner through civilisation and conversion than by the more straightforward
method of lead and rum. Only the master-races of the world are fit material for the
ordeal of civilisation. ([Sydney] Bulletin, 9 June 1883, 6)
Since at least the 1970s, historians in Australia and the United States have been
assessing the morality of their nations’ origins, prompted by what Antoinette Burton
has termed ‘‘the imperial turn’’—the increasing attention paid by scholars to the
impact of colonialism and imperialism in the wake of ‘‘decolonization, pre-and post-
1968 racial struggle and feminism in the last quarter century.’’1 In the 1990s this
scholarly preoccupation was channeled into public debate. In Australia in 1997 the
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) released its report, titled
Bringing Them Home, on the Australian government’s practice of removing Aboriginal
children from their parents. The report argued that this practice was a form of
genocide under the definition given in the United Nations Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (UNCG) of 1948, which includes the ‘‘forcible
removal of children’’ as one of its five subsections.2 This claim prompted much public
controversy at the time, and it was closely followed by ‘‘history wars’’ in which
conservatives and liberals debated the extent of Aboriginal massacres on the frontier.
Whether or not genocide took place in Australia has since been deliberated on by a
number of Australian scholars, who have published explorations of the issue of
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genocide in Australian history.3 In the early 1990s in the United States a similar
public discussion centered around the 1992 quincentenary of Christopher Columbus’s
arrival on the North American continent. This event prompted an enormous
outpouring of scholarship and public discussion about the implications of the United
States’ beginnings as a nation, one strand of which was the condemnation of the
decline of Native American populations since 1492 and the invocation of the crime of
genocide by scholars whom US historian James Axtell condescendingly described as
having ‘‘itchy fingers [on] the trigger of moral outrage.’’4
Few would deny the value of the project of recognizing the high price paid by the
original owners of the lands on which these settler societies imposed themselves.
However, the use of the word ‘‘genocide’’—used most often to refer to the Holocaust
perpetrated by Nazi Germany during World War II—complicated and politicized the
issue. Many Australians and Americans were uncomfortable conflating this event with
frontier ‘‘wars,’’ population loss due to disease, or the removal of indigenous children,
not wishing, perhaps, to undermine the uniqueness of the Holocaust experience.5
This discomfort has, in some ways, infected the debate about whether or not the crime
of genocide was committed against the indigenous peoples of North America and
Australia, despite the fact that many cogent arguments have been put, not least by the
HREOC report itself, that what occurred did fit with the UNCG’s definition.6
‘‘Historians,’’ writes Laurence M. Hauptman of the US context, ‘‘have a responsibility
to use words such as genocide, holocaust, concentration camp, or, more recently, ethnic
cleansing in a careful manner.’’7 ‘‘If the word is to retain any meaning or moral impact
at all,’’ Axtell argues, ‘‘we must not apply it wholesale to every Indian death
in the colonial period. To do so is to dilute our moral vocabulary to insipidity and to
squander its intellectual and emotional force.’’8 Australian historian Inga Clendinnen
believes that the use of the word ‘‘genocide’’ has unhelpfully generated ‘‘outrage . . .
accompanied by the slamming-shut of minds.’’9 Henry Reynolds, who has written
a book-length investigation of the issue in Australian history, has written of his
hesitation to speak of the subject of genocide, which he believes is
destined to be tossed on a sea of controversy, likely to be battered from all sides—by
those who are hostile to the mere suggestion that such an ‘‘outrageous word’’ could be
applied to Australia and by their opponents, who feel that no other term is powerful
enough to capture their anger.10
The issue is so fiercely debated, Reynolds writes, that ‘‘neither side appears to welcome
a careful and reasonably dispassionate investigation of the topic.’’11
The issue of whether or not indigenous peoples were the victims of genocide
has been further complicated by the assimilationist policies under which they
suffered—and the question of whether the removal of culture through education,
Christianization, institutions, child removal, and the breaking up of families was
as genocidal as the actual physical destruction of human bodies. Indeed, a common
tendency is to use linguistic subcategories such as ‘‘ethnocide’’ or ‘‘cultural genocide’’ to
describe what happened to indigenous peoples in settler societies. This articles
focuses on one particular aspect of US and Australian assimilation policies—the
phenomenon of biological absorption. Biological absorption was a discernible strategy
in both countries during the assimilation period and is of particular relevance to the
question of the applicability of genocide to indigenous peoples. This is because its basic
premise—that, through interracial relationships, indigenous people would biologically
disappear, or be ‘‘bred out’’—blurs the boundaries between cultural removal and the
physical destruction of a people. In this discussion my aim has been to move beyond
Genocide Studies and Prevention 4:1 April 2009
60
concepts of ‘‘national guilt’’ and debates over the legal meanings of the UNCG
definition–and to some extent the conservative/liberal political battle into which the
issue is so easily swept (it is worth noting that the vast majority of the participants in
the debates over indigenous genocide in Australia are not indigenous themselves)–and
into the realm of further historical understanding generated by the perspectives that
can be gained from comparative history. Ann Curthoys has argued for historians to be
less ‘‘national’’ and more ‘‘transnational’’ in their reassessments of national histories in
the light of indigenous issues, and asks whether such an approach might make it
‘‘possible to participate more . . . in worldwide historiographical conversations.’’12 Most
comparative studies of genocide that look at indigenous peoples compare them with
non-indigenous groups, most often the Jewish Holocaust.13 But comparing the
genocidal treatment of indigenous populations in different colonial contexts is
particularly helpful in assessing whether, as Robert Hitchcock and Tara Twedt have
discussed, the word ‘‘genocide’’ can in fact be applied to indigenous people.14 It is my
contention that a better understanding of biological absorption in the United States
and Australia helps us to assess the particularities of indigenous genocide. The
histories of indigenous assimilation in the United States and Australia make a
revealing comparison, both in terms of the policies themselves and also in terms of the
ways in which scholars have understood them.
The first section of this article describes the particular directions that scholarship
on biological absorption and genocide has taken. The second traces and compares the
histories of biological absorption in Australia and the United States in the twentieth
century, in an effort to gain a better understanding of the application of the concept
of genocide to the dealings of settler societies with the indigenous people they
displaced.
Scholarly Discussions of Biological Absorption
Scholarly discussions of biological absorption have taken very different tacks in
Australia and the United States. In Australia, debates have raged (prompted by the
HREOC report) about whether the assimilation policies of the twentieth century,
especially biological absorption, were a form of genocide. In the United States,
discussions of assimilation as genocide have not become so central either in the public
sphere or in scholarship. In part, this is a result of the very different ways in which
Australia and the United States set out to assimilate indigenous people in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. As I have explored in depth elsewhere, the
United States, influenced by a humanitarian movement that moved from the cause of
abolishing slavery to the ‘‘Indian problem,’’ put in place legislation and policies
that focused on cultural assimilation. The 1887 Dawes Act divided reservations into
individual allotments on which Indians were expected to become self-supporting
farmers, and funding was dedicated to educational institutions designed to help them
acculturate. In Australia, ‘‘protection’’ legislation offered few avenues for cultural
acculturation. Instead, it segregated Aborigines onto reserves where those of full
descent were expected to succumb to the ‘‘doomed race theory,’’ while those of mixed
descent were expected to ‘‘absorb’’ biologically, through interracial relationships, into
the white population. Some public servants and commentators openly articulated
absorptionist ideas, although such ideas always remained somewhat controversial.
By contrast, in the United States, where the issue of miscegenation was made
particularly salient by the taboos surrounding sex between white and African-
American populations, assimilationists rarely discussed interracial relationships as
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an aspect of Indian assimilation. Thus, some scholars have argued that biological
absorption was not part of US assimilation policies.15 These arguments are, as I will
demonstrate, based on too narrow a view of the extent of biological absorption in the
United States and Australia. Rather, as I argue, biological absorption permeated the
assimilation policies of both Australia and the United States, a phenomenon that
ought to be taken into account in any scholarly assessment of genocide and indigenous
peoples in these settler societies.
Despite hesitation to publicly discuss biological absorption as an assimilative
policy in the United States, some scholars have discerned what M. Annette Jaimes has
termed a ‘‘strategy of elimination’’ in the use of blood quanta to define who was or
was not an ‘‘Indian.’’ ‘‘If the government could not repeal its obligations to Indians,’’
Jaimes argues,
it could at least act to limit their number, thereby diminishing the cost associated with
underwriting their entitlements on a per capita basis. . . . Much of the original impetus
towards the federal preemption of the sovereign Indian prerogative of defining
‘‘who’s Indian,’’ and the standardization of the racist degree-of-blood method of
Indian identification, derived from the budgetary considerations of a federal govern-
ment anxious to avoid paying its bills.16
Patricia Limerick has also perceived an eliminationist logic behind the policies
put in place by nineteenth-century white Americans, who, she argues, planned to
set the blood quantum at one quarter, hold to it as a rigid definition of Indianness, let
intermarriage proceed as it had for centuries, and eventually Indians will be defined out
of existence. When that happens, the federal government will finally be freed from its
persistent ‘‘Indian problem.’’17
Controversial historian and activist Ward Churchill has similarly noted the
financial benefits behind the way in which Native American identity was configured,
arguing that ‘‘reductions in the number of Indians at large in North America
corresponded directly to diminishment of the cloud surrounding the dominant society’s
claims of clear title to, and jurisdictional rights over, its purported land base.’’18
Churchill invokes the racial ideologies that made blood quanta a compelling logic.
‘‘Endowed as they were with staunchly racialist perspectives,’’ he argues, ‘‘it was
predictable that [assimilationists] would rely heavily upon the sort of blood quantum
standards already evident in treaty language.’’19
As early as 1976, Ronald Trosper noted the dilemma facing American Indian
nations as a result of intermarriage with whites. ‘‘Rights to land and services originally
based upon treaty commitments depend in fact upon stereotypes for survival,’’ he
argued. ‘‘Should Indians appear to be like whites, valuable rights could be taken away
by Congress in response to an argument that all American citizens are the ‘same.’’’20
Melissa Meyer explicitly sees genocidal intent in the laws that regulated Indian
identity. ‘‘Few scholars would argue that all of United States Indian policy amounted
to genocide,’’ she argues, ‘‘but long-term demographic trends certainly point to a
holocaust. Genocide has ideological as well as demographic consequences; defending
and celebrating race is probably among them. In their purest form, blood quantum
requirements amount to a celebration of race.’’21
Indeed, scholarly discussions of miscegenation, strategies of elimination, and
Indians are often found not in discussions of genocide but in debates about Indian
identity. Bonita Lawrence argues that the history of government manipulation
of Indian identity in Canada and the United States ought not to be forgotten in
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discussions of urban mixed-blood Native identity. ‘‘The question of who is an Indian,’’
she writes,
which lurks beneath the surface of many of the issues that contemporary Native
communities are struggling with, is much larger than that of personal or even group
identity—it goes directly to the heart of the colonization process and to the genocidal
policies of the settler governments across the Americas toward Indigenous peoples.22
David Hollinger notes that the history of elimination through designation has led to a
recent tendency for Americans with Indian heritage to ‘‘reclassify’’: ‘‘In the twenty
years between 1970 and 1990, the federal census reported an increase of 259 per cent
in the American Indian population despite a very low birthrate.’’23
Native American ‘‘strategies of elimination’’ are also discussed in scholarship that
attempts to understand the broader racial landscape in the United States and its effect
on discourses about miscegenation. Churchill notes that since African Americans
‘‘were considered to be property, yielding value not only in their labor but as
commodities which could be bought and sold, it was profitable not only to employ but
to breed them in ever larger numbers.’’ By contrast, he writes,
Native people . . . were legally understood to own property—mainly land, and minerals
within that land—coveted by whites. It followed then, as it still does, that . . . any
racial admixture at all, especially with blacks, was often deemed sufficient
to warrant individuals, and sometimes entire groups, being legally classified as
non-Indians.24
Patrick Wolfe has similarly compared the racial discourses surrounding Indians
and African Americans; he describes the
difference between one group of people who had survived a centuries-long genocidal
catastrophe with correspondingly depleted numbers and another group who,
as commodities, had been preserved, their reproduction constituting a singularly
primitive form of accumulation for their owners.25
Hollinger argues that the particular racial landscape in the United States made the
discourses surrounding miscegenation and Indians unique, noting that ‘‘the Indian
case was sufficiently different from both the African-American case and that of the
European immigrants to stand somewhat outside the miscegenation conversation
and the melting pot conversation.’’26
The ‘‘strategy of elimination’’ argument is not without its critics. Alexandra
Harmon and Circe Sturm have both, for different reasons, challenged the assumption
made by Jaimes, Limerick, and others that blood quanta were introduced by the
federal government in a cynical effort to reduce Indian numbers. Harmon calls
their arguments ‘‘largely speculative generalizations’’ and contends that a further
investigation is required to ‘‘provide a sounder foundation for conclusions about the
influence of U.S. law and racial ideology on the composition of tribes.’’27 She argues
that tribes themselves played a crucial and active role in allowing blood quanta to
define their identities. Circe Sturm points out the importance of the deeply ingrained
racial discourses that created blood quanta:
Blood quantum was widely embraced by nineteenth-century scientific thought as a
rational measure of racial identity and racial ‘‘purity’’ . . . In fact, blood quantum
could just as easily been introduced by naively well-meaning bureaucrats and
liberal supporters who wanted to help ‘‘deserving Indians’’ but had no effective way
of identifying them except through the crude contours of genealogy.28
John LaVelle questions the historical accuracy of Jaimes’s and Churchill’s claims.29
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In the second half of this article, I hope to find at least part of a way beyond these
scholarly quandaries about a ‘‘strategy of elimination’’ by giving a broader view of
biological absorption in the United States and an argument about its previously
unrecognized centrality to US assimilation policy. Harmon is right that further
scholarly investigation reveals that a ‘‘strategy of elimination’’ can be found to
permeate many other aspects of assimilation policy than are covered in the literature
outlined above, and the racial discourses that Sturm, Hollinger, and Wolfe ask us to
examine can be seen to have a clear absorptionist thread that is particularly revealed
in a comparative study. This perspective also enables us to get beyond discussions of
the way ‘‘blood’’ was a seductive means of understanding racial identity for both Indian
and white people (even those who were not necessarily engaged in reducing the Indian
population) and to understand how it operated as a method of reducing Native
American numbers.
In Australia, by contrast, the 1997 HREOC report, Bringing Them Home,
prompted forthright discussion of biological absorption as genocide. Many commenta-
tors decided that child removal was not genocide but concluded that genocide had
indeed taken place in Australia during the interwar period in the Northern Territory
and Western Australia, under the policies of chief protectors A.O. Neville and Cecil
Cook. Both Neville and Cook were open about their belief that ongoing interracial
relationships would solve the problem of the growing population of Aborigines of mixed
descent by seeing them absorbed into the white population generation by generation.
Meanwhile, Aborigines of full descent would, thanks to the Darwinian notion of
‘‘survival of the fittest,’’ slowly die out (indeed, as Colin Tatz has argued, a ‘‘major
underpinning, almost an article of faith, of Australian race-relations history has been a
Social Darwinist notion that the unfittest don’t survive’’).30 Thus, Australia’s
‘‘Aboriginal problem’’ would be solved. Although other states/colonies were not as
blatant in their absorptionist policies, the same notion was expressed at a national
level during the oft-quoted 1937 Aboriginal Welfare conference, at which it was
resolved that ‘‘ultimate absorption by the people of the Commonwealth’’ was the future
of Australia’s mixed-descent population.31
Many of the scholars who have discussed the interwar absorptionist theories of
Neville and Cook resist the applicability of genocide to any other policy in Australia’s
history. Russell McGregor has argued that Aboriginal assimilation policies in
Australia in the post-war period ‘‘cannot be comprehended within the conceptual
framework of genocide’’ but believes that ‘‘iinterwar absorption did seek to engineer
[the effacement of one of the groups involved].’’32 Paul Bartrop also states that ‘‘it is
impossible to conclude otherwise that Australia in the 1930s was possessed of an
administrative culture that in reality practiced genocide.’’33 Robert Manne reluctantly
concludes that ‘‘because of the fantastical nature of the absorption policy, ‘genocidal
thoughts’ and ‘genocidal plans’ are more adequate descriptors of what they were
implicated in than ‘genocidal crimes.’’’34 Early in the debate, Raimond Gaita observed
that the absorptionist program’s ‘‘arrogant belief that some peoples may eliminate
from the earth peoples they hold in contempt’’ was crucial to the designation of
Aboriginal assimilation policies as genocide.35 Manne has also argued that the 1937
conference was a moment when ‘‘genocidal thought and administrative practice
touched.’’36 ‘‘If a case is to be made that genocide was committed,’’ he contends, ‘‘it can
only be made with regard to a particular policy plan, biological assimilation; at
a particular time, the 1930s; and in particular places, the Northern Territory
and Western Australia.’’37 In his discussion of forced assimilation, Tatz similarly
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focuses on the absorptionist policies of A.O. Neville, J.W. Bleakley, and Cecil Cook,
concluding that
no matter what spin is put on the mindset of these men, the intent was as repugnant
then as it would be now: to await the ‘‘natural’’ death of the ‘‘full-blood’’ peoples and to
socially engineer the disappearance, forever, of all those ‘‘natives of Aboriginal origin.’’
They were, indeed, progenitors of group disappearance. They were, beyond doubt,
complicit. They did conspire and they did attempt to commit genocide, that is, ensure
the elimination, in whole or in part, of a racial group (of ‘‘half-castes’’).38
This focus on the 1930s in discussions of Aboriginal genocide and biological
absorption is problematic. As Manne has pointed out, such a focus is necessarily
limiting, as the ‘‘administrative will to pursue [absorption] did not survive Cook’s
virtual removal from his post in 1939 and Neville’s retirement one year later.’’39 These
arguments also ignore the insidious nature of biological absorption, the many guises in
which it appeared, and the vast machinery that made up Aboriginal assimilation
policy. As Andrew Markus has argued,
the debate that has erupted over the removal of children has diverted attention from an
issue of central importance. Policies of child removal should not be seen in isolation, as
they often are—child removal was but one of the integral components of a clearly
articulated government policy in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century.40
We need to acknowledge biological absorption beyond Neville and Cook. Absorption, in
fact, deeply underpinned Australian assimilation policy and dealings with Aborigines
both before and beyond the interwar period.
Biological Absorption in Australia and the United States
What, then, might a broader history of biological absorption in Australia and the
United States look like? As an Australian historian, I take my starting point for
understanding the phenomenon of biological absorption from the work of Russell
McGregor, Warwick Anderson, and Patrick Wolfe, who have defined the concept in
their work on Aboriginal policy and racial discourses in the twentieth century.41 It is
my contention that biological absorption should be understood as even more pervasive
than the excellent work of these historians suggests. The notion of biological
absorption can be found in the written and spoken words of those who commented
on the future of colonial societies and in the way they imagined what interracial sexual
relationships might do to the future of indigenous cultures. It can be found baldly
stated in the rationales behind government policies (at least in Australia). The idea
that indigenous people would disappear through interracial relationships can be
discerned in the use of blood quanta to identify Native Americans, in the decisions
made as to who would be put on tribal rolls, and in who was declared competent and
therefore exempt from federal controls and protections. But it also emerges in less
obvious, more understated ways. It can be found, for example, in the removal of
indigenous children from their communities, and in the ways their futures were
imagined. It can also be recognized in the laissez-faire attitude of the Australian
government, which expected it to solve the ‘‘Aboriginal problem’’ in only a few
generations, and in the assumptions underlying the granting of certificates of
exemption from protection legislation. It can be discerned as an undeclared outcome
of the efforts to culturally assimilate indigenous people—in how white people imagined
acculturated Indians might interact with society, blend in, and eventually intermarry.
In some contexts it was expressed as boundary maintenance, whereby anxieties about
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interracial mixing led to efforts to categorize people of mixed descent in a certain way
that did not threaten the status quo. In other places, it took the form of simply
turning a blind eye to the rape or sexual oppression of Aboriginal women. And it is
visible in the fact that people of mixed descent were deemed inauthentic, or not
properly ‘‘indigenous,’’ and in the way ‘‘mixedness’’ could be used to undermine
tribal sovereignty.
Thus, in order to fully understand biological absorption, we need to both broaden
our focus and recognize the pervasiveness of this concept in many aspects
of indigenous assimilation policy. Indeed, an acknowledgment of the centrality of
biological absorptionist imaginings to settler colonial societies might help to realign
and extend the discussion about indigenous assimilation and genocide. In the following
paragraphs I locate biological absorption in three different aspects of the culture,
legislation, and assimilation policies of Australia and the United States. Lacking the
space for an all-encompassing discussion of the many guises of biological absorption,
I have focused on three aspects of assimilation policy in which absorption remained an
unspoken conspirator: the blind eye turned on the rape of indigenous women, the
absorptionist assumptions behind efforts at cultural assimilation of indigenous people,
and the destabilizing of indigenous identity through laws and the imposition of
artificial ideas of cultural authenticity.
As countless historians of colonial societies have noted, the rape of indigenous
women paralleled the possession of their land. Ann McGrath has argued that from the
moment of the first settlement at Port Jackson in the late eighteenth century
Aboriginal women were being raped. She notes that as early as 1796, prostitution
involving Aboriginal women had become ‘‘commonplace’’ and there were regular
reports of convicts and sailors sexually ‘‘interfering’’ with Aboriginal women.42
Raymond Evans has argued the centrality of violent interracial sexual contact to
both ‘‘frontier and post-frontier existence.’’43 In the American colonies, the mythical
union of John Rolfe and Pocahontas, an Algonquian woman, in the earliest years of the
colony of Virginia became, as Gary Nash, has argued, ‘‘the embryo of a mestizo United
States.’’44 This consecrated but ill-fated union lent some form of legitimacy and
romance to the sexual oppression of Indian women by white men that took place as
Europeans overtook the continent. As Andrea Smith has further argued in the
US context, the ‘‘project of colonial sexual violence establishes the ideology that Native
bodies are inherently violable—and by extension, that Native lands are also inherently
violable.’’ Drawing from her experience as a rape crisis counselor, Smith explicitly
names this phenomenon as genocide: ‘‘Native peoples,’’ she writes, ‘‘internalize the
genocidal project through self-destruction. . . . It was not a surprise to me that Indians
who have survived sexual abuse would often say that they no longer wish to be
Indian.’’45
The rape of indigenous women in US and Australian history was not part of a
deliberate strategy of biological absorption (that is, the rapists did not have absorption
as their prime motivation). Can we assume, however, that the blind eye that was
turned on it in both settler societies was in some ways part of an appreciation of the
long-term consequences of interracial mixing for indigenous peoples? There was little
effort in either country to prevent or deter white men from having access to indigenous
women. In the United States, the rape and mutilation of Indian women’s bodies
was often an aspect of massacres and warfare perpetrated by the army.46 Later, in
the assimilation period, concerns about ‘‘squaw men’’ were raised only when their
relationships with Indian women appeared to be giving them access to land.47
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Tellingly, men in relationships with Indian women were also seen by some as an
‘‘element of civilization.’’48 Benjamin S. Coppock told the Lake Mohonk Conference
in 1893 that the
army, the trading-posts, the missionary, the written language, the ‘‘squaw-man,’’ the
half-breed children, the frontiersman, the lack of game, the ingress of railroads,
the training of children in school, have all helped to modify the practical question of
Indians being longer Indians among us.49
When a 1904 Royal Commission into Aboriginal conditions in Western Australia
found alarming evidence of the abuse of Aboriginal women, its leader, Dr. Walter Roth,
came in for some vociferous criticism from various members of Parliament who
believed that this was a natural, expected part of colonialism. ‘‘What good has Dr. Roth
done in holding up this immorality?’’ asked one member.
He has only made this place stink in the nostrils of other places, and has done no good to
the natives. Do members mean to say they are ignorant of all this? Surely anyone
knowing the history of Western Australia knows this sort of thing is going on, and as far
as my reading or knowledge goes it seems to me that wherever races are mixed it
has been the same ever since the dawn of history.50
While men who engaged in sexual relationships with Aboriginal women were often
castigated for their immorality, the worst disdain seems to have been reserved for men
whose relationships were long term, and therefore more likely to be based on affection.
In 1936, the Hon. J. Nicholson told the Western Australian parliament that he was
decidedly against the man who cohabits, or habitually lives, with a black woman. I do
not think that practice is in accord with nature of the proper scheme of things.. . . When
the offence is of a casual nature, it is different.51
In Australia, we can see a flow-on effect of the overlooking of the sexual
exploitation of Aboriginal women. An unspoken reliance on biological absorption as a
solution can also be discerned, as Pat O’Malley has termed it, in the ‘‘ungovernment’’ of
Western Australian Aboriginal people in the 1930s and 1940s. O’Malley argues that
the policies set in place by A.O. Neville led the government to employ a strategy of
isolation and neglect of Aborigines in the Central Reserve, as Neville waited for
interracial relationships and high rates of poverty and disease to take care of the
population there: ‘‘In a sense, it was government at a distance, in which the indigenous
culture preserved by Neville’s policies would produce the eugenic effects he sought.’’52
This idea might be applied more widely. In neither country were serious attempts
made to prevent the access of white men to indigenous women—white men were rarely
prosecuted, and received only light sentences, for raping indigenous women53—and, as
I will show in my forthcoming discussion of legal indigenous identity, governments
wrote legislation that responded to this problem rather than addressing it. As Neville
chillingly told the 1937 conference, speaking about girls and women of mixed descent
sent into domestic service,
Our policy is to send them out into the white community, and if a girl comes back
pregnant our rule is to keep her for two years. The child is then taken away from the
mother and sometimes never sees her again. Thus these children grow up as whites,
knowing nothing of their own environment. At the expiration of the period of two years
the mother goes back into service so it really does not matter if she has half a dozen
children.54
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Thus we see biological absorption working as an offshoot of colonial contact, taking
advantage of a behind-the-scenes activity that helped to destabilize indigenous
communities by diluting (from the colonists’ perspective) their identity.
A second veiled expression of absorptionist ideas is found in the cultural
assimilation policies practiced by the Australian and US governments. These, of
course, ostensibly focused on transforming indigenous people—not biologically, but
culturally—into people who spoke English; practiced Christianity; and embraced
European gender roles, land ownership, and capitalism. Nonetheless, on closer
examination, a perceivable if undeclared byproduct of these policies was very often the
idea that acculturated indigenous people would make potential marriage partners for
whites. In Australia, for example, the removal of indigenous children from their
families has been recognized as an absorptionist policy, most notably by the HREOC
report Bringing Them Home, which notes that it was most often children with lighter
skins who were taken from their parents.55 As Robert van Krieken has argued,
absorption and child removal were in fact linked:
[The] primary and overarching concern was to ‘‘solve’’ the ‘‘half-caste problem’’ by
breeding out colour of both body and mind through this programme of social
engineering, and in this sense the removal of Aboriginal children meshed with
the first strategy of controlling sexual relations and reproduction among adult
Aborigines.56
This racial targeting reveals the child removals’ absorptionist underpinnings.
These children were not simply being removed to be educated and acculturated into
the ways of white Australia; they were, in fact, being removed because they were prime
candidates for sexual relationships or marriage with whites. Although this logic was
rarely articulated, there are certainly examples expressed by prominent Australians.
In the debates surrounding Queensland’s Aboriginals Protection and Preservation
Act of 1939, one parliamentarian noted that on a recent visit to Fantome Island, he
had been
astounded to see what I thought was a little curly-haired white kiddy running about the
beach playing with the piccanninies. When I asked who she was I was told that she was
the child of the half-caste cook at the hospital.. . . I think that perhaps we could
persuade these mothers to lease their children to others to be educated, and to go out to
work amongst the white population. Then these girls would probably marry, and no-one
would be any wiser about their parentage. They could be readily absorbed into the
white population instead of having to return to the gunyah life.57
Quentin Beresford and Paul Omaji have pointed out that Sister Kate Clutterbuck’s
home for removed Aboriginal children in Perth’s southern suburbs in the 1940s
had a clear racial-engineering purpose, which encouraged girls to marry
white men.58 Victoria Haskins notes that in New South Wales, where Aboriginal
girls were particularly targeted for removal and were sent into domestic service, the
NSW Aboriginal Welfare Board’s records for the 1920s and 1930s show ‘‘a remarkably
high rate of pregnancy for girls indentured to service, especially those sent to the
cities.’’59
In the United States there is no evidence that pale-skinned Indian children were
targeted in the same way,60 but in some of the boarding schools to which Indian girls
were sent there was a culture of assimilation that implicitly encouraged or led to
marriages of acculturated graduates with white men. Devon Mihesuah’s study of the
Cherokee Female Seminary in Oklahoma reveals that most graduates ‘‘married white
men or men who had a smaller amount of Cherokee blood than they had.’’61 In my own
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work on Carlisle Indian School I found that the school placed great importance on who
students married, and created an environment in which significant numbers of alumni
married white partners.62 Making indigenous people live and act as though they were
white, and preparing them for a life away from their own communities—indeed,
teaching them that their own communities were not the places in which they should
envision their own futures—was not an openly absorptionist policy, but it was a policy
with an easily imagined consequence: relationships with white people, no doubt based
in many cases on love and respect, but intermarriages nevertheless.
A third area in which biological absorption can be discerned as an unspoken aspect
of colonialism is the legislative attempt to regulate indigenous identity and related
ideas about ‘‘authentic’’ and ‘‘inauthentic’’ indigeneity that are common to both
Australia and the United States. On closer examination, an acknowledgment of the
absorptionist outcomes of these policies has much to contribute to the historiography
on biological absorption in both countries. In both nations, legislation passed by settler
governments attempted to decide who was and was not an indigenous person.
This legislation was rarely inclusive and often gave people of mixed descent an
uncertain legal status. As Paul Havemann has argued, the ‘‘power to confer the status
of citizenship is the pivotal technique used by modern states to distinguish the
‘belonging’—non-waste—from the ‘excluded’—the waste.’’63
In many Australian states, legislation defined people of mixed descent as
Aboriginal only if they associated with Aboriginal people of full descent or were of
a certain age. The 1886 Aborigines Protection Amendment Act in Victoria, for example,
assigned Aboriginal status only to those people of mixed descent ‘‘habitually
associating and living with an aboriginal,’’ women of mixed descent who were
‘‘married to an aboriginal’’ prior to the act’s coming into force, infants, and persons over
thirty-four years of age.64 If not defined as Aborigines, these people occupied an ill-
defined legal status somewhere between white and indigenous, in a society that judged
them very much on the color of their skin.
Another legal method existed by which government officials could remove
Aboriginal status. Exemption certificates were awarded in New South Wales,
Western Australia, South Australia, Queensland, and the Northern Territory.
Although these certificates ostensibly freed acculturated Aboriginal people from the
controls of protection legislation, there is some evidence that certificates were awarded
not just on the basis of acculturation but also based on perceived ideas about skin color.
In Queensland, there was a racial requirement: ‘‘only half-castes who are civilized and
have no intercourse with aboriginals can obtain them and then only on satisfying the
Department of their ability to manage their own affairs.’’65 All people of mixed descent
would be declared exempt, unless they lived ‘‘as an aboriginal with full-blooded
aboriginals,’’ in which case ‘‘[they] will be treated as . . . aboriginal.’’ This was not just a
protective measure. The secretary for health and home affairs, who introduced
the bill, thought that those people of mixed descent who were ‘‘inclined to look at
matters too loosely soon complied with conditions when they found that they were
likely to be brought under the control of the Aboriginals Department and treated
as Aboriginals.’’66 In other states, certificates were not awarded according to racial
background, but assumptions about skin color and the potential to blend in with the
white community made people of mixed descent prime candidates. It should be noted
that exemption certificates and legal controls over who was officially an Aborigine both
predated and lasted well beyond the interwar period during which most scholars locate
biological absorption.67 Thus, discussions of biological absorption and genocide would
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be enhanced by taking into account the broad absorptionist underpinning of much of
Aboriginal legislation in the twentieth century.
In the United States, the notion of the blood quantum was introduced in
nineteenth-century legislation was and used mostly inconsistently in federal Indian
law.68 At certain points in US history, however, blood quanta were clearly used to
separate people of mixed descent and to deny them Indian identity or the special rights
that came with it. The 1887 Dawes Act required Indian tribes to finalize tribal rolls in
order for lands to be divided equitably among their members. This process was soon
hurried along by the federal government, which sent enrollment commissions out to
reservations to enumerate Indian nations. The resulting administrative confusion and
strict deadlines left many people of mixed descent, whose connections to the tribe
were sometimes more fragile, off tribal rolls. In 1912, for example, the Dawes
Commission summarized its work in Oklahoma as follows: ‘‘Applications were made
for the enrollment of over 200,000 persons, of which number 101,221 were enrolled and
found entitled to allotments.’’69 In addition, a prevalent view of the time was that
many of the people applying to be placed on tribal rolls were white or ‘‘practically
white’’ people trying to get their share of Indian lands. Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Thomas Morgan used the Osage Nation as an example of white people’s claiming
Indian ancestry in order to be allotted land:
Some of the applicants for tribal rights have but the slightest trace, if any, of Indian
blood; and, in some instances, they have lived among and affiliated exclusively with
white people. Indeed, applications have been made to this office for participation in
tribal benefits by United States citizens whose sole title thereto rested upon their claim
of having aboriginal blood in their veins by descent from Powhatan through
Pocahontas.70
In April 1917, Indians of mixed descent were targeted in a different way.
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells issued his ‘‘Declaration of Policy,’’ which
immediately declared all Indians with less than one-half Indian ‘‘blood’’ to be
automatically ‘‘competent’’ and therefore exempt from the special rights and
protections that came with Indian status. Previously, competency had been a tool
whereby acculturated Indian people might become exempt from the twenty-five year
trust period that prevented their allotted lands from being sold or mortgaged, and had
to be applied for on the basis of acculturation and business acumen. Land-hungry
settlers soon realized that it was in their interests for as many Indians as possible to be
declared competent, culminating in Sells’s policy basing competency on racial
background. Finally, the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act contained a section that
defined as ‘‘Indian’’ all people recognized by an Indian tribe, and of the rest, only those
that were ‘‘of one-half or more Indian blood.’’71 Such a definition immediately
statistically absorbed all those Indians of mixed descent who were not on tribal rolls.
In states with large African-American populations, biological absorption of Indians
took a slightly different tack, operating as a kind of boundary maintenance. The
saliency of black/white miscegenation in Virginia, for example, created an environ-
ment in which a form of Indian biological absorption was openly advocated and
sanctioned, most prominently by the head of the Bureau of Vital Statistics, Walter A.
Plecker, and imposed upon the native peoples of that state by legislation that allowed
them to be called ‘‘colored’’ rather than Indian. This unusual and extreme focus on
Indians’ being absorbed into the African-American population rather than the white
population stemmed from the arrogant assumption made by some white Virginians
that segregation had been achieved with stringent application of the ‘‘one-drop rule,’’
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Jim Crow laws, and anti-miscegenation legislation; Indian people were a messy third
category that blurred their neatly dichotomized state.72 Recent scholarship has begun
to explore how white America’s focus on intermarriages between Indians and
African Americans has been used to declare Indians nations inauthentic. Tiya Miles
reports that
recently when I was speaking in a public forum about black and American Indian
relations in colonial and early America, a respected Indian elder from a Great Plains
tribe impressed on me her strong desire that I cease speaking about this topic. Her fear,
as she expressed it, was that documenting the intermarriage of black and Indian people
would give the U.S. government just one more reason to declare Native people
inauthentic and soluble and then to seize their remaining lands any vestiges of political
autonomy.73
These brief examples of how federal and state governments in the United States
used divisions based on blood quantum or race to reduce the numbers of Indians
support the idea of a ‘‘strategy of elimination’’ advocated by scholars such as
M. Annette Jaimes. Biological absorption may not have been an explicit policy in the
United States, but there is no doubt that simply being of mixed descent prevented an
individual from attaining full, unquestioned Indian status (at least in the settler
governments’ view). By itself, being of mixed descent did not necessarily separate a
person out from a tribe or nation, but in conjunction with other factors it could weaken
his or her claim on indigenous identity. Patrick Wolfe’s notion of repressive
authenticity—the romantic view of only full-descent, ‘‘traditional’’ Indians as ‘‘real’’
Indians—is useful here. Wolfe argues that this stereotyping ‘‘eliminates large numbers
of empirical natives from official reckonings and, as such, is often concomitant
with genocidal practice.’’74 Repressive authenticity has persisted to the present day.
As Andrea Smith reports,
In 1990, Illinois governor Jim Thompson echoed these sentiments when he refused to
close down an open Indian burial mound in the town of Dixon. The State of Illinois had
built a museum around this mound to publicly display Indian remains. Thompson
argued that he was as much Indian as current Indians, and consequently, he had as
much right as they to determine the fate of Indian remains. The remains were ‘‘his.’’
The Chicago press similarly attempted to challenge the identity of Indian people
protesting his decision by asserting that they were either only ‘‘part’’ Indian, or merely
claiming to be Indian.75
The use of blood quanta by many Indian nations is now controversial. As Theda
Perdue has argued,
it drives a wedge between the members of a Native community by using ‘‘blood’’
to privilege some individuals, to discredit others, and ultimately to racialize
Native societies in ways that are foreign to Native cultural traditions.76
Linking blood quanta to ‘‘strategies of elimination’’ to genocide reveals the historical
foundations of, and the absorptionist thinking that lies behind, this kind of racialized
categorization.
Thus, a comparison of indigenous assimilation policies in Australia and the United
States helps us to understand the many guises biological absorption can take.
Australian ideas about the long-term effects of ongoing interracial relationships
certainly had parallels in the US context. Indeed, a closer look at US Indian policies
prompts us to look beyond the rhetoric of cultural assimilation for absorptionist
strategies hidden in the legal definitions of indigenous identity. In turn, this is a
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valuable lesson for the Australian context, where scholars have focused on biological
absorption only when it was an outspoken policy.
So where does this broader view of biological absorption leave us with respect to
the debates over genocide and indigenous peoples in Australia and the United States?
At first glance, thinking of interracial marriages and their production of offspring
as genocide is counterintuitive; interracial relationships were a phenomenon that
created life, not ended it. Nevertheless, the doctrine of biological absorption rested on
the idea of the eventual disappearance of a distinct group of people. But should we
perhaps consider the linguistic device of using terms such as ‘‘ethnocide’’ or ‘‘cultural
genocide’’ to refer to absorption? Does it have more relevance to these sub-definitions
of genocide that scholars have invented to refer to attempts to destroy culture rather
the people?
Andrew Markus offers useful definitions of ethnocide and genocide. He defines
ethnocide as ‘‘the attempt to bring about the disappearance of an ethnic or racial
group by suppression of its culture, language, and religion, but stopping short of
physical destruction’’ and genocide as ‘‘the attempt to bring about the disappearance of
an ethnic or racial group by deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its partial physical destruction and including selective mass
killing.’’77 Given these definitions, a broader acknowledgment of how biological
absorption operated in Australia and the United States in fact blurs the boundaries
between ethnocide and genocide: absorption led to births, not to deaths, but these
births were supposed to be (although they often were not) a conduit of culture loss—a
gradual disconnecting from culture, language, and religion over the generations. Thus,
if we view biological absorption as ethnocide, we must take into account its biological
aspects—its reliance on blood, sex, and bodies. As R. Charli Carpenter puts it,
pregnancy can have a ‘‘unique role in corroding the victimized culture.’’78 If we view
biological absorption as genocide, we must acknowledge that it was not a method of
mass killing; but it was still certainly a ‘‘condition of life calculated to bring about
[a group’s] partial physical destruction’’: it was a policy about changing skin color and
physical markers of identity as well as internal connections to culture and family.
However, although the application of the concept of genocide to the assimilation of
indigenous peoples in Australia and United States has received much scholarly
attention, I believe we need to move away from hard-and-fast legal definitions in order
to be able to assess these nation’s histories more clearly. As Wolfe points out, there is a
danger in using sub-definitions of genocide, such as ethnocide or cultural genocide,
because such usage
confuses definition with degree. . .. In particular, in an elementary category error,
‘‘either/or’’ can be substituted for ‘‘both/and,’’ from which genocide emerges as either
biological (read ‘‘the real thing’’) or cultural—and thus, it follows, not real.79
‘‘The apparently insurmountable problem with the qualified genocides [‘cultural
genocide,’ ‘ethnocide,’ ‘politicide,’ etc.],’’ Wolfe writes,
is that, in their very defensiveness, they threaten to undo themselves. They are
never quite the real thing. . .. The term ‘‘structural genocide’’ avoids the questions of
degree—and, and therefore, of hierarchy among victims—that are entailed in qualified
genocides.80
Moving away from discussions of the strict definitions of genocide goes some way
toward recognizing the most important aspect of this debate—its implications for
indigenous communities themselves. As Seena Kohl has argued, the biggest difference
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between ethnocide and genocide is the tenacity of cultures that have undergone the
former.81 The fact that indigenous peoples have so successfully resisted attempts to
remove their culture and identity does not mean that we should underestimate the
persistence with which colonial societies attempted to erase them by bickering over
legal definitions.
We must also pay careful attention to how these debates over definition actually
assist indigenous peoples in negotiating the inequalities that still exist in settler
societies. As Dirk Moses points out,
who will gainsay the point of Indigenous jurist Larissa Behrendt that ‘‘the political
posturing and semantic debates do nothing to dispel the feeling Indigenous people have
that this is the word that adequately describes our experience as colonized people’’?82
When historians focus our discussions on the subsections of a legal definition, we
undermine the promise and potential of the historical profession. It is not our job to
decide legal accountability: it is our task to document the complexity of the past, with
all its variations and its troubling, difficult-to-define people and beliefs. Thinking
about whether biological absorption was genocidal according to the term itself obscures
the myriad ways in which absorptionist thinking underlay legislation even when it
was not openly discussed. There are good political reasons for indigenous peoples to
characterize their experiences as genocide and to use the language of accountability. In
our investigations into the past, we can help them best by trying to understand
colonialism and by exploring its powerful, still-present assumptions about the world.
I hope I have shown in this paper, for example, that there is an irony in applying a
strict definition from the 1948 UNCG to the equally stringent definitions of indigenous
identity from the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Australia and the United
States.
We must also think hard about how this aspect of Australia’s history affects
present-day ideas about indigenous identity. As Darlene Johnson argues,
genocide must also be understood in terms of the historical effects on a people of
institutional colonialism. It is still being written and read off our bodies. The policies of
control, segregation, incarceration—the abuses of power, the separation of families and
the gaoling of people—have effects on bodies and have inscribed cultural memories on
them.83
One of the outcomes of acknowledging the links between miscegenation, assimilation
policies, and genocide is a contribution to the angst-ridden debates about Aboriginal
and Indian identity, an acknowledgment of the underlying biological, physical, bloody
aspects of assimilation policies that demonstrate the terrifying resolve of settler
governments to rid themselves of the Aboriginal or Indian problem one way or another.
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Ontological Destruction: Genocide and
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The impact of colonialism on Aboriginal groups in Canada is often described as
‘‘cultural genocide’’ or ‘‘ethnocide.’’ In contrast, this article offers a re-reading of the
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (1948) that is sensitive to Aboriginal understandings and experiences
of group life and group destruction. Through this re-reading, it is argued that
genocide must be understood in a culturally contextualized manner so as to avoid
modernist and Eurocentric biases. Only by opening up the conception of genocide
will we be able to contend adequately with Canadian Aboriginal experiences of
colonialism.
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Introduction
The terms ‘‘cultural genocide’’ and ‘‘ethnocide’’ have often been used to describe the
destruction perpetrated against Canadian Aboriginal peoples.2 In such cases, one
senses that these terms are not intended to invoke one of the categories of genocide
created by Raphael Lemkin when the United Nations Secretariat retained him in 1946
to help draft an international convention3 but, rather, are used as qualifiers to describe
processes different from and less severe than genocide proper, which some suggest
must involve the attempted physical annihilation of the targeted group.4 However,
to characterize the harms produced by Canadian colonialism as cultural genocide is
problematic on at least three grounds. First, the varied path of attempted Aboriginal
destruction in Canada is misrepresented by attempts to reduce Canadian colonialism
to a singular event and Aboriginal Canadians to a single ‘‘group.’’ To put it simply,
Canadian Aboriginal peoples are culturally and regionally diverse and experienced
colonialism in different ways. Second, while all Aboriginal groups experienced at least
some degree of attempted assimilation, some also experienced high levels of physical
destruction through settler violence, disease, and deadly residential-school conditions,
as well as biological interference with reproductive processes. Finally, the separation
between ‘‘cultural’’ and ‘‘physical’’ forms of destruction—a modernist contrivance that
contends that such neat categories in fact exist—collapses under a more detailed
investigation of Aboriginal experiences of destruction. This third problematic is the
primary focus of this article.
While the assumption that Canadian Aboriginal peoples experienced only cultural
genocide is commonplace, in my research on land claims and reparations for Aboriginal
peoples in British Columbia, I have come across many Aboriginal persons who describe
their experiences of colonialism as ‘‘genocide.’’5 At first, I took this to be a politicized
use of the term—an attempt to harness its symbolic power to the task of advancing
Canadian Aboriginal justice claims.6 Surely they meant cultural genocide or ethnocide.
Moreover, in delineating their experiences of genocide, these Aboriginal respondents
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included not only residential schools and Canadian assimilation policies—phenomena
often discussed under the rubric of cultural genocide—but also land appropriation, the
spread of European diseases, and the broad legal framework of Canadian colonialism.
Taking these claims seriously, I begin in this article from the premise that these people
are neither strategically misinterpreting the term ‘‘genocide’’ nor employing it solely
for political purposes. In doing so, I argue that a re-reading of the 1948 United Nations
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (UNCG) through a lens
sensitive to Aboriginal realities lends greater validity to these claims.
If we are to begin to address Canadian Aboriginal claims of genocide, it is
necessary to reject a strictly epistemological approach to the question of genocide,
one that seeks to identify a guiding legal or sociological definition of genocide that can
be applied to multiple cases in a doctrinal manner. This means that the UNGC
definition of genocide will not be used here as a ‘‘universal grid’’7 for classifying human
groups and their violent relations. Lost within such generalizations are local
understandings of collective life and collective destruction. Thus, this article moves
toward an ‘‘ontology of destruction,’’ examining genocide from the perspective of how
destruction is experienced and made sense of by targeted collectivities who define their
worlds within culturally specific meaning systems. This portrayal will be partial, since
it is impossible to do more than hint at some Aboriginal understandings of destruction
within the allotted space. Thus, the examples provided are not intended as a
comprehensive account of Canadian Aboriginal genocides but are merely illustrative
of how the UNCG potentially fails to capture Canadian Aboriginal notions of being.
It should also be noted that my project is not to relativize or to broaden the concept
of genocide to the extent that it loses all meaning. Instead, the UNCG will continue to
serve as a guiding framework for constituting acts of genocide, but key components of
its definition will be interrogated and opened up so that they move beyond modernist
and Eurocentric meaning horizons. The goal is to employ the UNCG in a manner more
sensitive to cultural specificity, rather than in a strictly legalistic sense. To this end,
I will seek to destabilize what it means to be a ‘‘group,’’ to show ‘‘intent,’’ and to
experience ‘‘destruction,’’ all terms specified in art. 2 of the UNCG.8
Aboriginal/Non-Aboriginal Relations in Canada
Before embarking on this analysis it is necessary to provide a succinct summary of the
history of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations in Canada. The narrative that follows is a
simplification of the process of colonization, which, asmentioned above, took a variety of
distinct forms depending on the Aboriginal people and the region in question.
The first non-Aboriginal visitors to what is now Canada were Norsemen who
attempted to settle parts of Newfoundland and Labrador in the eleventh century.
Conflict ensued with the local Aboriginal population, and the Norse abandoned their
efforts. In the latter part of the fifteenth century, Europeans returned, this time
pursuing sea products ranging from cod to whale. Some expeditions set up temporary
camps ashore to dry their catch, but, for the most part, they had minimal contact with
Aboriginal peoples of this region.
Beginning in the sixteenth century, Europeans—in particular, the French and the
British—set out more regularly to explore North America. At first they sought to
discover a sea route to the riches of the Far East. But they soon discovered that North
America possessed its own store of wealth: the beaver pelts and other animal furs that
were desired in Europe. European traders depended on Aboriginal peoples to hunt
and treat the furs so that they could be transformed into hats and other clothing.
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This trade continued through much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
creating a symbiotic relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal trappers and
traders.
Aboriginal peoples were also important military allies for the competing European
colonizers. Warfare between Aboriginal peoples prior to the arrival of Europeans
tended to produce few casualties, since the available weaponry was relatively
unsophisticated. However, with the arrival of European military technology and
the export of European struggles to North American soil, Aboriginal peoples
found themselves increasingly engaged in deadly combat. The eighteenth century
was particularly bloody as the French, British, and Anglo-Americans battled for
control of North America. Many Aboriginal peoples found themselves immersed
in war, whether as part of an alliance with one of the conflicting European nations or
in combat with a new or long-standing Aboriginal enemy.
The French brought evangelism to their Aboriginal trading partners in the
seventeenth century. These efforts to ‘‘save’’ the ‘‘souls’’ of Aboriginal peoples were
intensified by religious orders such as the Re´collets and the Jesuits who ventured into
Aboriginal communities to proselytize to their inhabitants. These orders differed in
the degree to which they sought to assimilate Aboriginal peoples to European ways.
The Re´collets attempted not just a spiritual but a cultural conversion, while the Jesuits
believed that tending to the souls of Aboriginal peoples was enough. However, the
presence of these and other evangelists within Aboriginal communities, not to mention
the schools and churches they established, would, in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, be used by the Canadian government in its attempts to culturally absorb
Aboriginal persons into the Canadian mainstream (e.g., through ‘‘residential schools’’).
Despite the early presence of European traders and missionaries, settlers were few
at the onset of Canadian colonization. Indeed, Aboriginal peoples would have been in a
secure position to maintain their power, territories, traditions, and trade had it not
been for the spread of European diseases. Since Aboriginal peoples had established
little resistance to diseases such as smallpox, these diseases provided ‘‘biological
power’’ to facilitate European control.9 Carried along trade routes, diseases often
preceded Europeans into Aboriginal communities and decimated their populations.
At least half the Aboriginal population of between 200,000 and 300,000 people was
killed by disease between the beginning of the seventeenth century and the end of the
nineteenth.10 This devastating death toll opened vast areas of land to European
settlement and exploitation.
The destructive effect of colonialism intensified as Europeans began to seek
possession of Aboriginal territories for settlement and resource exploitation. Once
British control of Canada was established in the mid-seventeenth century, population
pressures and land scarcity in Britain brought settlers seeking new economic
opportunities to eastern Canada (and later to the Prairie region). In contrast, on the
West Coast of Canada, various entrepreneurs spearheaded colonial control of what is
today British Columbia when they strove to exploit the resources of this region.
Colonial economic activities on the West Coast began with the fur trade but expanded
into gold mining, fisheries, and forestry. Both settler and entrepreneurial patterns
of colonization affected Aboriginal peoples drastically, carving their traditional
territories into increasingly smaller allotments.
Any attempt by these newcomers to dispossess Aboriginal peoples of their lands
was supposed to be constrained by British law. In the aftermath of the Anglo–French
struggle for control of what is now Canada, George III of Britain issued the
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Royal Proclamation of 1763 to set the ground rules for colonial relations. The portion of
this text that refers to Aboriginal peoples reads as follows:
We do therefore, with the Advice of our Privy Council, declare it to be our Royal Will
and Pleasure . . . that no Governor or Commander in Chief in any of our other Colonies
or Plantations in America do presume for the present, and until our further Pleasure be
known, to grant Warrants of Survey, or pass Patents for any Lands beyond the Heads or
Sources of any of the Rivers which fall into the Atlantic Ocean from the West and North
West, or upon any Lands whatever, which, not having been ceded to or purchased by
Us as aforesaid, are reserved to the said Indians, or any of them.11
In accordance with this proclamation, the colonial government was charged with
signing treaties with Aboriginal peoples through which the latter would exchange
their territorial rights for goods and services to be provided by the Crown. This policy
was followed in several parts of Canada, leading to the creation of agreements such as
the ‘‘numbered treaties,’’ which cover large portions of Ontario and the Prairie
provinces. Negotiating in the afterglow of the cooperation and trust that defined
the fur trade, Aboriginal groups often assumed the treaties to be living documents that
would shift depending upon their changing needs. In contrast, the non-Aboriginal
negotiators saw the treaties as an opportunity to restrict Aboriginal peoples to reserves
and to gain access to their traditional territories through annuity payments.12
In other regions, this legal imperative to negotiate treaties was ignored. In British
Columbia, for example, Aboriginal peoples were denied treaties and forced onto
reserves smaller than those anywhere else in Canada. To this day, First Nations in
British Columbia seek treaty agreements that will recognize their Aboriginal rights
and title, as well as their inherent right to self-government.13
Although Canadian Aboriginal peoples have at times used laws such as the
Royal Proclamation to pursue their Aboriginal rights and title, law has more often
operated as a tool of colonization. Under British control, legal mechanisms such as the
1857 Gradual Civilization Act were passed to legislate the ‘‘progress’’ of Aboriginal
peoples. Following Confederation in 1867, the Dominion of Canada increased its use of
law as a means to control Aboriginal peoples. Indeed, a first step in this control was to
define the population that was to be controlled. In 1876, the Indian Act officially
codified the definition of Indian and non-Indian.14 This piece of legislation, despite
many revisions, is still in place and still regulates most dimensions of the lives of
First Nations individuals and communities.15 In addition, traditional Aboriginal
government structures were reshaped through laws such as the Indian Act and the
Enfranchisement Act of 1869, which combined to give the Canadian government
greater powers to interfere with governance on Aboriginal reserves.
It should also be noted that the spread of Canadian policing to the far corners of
the new nation had a marked impact on Aboriginal ways of life. Royal North-West
(later Canadian) Mounted Police officers enforced Canadian law upon even those
Aboriginal peoples who had previously operated at some remove from the colonial
government. Among the most destructive laws were those forbidding traditional
cultural practices, such as the Potlatch or Sun Dance, and those that required
Aboriginal children to attend residential schools.16
Residential schooling was an important part of a broader policy of assimilation.
Frustrated by Aboriginal peoples’ refusal to accept Canadian offers of ‘‘enfranch-
isement,’’ Canadian leaders turned to education as a means to eliminate Aboriginal
cultures. Residential schools began operating in the late nineteenth century, drawing
on an existing network of Protestant and Catholic schools. These were initially day
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schools, but their administrators felt that the children’s returning to their parents at
the end of each day was undoing their day of lessons in the proper conduct of ‘‘civilized’’
persons. In response, the schools began to hold students in residence for most of the
year, giving them only a month in the summer to visit their families. By 1920,
residential schools were made mandatory for all Aboriginal children. At many schools,
conditions were so inadequate that large numbers of children died from ill health,
exposure to the elements, and poor nutrition.17 Others suffered physical and sexual
abuse, as well as a constant verbal assault on their cultures, traditions, communities,
and families. Upon completing their education, many no longer felt at home or
welcome in their communities and became divorced from their cultural traditions.
Moreover, deprived of the experience of being parented, they later found it a great
struggle to raise their own children.18 Continuing cycles of emotional, physical, and
sexual abuse, as well as addiction, suicide, and other markers of intergenerational
trauma, within Aboriginal communities are considered residual effects of the
residential-school experience.19
The combined effects of land appropriation, violated or ignored treaties, legal
domination, and forced assimilation were devastating for Aboriginal peoples. However,
they did not entirely succumb to these experiences. Since colonization they have
enacted resistance both on an everyday and at a broader societal level. On the
everyday level, Aboriginal peoples have held onto their identities and have worked
hard to recover and revitalize Aboriginal languages and traditions in order to preserve
their cultures. Although these emblems of cultural identity are still in jeopardy, the
extent to which they have survived is remarkable, given the colonial onslaught against
them.20 On a broader societal level, Aboriginal persons have used national political
organizations such as the Assembly of First Nations and countless regional bodies to
express Aboriginal grievances and to pursue justice. The efforts of such organizations
have culminated in several moral and political victories. For example, in 1969, the
Canadian government tabled a white paper through which it attempted to impose the
individual rights of Canadian citizenship upon Aboriginal persons. This policy
decision, taken by Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal government, seemed so contrary
to advice provided by First Nations leaders in government consultations prior to the
release of the document that it immediately galvanized Aboriginal persons across
Canada. Most saw this policy as an attempt at cultural assimilation that would destroy
the Aboriginal way of life. Because of their vocal and concerted protest, the Trudeau
government was forced to withdraw the proposal.
Aboriginal peoples have also used Canadian courts to protect and extend their
Aboriginal rights and title. One of the first major legal victories for Aboriginal peoples
came in Calder v. British Columbia (1973).21 Although the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision did not technically favor the Nisga’a First Nation, which launched the case,
the reasons for the judgment given by the Court did recognize that Aboriginal title is
not something granted by the Crown but, rather, pre-exists European settlement.
This decision, together with Aboriginal protests against the 1969 white paper,
convinced the Canadian government to take steps to acknowledge Aboriginal
demands. In this spirit, in 1974 the government began to negotiate comprehensive
land claims with Aboriginal groups that did not possess treaties, and affirmed and
recognized Aboriginal and treaty rights in Part II of the Constitution Act, 1982.22
Aboriginal peoples remain a powerful force within Canadian society, despite living
in conditions that set them apart in terms of poverty, health, economic opportunity,
education, and other indicators of social marginalization.
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The complexity of this historical narrative, even in such a simplified form, makes any
application of the concept of genocide to the circumstances difficult. First, the events
described above are loosely networked and do not follow any straightforward genocidal
teleology of intent; that is, although we see many moments of intentional destruction,
it would be difficult to legally prove the existence of a focused plan of annihilation that
could be construed as specific intent. Second, assaults on Aboriginal peoples often
derived from what were, at least at the time, liberal or even humanistic motivations.
Various ‘‘enlightened’’ Europeans came to North America with the belief that ‘‘Indians’’
could—through instruction and education—be made fit for ‘‘civilized’’ society. Finally,
given the constant presence of Aboriginal resistance, there is a tendency in Canadian
historiography to avoid use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ lest it portray Aboriginal nations as
utterly powerless in the face of European might and overlook their impressive
perseverance.23
These issues must be acknowledged in addressing Canadian Aboriginal claims of
genocide. However, they also distract us somewhat from grappling directly with
Aboriginal experiences of attempted colonial destruction. The first two issues prioritize
the intentions and motives of the perpetrators, but we must first address what
we mean by ‘‘destruction’’ before we can examine whether or not it was intended.
As I suggest below, Aboriginal peoples who suffered greatly at the hands of the
majority continue, in their own eyes, to suffer the effects of colonialism. Humanitarian
motives do not absolve genocidal intent if these humanitarian beliefs promoted the
denial and elimination of Aboriginal ways of being. The third issue attempts to shift
the focus away from portraying Aboriginal peoples as passive victims and toward
an emphasis on their active survival; however, it is wrong to assume that charges of
genocide presuppose the passivity of victims. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find
any instance of genocide that did not meet with some level of resistance on the part of
victims.
The remainder of this article is devoted to re-reading the opening sentence of art.
2 of the UNCG in a manner informed by Canadian Aboriginal experiences of
colonialism. The objective is to illustrate how we must first open our evaluative tools
to localized Aboriginal understandings of group identity and collective destruction
before we can attempt to adjudicate whether or not genocidal intent was evident in the
Canadian case.
Genocide and the UNCG
Raphael Lemkin devised the term ‘‘genocide,’’ a combination of Greek genos (‘‘race,’’
‘‘tribe’’) and Latin cide (from cidere, ‘‘to kill’’), to provoke the world to take seriously
this crime that had heretofore gone ‘‘without a name.’’24 With this new word in hand,
he directed his efforts toward the legal codification of the term so that a clear standard
would be in place, rather than the hodgepodge of international treaties and
agreements that did not speak to the scale of genocidal crimes. Debate continues
about what Lemkin determined to be included within, or necessary to, his definition of
genocide.
Lemkin, with his focus on the maintenance and protection of ‘‘national groups,’’
discussed not only mass killing and the physical elimination of such groups but also
what is often referred to as ‘‘cultural genocide’’ or ‘‘ethnocide.’’25 Some, such as Ward
Churchill, argue that, according to Lemkin, the destruction of a group’s ability
to continue its cultural existence is sufficient for a determination of genocide.26
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Others argue that Lemkin still held killing to be an essential component of genocide.27
Regardless, it is important to note that Lemkin did give priority to the protection of
cultural or ‘‘national’’ groups.28 Thus, ‘‘physical’’ genocide was not, for him, simply a
matter of individual killings in the aggregate; rather, it referred to the manner in
which the mass loss of life debilitates the continuation of a ‘‘group.’’ Given this, it must
also be acknowledged that extermination is not the only means available to achieve
group destruction, although it is certainly a potent and primary means.
Moreover, we must first learn something about the group’s singularity, or what
Lemkin calls the ‘‘essential foundations’’ of group life,29 if we are to ascertain what it
might mean to destroy them. What binds the group together? What cultural
components are central to the definitional work of reproducing this group as a social
unit? Obviously, there must be individual members participating in this collectivity if
it is to exist, but there may be other necessary factors involved as well: territory,
language, modes of governance, to name but a few. Based on this focus on the key
components of group life, the analytical difference that scholars such as Chalk and
Jonassohn claim to exist between physical and cultural forms of genocide becomes less
obvious, as we can envision the possibility that the loss of the so-called cultural
components of group life might be as damaging to the group’s sustainability as the
killing of its members.30 Thus, these processes of physical and cultural destruction are
so entwined that they are often separable only at an analytical level that breaks down
upon examination of actual experiences of destruction.31
Lemkin’s goal of achieving recognition of the crime of genocide was realized,
in part, with the drafting of UNCG. Article 2 of this convention reads,
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.32
Setting aside for the moment the five means to genocide that follow the ‘‘as such,’’
as well as the political context in which this article was crafted,33 it is worth exploring
the opening sentence of art. 2 in relation to Canadian Aboriginal experiences of
destruction. It is this statement that establishes the parameters of the UNCG,
demanding that we consider the meanings of words such as ‘‘intent,’’ ‘‘destroy,’’ and
‘‘group.’’
Aboriginal Understandings of Group Identity
One of the most controversial aspects of the UNCG is that it restricts the groups
potentially targeted by genocide to ‘‘national, ethnical, racial or religious’’ groups.
Clearly, this is a rather limited list of potential groupings that ignores a great variety
of forms of collective life.34 Nonetheless, it could be argued that Aboriginal groups fit
into one or more of these group categories. For example, Aboriginal groups have some
of the characteristics of racial or ethnic groups, in the sense that they exhibit distinct
cultural practices and are bound by specific norms, beliefs, and a common language or
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linguistic heritage. However, this designation overlooks the multiethnic dimensions of
Canadian Aboriginal communities. Often these communities invite members from
other communities to join their ranks; indeed, such ethnic mobility was historically
encouraged as a means of creating inter-tribal links.35 For this reason, one might
be tempted, instead, to designate Canadian Aboriginal communities as ‘‘nations’’ for
purposes of the UNCG. However, this too is imperfect, since, unlike European notions
of nationhood that presuppose fixed national boundaries, Aboriginal understandings of
territory tend to be more fluid. For example, neighboring Aboriginal groups often held
‘‘shared territories’’ that allowed for multi-community usage of lands.36
Thus, the restrictions placed on group identity by the UNCG are inappropriate and
potentially encourage a ‘‘totalization’’ of community life that is itself a danger to
Aboriginal group identities. In other words, by seeking to impose clear community
parameters upon Canadian Aboriginal groups, interpreters of the UNCG may
miscategorize these communities in a way that obstructs their attempts to exist as
‘‘becoming communities’’37—that is, communities engaged in an ongoing and daily
process of self-definition and redefinition that never suggests a point of community
closure. Indeed, some Aboriginal peoples consider the experience of enforced closure,
through mechanisms such as the Canadian reserve system and the ‘‘self-governance’’
arrangements offered by the Canadian government, part of an ongoing process
of attempted colonial destruction.38
The UNCG further implies that a group consists solely of its human members, but
this may be quite contrary to the group identity of collectivities adhering to or built
upon animist belief systems that include their environs and local wildlife as part of the
group. Under the terms of the UNCG, the impact of the destruction or expropriation
of lands and wildlife on group life is considered only through the charge (in art. 2(c))
of ‘‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part.’’ Indeed, several scholars have used this
part of the UNCG to argue that the ecological destruction experienced by Canadian
Aboriginal peoples is genocidal.39 Along these lines, one could examine how, at the
end of the fur-trade period, with the move toward settlement, the colonial project
began to bear more directly on Aboriginal lands. For example, in British Columbia,
the imposition of the reserve system denied Aboriginal peoples nearly all of
their territories, as well as traditional hunting, fishing, and governance practices.
As Cole Harris notes,
From the late 1860s, Native leaders had protested their small reserves in every
way they could, claiming, fundamentally, that their people would not have enough food
and that their progeny had no prospects. In retrospect, they were right. The spaces
assigned to Native people did not support them, although the mixed economies they
cobbled together, the revised diets they ate, and the accommodations and settlements
they lived in had allowed some of them to survive.40
This destructive force of colonial land appropriation is evident in the experiences of
the Tsawwassen First Nation. Located in the lower mainland of British Columbia,
their reserve was wedged between a ferry terminal, a coal port, and a highway.
The coal port and the ferry terminal combined to destroy shellfish life and fishing areas
along the Tsawwassen beachfront, and their longhouse was destroyed to make way for
the highway. Such practices, and their equivalents throughout BC and across
Canada,41 were near catastrophic in their consequences, especially when combined
with the population loss caused by European diseases, making difficult not only
cultural but also physical reproduction. Thus, one could reasonably argue that these
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are instances in which ‘‘conditions of life calculated to bring about [an Aboriginal
group’s] physical destruction in whole or in part’’ were inflicted.
However, this reading does not fully address the centrality of land and wildlife to
Aboriginal peoples. As Peter Kulchyski suggests of Aboriginal communities in
Denendeh and Nunavut, the Aboriginal relationship to landscape is neither merely
‘‘closeness’’ to nor a strong reliance upon nature; rather, the natural world represents
an ‘‘embodied inscription.’’42 Territory is an essential part of their group-formation
processes, and its removal represents a dire threat to the ability of these groups to
reproduce a group identity. Mohawk legal scholar Patricia Monture-Angus describes
group identity as follows: ‘‘Identity, as I have come to understand it, requires a
relationship with territory (and not a relationship based on control of that territory).’’43
The point is that it is a disservice to force Aboriginal experiences of ecological
destruction into a framework that acknowledges only the subsistence value of land to a
group, even if this move might initially appear to advance their justice claims by
clearly locating land and wildlife destruction within the terms of the UNCG. To fully
acknowledge the Aboriginal experience of attempted destruction, we need to under-
stand land and environment not simply as means of sustaining group life, but as key
components of group life. Thus, in our example, the Tsawwassen did not simply lose
their traditional food supports and their longhouse; the whittling down of their reserve
and the destruction of their sociocultural environment placed severe restrictions on
how they could imagine themselves as a people in relation to, and as part of, their
physical surroundings.
Similarly, Westphalian notions of ‘‘national’’ territory as bounded property to be
owned and used for profit often conflict with traditional Aboriginal understandings of
territory.44 For the Coast Salish of British Columbia, territories are not sharply
defined and instead allow for greater freedom of movement, sharing, and relationships.
Indeed, the imposition of boundaries upon these communities presents a significant
challenge to their self-understandings and group identity. As Brian Thom states,
Coast Salish members
see boundaries and borders as arbitrary and artificial at best, and at worst a part of a
recurring colonial mechanism of government to create division between communities
and kin and weaken the potential strength of the Coast Salish people as a Nation.
These people are concerned that the power of such maps and terms will have the effect
of severing their connections to place, framing the future of engagements with the land
exercised as rights negotiated under land claims settlements firmly in western
ontological terms.45
Genocide scholars interested in the attempted destruction of Canadian Aboriginal
peoples should thus be wary of trying to categorize and draw boundaries around these
peoples in a manner that imposes Western understandings of group identity and group
spaces. If its categories are not held sufficiently open to Canadian Aboriginal notions of
identity and space, the UNCG may unwittingly become yet another Eurocentric tool
for reframing Aboriginal lifeworlds, rather than a resource for Aboriginal justice.46
Forms of Destruction
So what does it mean to ‘‘destroy’’ a group? The previous section discussed the
destructive effects of the imposition of European notions of group identity and
territory; in this section I focus instead on how a modernist framing of destruction
potentially leads to the exclusion of certain harms from consideration in our discussion
of genocide.
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Genocide carries with it notions of harm that are artifacts of a specific
(in particular, modernist) viewpoint that may not reflect how harms are experienced
and understood by different collectives. This is particularly true of what are argued to
be ‘‘natural’’ processes of destruction, such as disease and famine. As Bruno Latour
notes, the modern ‘‘Constitution’’ holds the poles of nature and culture separate, all the
while allowing for the proliferation of hybrids, or ‘‘quasi-objects’’ and ‘‘quasi-subjects,’’
that are amalgamations of nature and culture networked together in a complex
interface. This act of ‘‘purification’’—that is, of keeping nature and culture separate—
allows moderns to stack the deck in their favor, designating events and objects to
either the nature or the culture pole when it suits their interests.47 Taking Latour’s
argument out of its science studies context, we can examine how this practice of
purification operates within debates about what is and what is not genocide, as the
hybridity of destructive processes—for example, the deadly spread of HIV/AIDS
through rapes, or the destruction caused by (fully or partially) orchestrated famines
designed to punish rebellious collectives—often complicates the picture of what is and
is not a part of a genocidal action.
We are able to separate hybridic and networked phenomena such as disease and
famine into the category of ‘‘nature’’ (as distinct from culture or society) not because
this is what empirical evidence suggests but because we adhere to an intellectual
orientation that holds nature and culture to be mutually distinct and uncoupled,
despite their clear interconnections.48 Moreover, this separation also allows for the
production of more terrible hybrids whose destructive tendencies are not held to
account by law or ethics because they are not viewed as targets for social intervention.
Thus, European diseases were permitted to ravage Aboriginal communities largely
unchecked, and with a certain degree of indifference, because these were not processes
for which Europeans felt particularly responsible.49
The spread of European diseases served to weaken Aboriginal communities and to
increase European dominance in North America. As traders and missionaries
penetrated further into Aboriginal societies, they carried epidemics such as smallpox
with them. In other cases, the diseases spread through Aboriginal networks,
originating at colonial entry points—the forts and ports of North America—and
eventually reaching even those groups who had yet to experience European contact.
In these latter cases, the diseases acted as a pre-emptive form of ethnic cleansing,
allowing Europeans to declare Aboriginal lands terra nullius upon reaching the latter’s
decimated communities.50
Amidst the first epidemics of the mid- to late seventeenth century, the growing
importance of trade for Aboriginal societies limited their ability to respond to the
simultaneously growing threat of disease. For example, the Huron in southwestern
Ontario suspected that the plagues that were destroying their communities were
brought by the French Jesuit missionaries, but they dared not evict the missionaries
for fear that the French would halt trade with the Huron. Subsequently, with the
Huron weakened by disease and the supply of beaver pelts dwindling to the point of
provoking greater inter-tribal friction over trade competition, the Iroquois confederacy
attacked and destroyed the Huron.51
Tuberculosis was rampant through many residential schools until the 1940s, and
reports suggest that the staff at these schools did little to help the infected children.
Susceptibility to this and other diseases was increased by the poor nutrition and
inadequate clothing provided to students. In addition, there are reports of students’
being required to bunk with others who were infected.52 With death tolls from
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tuberculosis reaching as high as 50% in some schools, any claim that this was simply
‘‘natural’’ is exposed as disingenuous at best.
More recently, the community of Grassy Narrows experienced the destructive
effects of forced modernization, environmental deterioration, and assimilation.
Relocated from their more isolated reserve by the Canadian government because it
was believed the First Nation would be better served if they had access to a direct
roadway to Kenora, Ontario, the community suffered in the end through the loss of its
traditions, mass suicide, rampant child neglect and abuse, widespread alcoholism and
mercury poisoning, and the destruction of their food source and livelihood.53
Each of these destructive events represents a braiding of social and natural
processes.54 However, the UNCG is often read within a modernist framework that
assumes a stark divide between nature and culture. Thus, the five forms of destruction
highlighted in art. 2—‘‘killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group’’—all presume a decidedly social strategy of elimination.
The problem with this presumption, in terms of understanding the attempted
destruction of Canadian Aboriginal peoples, is that it allows the colonizer to avoid
responsibility for hybridic assaults on Aboriginal peoples. Disease is conveniently
removed as relevant evidence because it is classified as a natural process. But diseases
such as smallpox and tuberculosis, and industrial ailments such as mercury poisoning,
were experienced by Aboriginal peoples as consequences of enforced contact with
non-Aboriginal peoples, and as part of a structured set of destructive relations, that
cannot simply be categorized as ‘‘natural.’’ If we are to contend adequately with these
experiences, we must not exclude certain forms of destruction from consideration;
instead, genocide scholars must be ready to interrogate the modernist oppositions that
shape our ways of knowing and being in the world.
Understanding Intent
One of the most vexing issues in discussions about genocide in Canada is that of intent.
As in debates about genocide in other settler societies (the United States, Australia,
and New Zealand), questions are raised about whether the perpetrators clearly
formulated an intent to eliminate Aboriginal peoples. Some argue that because the
Canadian colonial government’s assimilation policies were based on humanitarian
and welfare-oriented concerns, they cannot be considered genocidal, since they do
not evince a clear malevolent intent. Others point to the fact that functionaries
and settlers operating at a distance from government were often the key agents of
Aboriginal destruction. Missionaries, gold miners, settlers, and others carried with
them no government mandate to impinge upon Aboriginal lifeworlds. However,
Lemkin’s work on Aboriginal genocides suggests that centrally coordinated planning is
not required for an event to be categorized as genocide. Indeed, Lemkin’s work shows
great awareness of the networked character of Aboriginal destruction, acknowledging
that various ‘‘genocidists’’ possessing different motives might each play a role in the
wider process of Aboriginal destruction.55
My objective in this section, however, is neither to outline debates about colonial
intent nor to offer an alternative notion of intent. Rather, I aim to demonstrate,
through the example of Canadian residential schools, how the notion of intent hinges
on our understandings of group identity and group destruction.56 In other words,
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unless we take Aboriginal notions of group identity and group destruction seriously,
we will have difficulty pinpointing ‘‘intent.’’
Death was not an uncommon event in Canada’s residential schools. More than half
the students at certain schools succumbed to early death from unchecked disease, poor
nutrition, or lack of proper clothing and shelter.57 Add to these the deaths brought on
through physical and sexual assaults, and the suicides that sometimes followed these
attacks, and one gains a sense of the deadly nature of this ‘‘civilizing’’ project. The
point has been made that it was the ‘‘progressives’’ of their time who sought to redeem
Aboriginal peoples by incorporating them into colonial society.58 For this reason,
charges of presentism are often leveled against those who are insensitive to the ethical
milieu in which government and residential-school workers operated. Indeed, in
the words of Reverend Wilson of the Shingwauk, residential schools appear benign on
the surface:
[The Indian child] must be taught many things which come to the white child without
the schoolmaster’s aid. From the days of its birth, the child of civilized parents is
constantly in contact with the modes of civilized life, of action, thought, speech and
dress; and is surrounded by a thousand beneficent influences. . . . He [the Indian child]
must be led out from the conditions of . . . birth, in his early years, into the environment
of civilized domestic life; and he must be thus led by his teacher.59
The intention to breach the bond between parent and child and to disconnect the
Aboriginal child from his or her collective receives much more blatant treatment in the
words of Duncan Campbell Scott, superintendent of Indian Affairs from 1913 to 1932:
‘‘I want to get rid of the Indian problem. Our object is to continue until there is not a
single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed. They are a weird and waning
race.’’60 Those seeking a teleology of intent would likely identify the latter statement as
a point of origin in the Canadian genocidal process, but we must not fall into this
trap; instead we should seek to understand the networked destruction wrought by
residential schools in Canada as they destroyed not just lives but generations of lives
by disrupting cultural patterns of parenting and cultural transmission. In this sense,
they reflect an all-out assault on Aboriginal ontologies. As John Milloy points out,
The child, parent, and community exist in a landscape—a culture’s translation of
environment into a ‘‘meaning’’-filled place. Parts of the programme of studies would
disorient children and then attempt to re-orient them in a place filled with European
‘‘meaning.’’ This ‘‘programme’’ intersected with other parts of the Canadian colonial
enterprise to drastically alter the path of Aboriginal cultural production and
reproduction.61
Thus, even though we have what may be taken as a clear statement of intent
issued by a prominent government official, an overreliance on this statement distracts
us from what is really at stake here: a colonial project that refused, and continues
to refuse, to recognize the legitimacy of Aboriginal lifeworlds. Canadian colonialism
has sought—through a range of seemingly benign and overtly aggressive actions—to
replace these lifeworlds with the cultural patterns of the colonizers.62 As Robert van
Krieken states with respect to the experiences of the ‘‘stolen generations’’ of Australian
Aboriginal peoples, the source of destruction may lie less in an ‘‘unambiguous ‘intent to
destroy’ a human group, than in the presumption that there was not much to
destroy.’’63 Thus, to better understand the Aboriginal experience of destruction, we
must move beyond a legalistic notion of intent that seeks to identify specific
calculations of destruction on the part of the perpetrator; instead, we must understand
intent as a catastrophic form of misrecognition, which so devalues a population that
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assimilation is assumed to be a matter of their general welfare. In many ways,
Europeans imagined Aboriginal peoples to be destitute, backward, uncivilized, and
savage, and these assumptions facilitated their choice to impose a ‘‘liberal humanism’’
that denied Aboriginal ontologies.
Conclusion
The argument that Canadian Aboriginal peoples have experienced genocide is not
new.64 However, the authors who make this argument tend to take a universalist and
modernist interpretation of genocide as their premise and to fit their claims of genocide
within its frame, thereby reinforcing its hegemony. In contrast, my objective here has
not been to prove a Canadian Aboriginal genocide against the UNCG standard or any
other; instead, I have attempted to (a) establish that the designation of ‘‘cultural
genocide’’ is too qualified and imprecise for understanding Canadian Aboriginal
experiences of colonialism, and (b) argue that re-reading and opening certain
components of the UNCG through an engagement with Canadian Aboriginal
experiences and understandings of group identity, destruction, and intent provides a
clearer path to discerning the nature of genocide in Canada.
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A Report from the Field: The Declaration
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Peoples—Implementation and Implications
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Over nearly two-and-a-half decades, indigenous peoples and their supporters
expended enormous energy on developing a declaration on the rights of indigenous
peoples that both protects and promotes their individual and collective rights.
The debates surrounding the declaration focused on issues ranging from self-
determination to the rights of indigenous peoples to practice their cultures and to
participate in decision making. The declaration establishes the requirement for
fair and adequate compensation for violations of rights and directly addresses the
issues of ethnocide and genocide. The United Nations General Assembly passed
the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on 13 September 2007, with
143 votes in favor, four votes against, and eleven abstentions. Notably, the votes
against were cast by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.
Implementation of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples will be a
complex process, especially given that many indigenous communities today are
located in places where states, private companies, and individuals are competing
for resources, sometimes with deadly results.
Keywords: indigenous peoples, United Nations, genocide, Commission on
Human Rights
Introduction
The colonization of what came to be known as the Americas, Africa, Asia, the Pacific,
and the Arctic by various European nations from the fifteenth to the nineteenth
centuries witnessed the expansion of contacts between indigenous peoples and non-
indigenous governments and agencies. Indigenous peoples in these areas were
subjected to policies ranging from genocide to paternalism and benign neglect.
Most indigenous groups chose to resist actively what they saw as an onslaught.1
Of the world’s contemporary peoples, those groups defined by themselves or others
as indigenous tend to be overrepresented among those lacking basic human rights,
living below the poverty line, and working under exploitative or unjust conditions. The
indicators of indigenous peoples’ deprivation are stark: they tend to have the lowest
standards of health and nutrition; the highest rates of unemployment, illiteracy,
and mortality; the shortest life spans; the lowest incomes; and the lowest degrees of
political participation of the various categories of people in the countries in which
they reside.2
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The past several decades have witnessed intensifying efforts, at both the inter-
national and the grassroots level, to promote human rights for indigenous peoples.3
The indigenous peoples’ movements of this period have had a number of impacts, not
least on issues relating to genocide and mass killings. As Ronald Niezen points out,
As the regional scope of the movement has moved to new hemispheres, above all to the
inclusion of unstable and/or undemocratic states, the form of grievance has also shifted
from a more or less uniform pattern of ethnocidal displacement and assimilation to a
more frequent inclusion of mass killing, the entanglements of ethnic rivalries, and
efforts towards ethnic cleansing.4
This shift can be seen, for example, in Bangladesh, Burma (Myanmar), Chad,
Colombia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.5
Yet these populations continue to be vulnerable to oppression and exploitation.
International conventions and declarations on indigenous and minority rights have
often gone unenforced, and, as a result, the rights of members of these groups
have been violated with impunity by states, by international agencies, and by private
companies and individuals.6
International Human-Rights Instruments Involving Indigenous Peoples
Until relatively recently, only a few international human-rights statements dealt
specifically with indigenous peoples. For decades, the only international legal
instruments that directly addressed indigenous peoples’ rights were Convention
No. 107 and Recommendation No. 104 of the International Labor Organization (ILO),
which were passed in 1957 and went into effect in 1959. Many indigenous groups felt
that they were essentially left out of the debate on the promotion of indigenous rights.7
The Civil Rights movements in the United States (1954–1968) and decolonization
trends in the developing world in the 1960s provided important lessons for indigenous
peoples, and in the 1960s and 1970s indigenous groups began calling for greater
recognition of their civil and political rights as well as their social, economic, and
cultural rights. Many indigenous groups worked at the local level, attempting to
organize their communities, and sought assistance from non-governmental organiza-
tions such as churches and humanitarian agencies. Some groups, such as American
Indians in the United States, Australian Aboriginals, and various Latin American
Indian peoples, formed organizations geared toward promoting their rights and
well-being.8 Other groups ended up in direct confrontation with the state, as was the
case, for example, in Bangladesh,9 Brazil,10 and Indonesia.11
The same period saw the establishment of organizations aimed at supporting
indigenous peoples, including the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs
(IWGIA) in 1968, Survival International in 1969, and Cultural Survival in 1972.12
These organizations helped bring attention to the plight of indigenous peoples
who were being destroyed and dispossessed and whose resources were being exploited
by states, private companies, and individuals.
Particularly important to the emergent international indigenous movement were
the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination and their right to determine for
themselves the kinds of development policies that would affect them.
Indigenous peoples therefore sought to be recognized by the ILO and the United
Nations as peoples with particular characteristics and as groups whose physical
and cultural survival was threatened.
One of the biggest issues with which many indigenous peoples are concerned
is that of autonomy, or, as indigenous leaders put it, ‘‘self-determination.’’
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An examination of the sociopolitical status of indigenous peoples around the world
reveals that very few of them are in control of the governments of the countries where
they reside and that most of them lack political power even at the regional level.
A major reason for this situation is that indigenous peoples were designated by colonial
governments as ‘‘wards of the state,’’ lacking the legal right to participate in political
decision making or to control their own futures. Indigenous peoples around the world
have long had to contend with institutionalized discrimination and the lack of
recognition of basic civil, political, and socioeconomic rights.13
In 1971, the UN Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities authorized a study titled ‘‘The Problem of Discrimination Against
Indigenous Populations.’’ This study, which took years to complete, brought together
data on the situations facing indigenous peoples worldwide.14 One of the outgrowths
of this process in the United Nations was the establishment of the Working Group
on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in May 1982.15 The WGIP, which met annually in
Geneva, Switzerland, until 2006, was charged with reviewing developments affecting
the rights of indigenous peoples and with producing a set of human-rights standards
relating to indigenous peoples.
In the 1980s, a decision was made to revise ILO Convention No. 107 to take
diversity among indigenous peoples more directly into account and to produce a
document less focused on assimilation than the existing one, the title of which was ‘‘For
the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-tribal
Populations in Indigenous Countries.’’ There were disagreements among indigenous
groups, including those from the global North and the global South (i.e., developing
countries), over the text and emphasis of the new convention, which was eventually
passed in 1989.16 A major concern of indigenous peoples in the South, such as the
Mapuche of Chile, was that they were coping with repressive regimes that, they
contended, had extermination as an avowed goal.17 Another complaint was that that
the convention did not restore to indigenous peoples full property rights over their
own lands.
The WGIP, with the participation of indigenous representatives, drew up a draft
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that was completed in 1993. The
following year, the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted
by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities;
it was then forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), later
reorganized by the United Nations as the Human Rights Council. The UNCHR
established in 1995 an open-ended inter-sessional working group the sole purpose of
which was to elaborate on the draft declaration. A major goal of the UN General
Assembly’s 1993 proclamation of the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous
People (1995–2004) was to promote the human rights of indigenous peoples.18 One part
of this effort was support for efforts to come up with a Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.
In 2000, the United Nations established the Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues (PFII), which held its inaugural session in May 2002. The PFII’s aims include
strengthening international cooperation aimed at solving problems facing indigenous
peoples, coordinating development and human-rights efforts involving UN agencies
and indigenous peoples, and serving as a focal point for discussions relating to
indigenous peoples and states.19 The PFII is unique within the United Nations in that
it is the only forum in which indigenous peoples sit as equals alongside government-
appointed members.20 An example of the PFII’s role is its involvement in the health
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and well-being of indigenous peoples, coordinating efforts with the World Health
Organization (WHO) and other UN agencies that are attempting to address health
inequities in the Americas.21 The PFII has also focused attention on crucial issues such
as the impacts of climate change on indigenous peoples and their habitats.
Another great achievement on the part of indigenous peoples in their ongoing
pursuit of protection and recognition of their fundamental rights by the United
Nations came in 2001 with the creation by the UNCHR of the mechanism of the UN
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of
indigenous peoples.
Later that year the chair of the UNCHR appointed Rodolfo Stavenhagen as Special
Rapporteur for a three-year period; in 2004, the mandate of the Special Rapporteur
was renewed for an additional period of three years. In 2007, after the adoption of the
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the new Human Rights Council
(HRC) again renewed the Special Rapporteur’s wide mandate and decided to add the
task of ‘‘promoting the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and
international instruments relevant to the advancement of the rights of indigenous
peoples,’’ thus establishing a clear legal framework for the different activities of
the UN Special Rapporteur. James Anaya assumed the mandate from Rodolfo
Stavenhagen on 1 May 2008.
Unlike the PFII and the new UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, the Special Rapporteur is authorized to take complaints from indigenous
individuals, groups, or communities, including requests for urgent action; to
investigate them; to make visits to the countries where the complaints originate;
and to make recommendations to the country violating indigenous human rights and
to the various human-rights organs of the UN as to steps they should take to remedy
the violations or to prevent future violations.
Debates around the Declaration
Debate surrounding the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ranged from
disagreements over the use ‘‘indigenous people’’ versus ‘‘indigenous peoples’’ (the latter
advocated by several states including Canada) to the issue of political self-
determination, which a number of state governments saw as opening up the possibility
of secession and, potentially, the dissolution of nation-states and the rise of intergroup
conflict. Debate also focused on the issue of collective versus individual rights. Some
states expressed concerns about the extent to which indigenous peoples would be
granted control over land and subsurface resources such as minerals and petroleum.
A number of states, including Botswana, maintained that all peoples in the
country are indigenous and that providing assistance to specific groups would
be tantamount to promoting apartheid (separate development) like that practiced in
South Africa until April 1994.22 Many indigenous peoples sought to ensure the right to
culture, including the right to speak indigenous mother tongues in the face of
opposition from governments. Indigenous peoples that are minorities in the states
where they reside (or majorities, as in the cases of Guatemala and Bolivia) are all too
often faced with state restrictions on cultural practices; in many instances there has
been overt repression of peoples seeking to promote their own identities.
In many parts of the world ‘‘indigenousness’’ has taken on added political and
economic significance because it is used to claim title over blocks of land and the
resources on these lands, as well as development assistance or recognition from states
and intergovernmental organizations.23 There are cases in which indigenous peoples,
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including small-scale isolated groups, have come into conflict with states over
resources, sometimes with deadly results— as, for example, in the Amazon Basin of
South America and in Southeast Asia.24
Today, indigenous peoples, like many other groups, are operating in a world in
which conflicts are all too common. Some of these conflicts arise out of competition for
resources, while others derive from interethnic tensions or from disagreements
between the governments of states and peoples within those states. Indigenous peoples
may also be victims of conflicts that do not concern them directly, as was the case, for
example, with the Twa of Rwanda. A sizable proportion of the refugee population in
some parts of the world (e.g., in Africa and Asia) is made up of indigenous and minority
peoples. The concerns of indigenous peoples today, therefore, range from genocides
and discriminatory treatment to the failure of states and transnational corporations to
consult with indigenous peoples or to inform them about initiatives and plans that
could affect their lands and livelihoods.
Some intergovernmental institutions, such as the World Bank, have attempted
to take indigenous peoples into consideration and have established policies and
guidelines aimed at promoting and protecting their rights.25 There are cases, however,
in which the activities of intergovernmental organizations have had very negative
consequences for indigenous peoples; in the case of the Chixoy Dam in Guatemala, for
example, investigations have shown the World Bank’s complicity in genocide.26
The formal adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the
UN General Assembly on 13 September 2007 was seen as an important victory by
indigenous peoples around the world. The declaration acknowledges the occurrence of
a wide range of violations against indigenous peoples and lays out minimum standards
for ensuring dignity, well-being, and physical and cultural survival.
The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, in his statement on the occasion
of the adoption of the declarationby the General Assembly, noted that the adoption of
the declaration constituted a fundamental landmark for indigenous peoples and
represented their important contribution to the construction of the international
human-rights system.27
The process of achieving agreement on the declaration within the United Nations
was not an easy one. Four states—the United States, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand—opposed the Declaration and voted against its adoption. Earlier in the
process, the African Group of States had raised serious questions about the
declaration’s principles and implications.28 Concerns raised by various states included
the perceived dangers of self-determination and self-government, which some states
felt would threaten their territorial integrity and confer upon indigenous peoples the
right of secession. There were also concerns that indigenous peoples would use some of
the declaration’s provisions on land, territories, and resources to control mineral and
oil exploration and to limit economic development. Article 23 of the declaration states
that ‘‘indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and
strategies for exercising their right to development,’’ something that some states
maintained was inappropriate because, in their view, governments ought to be the
decision-making bodies with respect to national development.
An unqualified right to free, prior, and informed consent on all matters that
affect indigenous peoples, some states believed, would give indigenous groups
veto power over state policies and plans and over laws passed by legislative bodies.
With respect to the issues of redress and restitution, states feared that the
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implementation of this provision would reopen agreements and settlements already
established between indigenous peoples and states.
The concerns of the African Group of States related to a number of the forty-three
articles of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. It was argued, for
instance, that the absence of a definition of indigenous peoples in the text would create
legal problems for the implementation of the declaration. Article 3 on self-
determination was opposed in part because of the possibility that ethnicity, culture,
and language could easily become a rationale for groups seeking exclusivity within
nation-states, whereas, in the opinion of these states, the United Nations has the
responsibility to protect the integrity of nation-states.29 The African Group of States
argued that the recognition, observance, and enforcement of treaties and agreements
are the responsibility of the state.
Often, the term ‘‘indigenous’’ refers to individuals and groups who are descendants
of the original populations (that is, the ‘‘first nations’’) of a country, but this is not,
for example, how indigenous peoples in Africa see themselves.30
Admittedly, particular problems do arise in defining people as indigenous.
An important criterion for ‘‘indigenousness’’ is the identification by people themselves
of their distinct cultural identity. Most indigenous people prefer to reserve for
themselves the right to determine who is and is not a member of their group.
As Bernard Nietschmann puts it, ‘‘Like a nation, a people is self-defined.’’31
In many areas, it is difficult to determine antecedence, since a variety of
populations have moved into and out of local areas over time. Africa, the continent
with the longest history of human occupation, contains the greatest range of human
genetic and cultural diversity. As a result, there have been complex interactions
between indigenous and non-indigenous groups in Africa, some of which have resulted
in indigenous groups’ being marginalized socially, politically, and economically.
The establishment of majority rule in South Africa in 1994 and the passage of a new
South African constitution, however, have provided hope for indigenous peoples
throughout Africa.
The Constitution of Cameroon stipulates that ‘‘the State shall ensure the
protection of minorities and preserve the rights of indigenous populations
in accordance with the law.’’ The term ‘‘indigenous’’ is not defined, yet Cameroon
has created an Indigenous Peoples Development Plan, as well as a plan for indigenous
and vulnerable peoples in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Indigenous peoples
are also mentioned in legislation in Congo and Burundi. The African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights underscores this kind of approach, noting that ‘‘a strict
definition of indigenous peoples is neither necessary nor desirable.’’32
Indigenous peoples in Africa are highly diverse. They range from small
communities of foragers (hunters and gatherers) such as the Twa in Central
Africa to sedentary agropastoralists and peri-urban factory workers in the
industrial economies of southern African states.33 The vast majority of African
indigenous peoples have diversified economic systems, combining small-scale
agriculture and livestock production with natural resource procurement and business
activities.
Some indigenous groups in Africa do not live within individual countries but,
rather, are found in several states, overlapping national borders. This is the case, for
example, with the Ju/’hoansi of northwestern Botswana and northeastern Namibia
and the Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania. The transboundary nature of many
indigenous peoples puts them in a special position vis-a`-vis nation-states, many of
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which are concerned about their sovereignty and security and are attempting to
prevent movements of people and goods across their borders.
The claims of indigenous peoples in Africa and other parts of the world are
relatively similar: they wish to have their human rights respected; they want
ownership and control over their own land and natural resources; and they want
the right to participate through their own institutions in the political process at the
nation-state, regional, and international levels. All these claims raise concerns on
the part of states wishing to retain for themselves the right to determine the policies
they pursue and the right to protect their populations and territories. Article 9
of the declaration, which states that ‘‘indigenous peoples and individuals have the
right to belong to an indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the
traditions and customs of the community or nations concerned,’’ was opposed by
the African Group of States because they felt that this clause could be interpreted
to mean that tribal communities can choose to belong to one country while living
in another.34
Because many of the indigenous groups of Africa remain unrecognized in the
nation-states where they reside, they are seeking to organize themselves and to lobby
in defense of their human rights. In doing so, they employ a variety of innovative
strategies that range from the use of the Internet, geographic information system
(GIS) tools, and global positioning system (GPS) instruments to conflict-resolution and
negotiation techniques. Diplomacy and bargaining are also key strategies in
indigenous peoples’ interactions with other groups and state governments.
Indigenous groups have also sought redress through the courts and have used the
media to positive effect.35
Members of indigenous groups have taken part in international forums on
indigenous peoples held by academic institutions and indigenous peoples’ human-
rights and advocacy organizations.36 While the indigenous movement is still in its
infancy in Africa in many ways, steps are being taken toward establishing Africa-wide
indigenous peoples’ networks and promoting indigenous peoples’ rights at the
continental and regional levels, one example being the Indigenous Peoples of Africa
Coordinating Committee (IPACC). Important work has been done by the African
Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities; for
example, their missions to various African countries have resulted in useful
recommendations for improvements in policies and programs that relate to indigenous
peoples.
In June 2006, the UN Human Rights Council adopted the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples with a vote of thirty-two in favor and two against.
Intense negotiations among states, indigenous groups, and support organizations in
2006–2007 eventually resulted in a compromise, and the declaration was passed by
the General Assembly in September. Lobbying strategies, networking, and awareness
campaigns were employed by indigenous peoples’ delegations and by regional
associations and NGOs, including the ACHPR, with strong support from the IWGIA,
which engaged in lobbying and helped to win the votes of the African Group of States
for a version of the declaration modified to meet the demands of various
governments.37 Ultimately, there were 143 votes in favor of the declaration, four
votes against, and eleven abstentions.
After the vote in favor of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was
announced, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, chair of the PFII, and Les Malezer, chair of
the Global Indigenous Peoples Caucus, were allowed to address the members of the
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General Assembly. They expressed their appreciation to the UN member states that
voted in favor of the declaration. As Malezer noted,
The Declaration does not represent solely the viewpoint of the United Nations, nor does
it represent solely the viewpoint of the Indigenous Peoples. It is a Declaration which
combines our views and interests and which sets the framework for the future. It is a
tool for peace and justice, based upon mutual recognition and mutual respect.38
The challenge now is to implement the provisions of the Declaration.
In her statement, Tauli-Corpuz stressed that ‘‘effective implementation of the
Declaration would test the commitment of States and the whole international
community to protect, respect, and fulfill indigenous peoples’ collective and individual
human rights’’; she concluded her statement by calling on governments and civil
society at large ‘‘to rise to the historic task before us and make the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples a living document for the common future of
humanity.’’39
Conclusions
As Julian Burger notes, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is a
unique instrument in the UN system in that it was drafted with the participation of
people who are both the victims of human-rights abuses and the potential future
beneficiaries of its provisions.40 It is a unique document, as well, in that its drafting
took into account a broad array of interests and was discussed extensively at
the grassroots level as well as at the regional, national, and international levels.
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples outlines the standards for
what indigenous peoples feel are their fundamental human rights. It differs from other
UN human-rights instruments in that it addresses the rights of indigenous peoples as
collectivities instead of placing the emphasis on individual rights and freedoms. As
Dalee Sambo Dorough said at the conference Being Indigenous in Today’s World, held
in Copenhagen on 6 October 2008, the adoption of the declaration ‘‘redefines the terms
of our survival in international law.’’41 While it is a declaration and not a convention,
and therefore is not binding on states, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples has the potential to become customary international law, and, as such, will
henceforth have significant implications for the ways in which states behave toward
indigenous peoples and for their deliberations and decision making vis-a`-vis
indigenous concerns.
The crucial issue now, we believe, is to find ways to compel states to comply with
the international human-rights standards outlined in the declaration and to ensure
the long-term survival and well-being of indigenous peoples throughout the world.
Ways to do this include enhancing the capacities of states, indigenous peoples, and
community-based organizations to plan and implement sustainable development and
conservation strategies; engaging in human-rights education; promoting constitu-
tional reform at the national level; forming networks; and undertaking collaborative
activities at the international, national, or local level. Another way to ensure that
indigenous peoples are protected from genocide is to take those responsible to court
and prosecute them to the fullest extent of the law, as well as to impose sanctions on
states that engage in genocide.
The new Human Rights Council’s Expert Mechanism on Indigenous Peoples’
Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms of indigenous peoples, and the PFII, given their different mandates, should
coordinate their efforts closely, paying particular attention to issues of genocide,
Genocide Studies and Prevention 4:1 April 2009
106
ethnocide, and massive violations of human rights. Simply promoting democratic
governance and participatory decision making is not enough; we must ensure that
there is transparency, accountability, and fairness, and that international human-
rights standards are applied universally, not only to member states of the United
Nations but to all peoples, groups, and communities.
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Book Review
F. Todd Smith, Dominance to Disappearance: The Indians of Texas and
the Near Southwest, 1786–1859. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
2005. Pp. 320, cloth. $59.95 US.
Reviewed by Charles A. Flowerday, Graduate Student in Journalism and Anthropology,
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
In Dominance to Disappearance: The Indians of Texas and the Near Southwest,
1786–1859, F. Todd Smith does an exemplary job of documenting the origins,
migrations, and deprivations—as well as the depredations—of the Indians of Texas
and western Louisiana. In doing so, he does a thorough and outstanding job of
meticulously amassing and narrating his voluminous compilation of detail. Smith, an
associate professor of history at the University of North Texas, has written extensively
on Texas Indians.1
Dominance to Disappearance provides the first detailed history of all Texas
Indians, their tribal neighbors, and the eventual (Indian) immigrants from western
Louisiana, ranging from the late eighteenth century (the end of the colonial period)
to the mid-nineteenth century (the run-up to the Civil War). As the title suggests,
Native Americans dominated the region, holding numerical superiority, a factor that
Smith says constituted a social and economic fulcrum, until halfway through the
period explored. By the end of that period, they were gone. Essentially, this is the story
of three-quarters of a century of refugees in time-lapse migration.
Smith divides his book into the following periods: ‘‘Dominance: The Indians of
Texas and the Near Southwest to 1786’’; ‘‘Tenuous Coexistence: The Indians and
Spain, 1786 to 1803’’; ‘‘Contested Boundaries: The Indians, Spain and the United
States, 1804–1810’’; ‘‘The Indians and the Breakdown of Spanish Texas, 1811 to 1822’’;
‘‘Destruction: The Indians, Mexican Texas, and the American Intrusion, 1823 to 1835’’;
‘‘Defeat: The Indians and the Republic of Texas, 1838 to 1845’’; ‘‘Desperation: The
Indians and the United States, 1846 to 1853’’; and ‘‘Disappearance: The Indians and
the Texas Reserves, 1854–1859.’’
The volume’s epilogue begins following the tense and genocide-like pressure
applied by ethnocentric Texans, which forced the withdrawal of virtually all Texas
Indians to reservations in Indian Country (present-day Oklahoma). Particularly
for the formerly agricultural tribes, but also for some of the former nomads, this
removal marked the beginning of a fairly successful adaptation to farming and
ranching livelihoods. It also marked the beginning of the adaptation that has
characterized many of the tribes since: a viable cultural mix that preserves much
traditional culture, and reclaims some of the rest, while adopting many aspects
of Euro-American schooling and commerce. The relative resilience of most of these
tribes is remarkable; and, even if most of the legacy constituted loss, there was muted
good news at the end.
With the Spanish return to the area during the first part of the eighteenth century
(after Southwest Indians had acquired horses), we are introduced to a period during
which emigrant tribes entered the region from parts east, having been pushed aside by
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Euro-American settlers, particularly after the Seven Years’ (French and Indian)
War, when the area to the east passed from French to English hands. During this
period, the region’s Indians, more settled in the east and more nomadic in the west,
dominated the region and fended off most Spanish territorial (and military)
aggression, as well as the many attempts at Christianization.
Spain saw that most of the province’s Indians had not responded to attempts at
conversion and sedentary living; so, in 1772, having won the region from the French, it
instituted a new system that mirrored that used in Louisiana, dealing with the Indians
solely via trade and gifts. This change offered the region’s indigenous groups a respite
from cultural, political, and military harassment and eventual domination by
Euro-Americans—a brief interlude during which the Spanish to the west, the
Americans to the east (following the Louisiana Purchase), and illegal French traders
in the middle vied for their trade and friendship.
But by the 1820s, especially after Mexican independence in 1823, their fortunes
were eclipsed by land-hungry Euro-Americans pressuring them on all sides. This
period was characterized by a shift from Spanish to American intermediaries and
eventual opposition, and from an emphasis on trade to an emphasis on driving Indians
off their land and using it for real-estate speculation as settlers poured in.
Except near the end of Indian residence in Texas, and during the tenure of some
unsympathetic Texas presidents (or governors), this extirpation never involved a
policy of outright eradication. Many conciliatory moments occurred; peace councils
were held, or treaties signed—only to be quickly broken by one side or the other.
The situation was exacerbated by leaders who could never completely control those for
whom they ostensibly spoke. And so the fire smoldered, like a many-sided guerilla war,
for nearly seventy-five years.
In addition, the Indians, whose social organization and government were never
close to unified, hurt themselves through numerous raids, ‘‘wars,’’ and skirmishes
amongst themselves. Significantly, the outsiders imposed a nation-state, or two or
three, on countless tribes and bands that had never before been disposed, or needed, to
join together.
Documenting the fits and starts of Indian resistance and Euro-American reprisals,
punctuated by all-too-brief periods of relative calm, Smith charts the continual
pressure of Euro-American settlement on Native populations. The former’s relentless
hunger for land drove the latter west into Texas, then north into present Oklahoma.
Native populations were first caught in the cat-and-mouse game of colonial powers
vying for control, sometimes worsening the situation with wars and raids amongst
themselves and alliances with one and then another European power, which alienated
unaligned tribes and those allied with other Euro-American groups.
In this period Indians were caught in conflicts between Spain and France; Spain
and the United States; Mexico and the United States; Mexico, the United States, and
the rebellious new nation of Texas; the United States and the state of Texas, which
included, somehow, an autonomous Indian land policy (mostly a non-policy of no
Indian lands); and between the US government and a Texas with a nearly genocidal
intolerance of Indian presence, which the federal government was powerless to oppose.
Often such policies were promulgated by the region’s settlers themselves, rather than
at the bidding of the state leadership. However, neither the people of Texas nor its
legislature ever really owned up to any responsibility to, or for, the Indians.
All of this raises the question of what constitutes genocide, or ecocide, or ethnocide.
Attitudes notwithstanding, apart from a mob of radical and violent ethnocentrists in
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Texas near the end of Indian tenure in the region, little Euro-American behavior
conformed to today’s popular notions of genocide. That said, the Euro-American
assault on the land base, life ways, and mental and physical health of Texas Indians
did constitute a certain kind of genocide, one that includes various subcategories of the
concept: more specifically, ethnocidal actions (destroying a culture to disenfranchise
and destroy a people) and ecocidal actions (destroying a group’s ecosystem, resources,
or adaptation so as to destroy a people). In slow motion, and with occasional good
intentions, it was this kind of oppression that, in this region, destroyed a number of
tribes in their earlier forms (many had to consolidate with other, larger tribes) and
nearly destroyed many others.
Smith deserves a great deal of credit for the tremendous service he has rendered
to scholars and others by crystallizing the major demographic, economic, political,
and military changes that occurred in the lives of Indians in the region studied during
the seventy-three years he focuses on and in the 400 years leading up to them.
His research involved consulting the Archivo General de Indias in Spain for
Spanish accounts of this history; few studies before have extensively consulted
so much Spanish archival material. French-language sources were also used. The
use of extensive published and unpublished material lends even greater credence
to Smith’s study. This, then, is a work of copious detail and thorough documentation,
and will be of great value to people working in any number of fields related
to economic, environmental, or social history; frontier and agricultural history;
economic, social, and ecological anthropology; human and economic geography; or
human rights.
That said, there are so many major groups of Indians, so many tribal leaders and
dissidents and so many lesser-known tribes, that keeping track of them in a narrative
unbroken by subheadings or more than a handful of maps is a daunting task. At times,
the narrative is too much a litany of raids and counter-raids, often stock stealing or
reprisals for territorial incursions that led to greater violence, with few, if any, large
battles, such that major events or processes become hard to isolate. Turning points
surely existed, but here they sometimes are hard to locate. For these reasons, the book
is in need of a master list that provides the names of groups and the names, lifespan,
successes, and failures of individuals such as chiefs, major leaders, rebels, and
vigilantes (the index lists seventy-nine tribes, 136 chiefs or headmen, and more than
twice the latter number of notable Euro-Americans). Also needed are population charts
for each tribe and band, showing their increase or decrease across time and space,
perhaps indexed to the maps; and an annotated timeline at the beginning or end of the
book that delineates significant developments and addresses their implications. This
would not require or result in a ‘‘dumbing down’’; rather, it would represent a
‘‘smarting up’’ for people who already lack time in every part of their lives. Indeed, it
would be a great help to even those well versed in Native American history, social or
environmental history, colonialism, and indigenous anthropology (or, for that matter,
any branch of anthropology)—all of whom should find this book of interest. Any
subsequent edition might take the following suggestions into account. This would
make Dominance to Disappearance a truly outstanding resource.
While seven maps are included, that number is not quite enough for such a
geographically precise and complicated history. What is needed are time-lapse
diagrams with arrows showing stops and migration patterns, for Indians and Euro-
Americans; ideally, these would be annotated with the following information: name of
village, mission, town, camp, or agency; raiding and stock-thieving patterns; time
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spent there, reason for being there, reason for leaving; numbers and groupings of
Indians, and the same for settlers; major conflicts; and so on. The volume could include
one diagram for each tribe (or, at least, for each major ethnic group) and each
settlement (or territory) in each era. It would also have benefited from subheadings
outlining the adaptations to environment and cultural modes (life ways) that evolved
at each stop or movement of the groups and subgroups.
All in all, this book is recommended to readers for its detailed documentation of
this little-explored area of Native American history.
Note
1. His prior works include F. Todd Smith, The Caddo Indians: Tribes on the Convergence of
Empires, 1540–1845 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995); F. Todd Smith,
The Caddos, the Wichitas, and the United States, 1846–1901 (College Station: Texas A&M
University Press, 1996); and F. Todd Smith, The Wichita Indians: Traders of Texas and the
Southern Plains, 1540–1845 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000).
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Book Review
Beatriz Huertas Castillo, Indigenous Peoples in Isolation in the
Peruvian Amazon: Their Struggle for Survival and Freedom.
Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2004.
Pp. 247, paper. $25.00 US.
Reviewed by Katie Chinn, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona, Tucson
In Indigenous Peoples in Isolation in the Peruvian Amazon: Their Struggle for Survival
and Freedom, Beatriz Huertas Castillo examines the vulnerability of isolated
aboriginal groups, focusing on those groups residing in the Amazonian region of
Peru. As well as describing the problems facing indigenous Peruvian groups today, she
offers insights into the historical events that have contributed to their position of
vulnerability. Finding a balance between respecting an indigenous group’s desire to
remain isolated and ensuring that their needs are represented and protected is a
delicate task. Castillo presents the complexities of this precarious balancing act and
makes some recommendations on how it might best be handled.
Castillo outlines the problems faced by isolated aboriginal groups in today’s world
by using the example of those living in the Peruvian Amazon, specifically those in
the department of Madre de Dios, close to the Bolivian border in southeastern Peru.
She describes who these voluntarily isolated peoples are and what factors contribute to
their decision to remain apart from wider society. In doing so, she provides a well-
rounded overview of the history of indigenous peoples of the Peruvian Amazon,
outlining issues they have dealt with such as outsiders encroaching on their land and
exploiting their natural resources.
Based on the descriptions in this book, both historic and recent, the isolated
indigenous peoples of the Peruvian Amazon have experienced what can be described as
cultural genocide or ethnocide, the destruction of a group’s culture. At the same time,
they have had to cope with overt and purposeful violence aimed at destroying them or
removing them from their habitats in order to facilitate ‘‘modernization,’’ development,
or resource exploitation. Violence is a common theme in the stories of these groups.
Members of some isolated indigenous communities have claimed that they were
‘‘hunted like animals.’’ Pressured by transnational forces and exposed to disease and
environmental destruction, as well as governments, organizations, and companies
intent on modifying their lifestyles and livelihoods, isolated Amazonian indigenous
groups are some of the most threatened peoples in the world today. Current problems
facing the indigenous groups of the Madre de Dios region include logging, mining,
oil and gas exploration, colonization, and government plans to open up the region to
tourism. There are fears that some, if not many, of the isolated indigenous peoples
in the Peruvian Amazon could become extinct if efforts are not made to protect and
promote their rights to life, liberty, health, and physical and mental well-being.
Ethnocide in the Peruvian Amazon also occurs when non-native religious
organizations promote their views and actively seek to discourage the practice of
indigenous traditions. It is important to note, however, that although ethnocidal
policies are practiced widely, they have not necessarily led to cultural disintegration.
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One reason that groups opt to move further into the forest and avoid contact if at all
possible is to maintain their cultural, economic, and spiritual identities.
Castillo points out that isolated indigenous peoples have had to abandon their
traditional areas and move to new places, in some cases to escape destructive
development projects; one example is the Camasea gas project, whose pipelines have
experienced leaks, fouling rivers and affecting the quality of drinking water, fish, and
aquatic animals such as turtles. Children in environmentally polluted areas exhibit a
variety of health problems.
Each indigenous group has experienced colonization in its own unique way, but
they often share the same story of exploitation, vulnerability, and violations of their
human rights. Castillo’s efforts to provide context for the group of indigenous peoples
living in the Madre de Dios area shed light on the reasons why indigenous groups wish
to remain isolated and avoid exposure to the complexities of modern society.
Members of isolated indigenous groups have moved out of areas where there are
environmental problems, expanding numbers of outsiders, and rising disease rates.
The impacts of these migrations include tensions and conflicts between host
populations and newcomers. As recently as June 2008, a small group of isolated
Makuxi Indians was attacked by gunmen hired by a local businessman in Roraima,
Brazil. In 2000, a massacre of a dozen Tagaeris, who total less than 300 in the
Ecuadorean Amazon, was carried out by other Indians at the behest of a logging
company seeking to exploit resources in their area. The effects of these varied
processes on isolated indigenous peoples include depopulation, social and economic
collapse, misery, and, in some cases, rising suicide rates. A major problem, according to
Castillo and to spokespersons for organizations working to protect isolated indigenous
peoples, is that government policies with respect to groups that choose to remain
isolated are vague at best.
Castillo also examines the efforts of indigenous organizations to represent and
protect those groups residing in the Amazonian region of Peru, one example being
FENAMAD (Federacion Nativa del Rio Madre de Dios y Affluentes, meaning
‘‘the native federation of the Madre de Dios River and its tributaries’’). In addition,
she discusses the diverse impacts of outsiders—including missionaries, anthropolo-
gists, hunters, loggers, oil companies, miners, fishermen, and gatherers of wild edible
and medicinal plants—on the region.
Specifically, Castillo delves into the rich and complex history of the aboriginal
peoples of Madre de Dios, beginning with the rubber boom of the 1850s–1920s, during
which their lands were destroyed, they were exposed to disease epidemics in which
large numbers died, and many were left in positions of bonded labor, dependent on
‘‘rubber barons.’’ Since then, the indigenous peoples of southeastern Peru have had to
cope with the intrusions of the above-mentioned outsiders.
Today, some three-quarters of the Peruvian Amazon—approximately 123 million
acres—has been allocated by the government to oil and gas exploration. Logging and
mining operations dot the landscape, and there are plans to put large roads in the area.
Not surprisingly, local people react negatively to the incursions of outsiders, and
in some cases violence results, with casualties on both sides. The types of violence have
been wide-ranging, including but not limited to clashes between outsiders and
indigenous groups in which members of indigenous communities have died; retaliation
by rubber barons, loggers, miners, and others when members of indigenous groups
leave their employ; rapes of indigenous women; disappearances of members of
indigenous groups; and booby-trapping of trade goods left in the forests for isolated
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indigenous peoples. Members of isolated indigenous groups have also been captured,
held in detention, and mistreated. While large-scale massacres of indigenous groups
are rarer now than they used to be, they have sometimes occurred, as, for example, in
the case of a group of Brazilian Yanomami who were killed by garimperos (gold miners)
in 1993. Conflicts between members of national Indian organizations such as the
National Indian Foundation of Brazil (FUNAI) resulted in a decision by FUNAI to
change its policy of seeking direct contact with voluntarily isolated indigenous
communities, opting instead to leave them alone.
In an effort to end conflicts and reduce impacts on isolated indigenous peoples,
Castillo offers some proposals on ways to handle the various issues, ranging from the
establishment of protected natural areas (PNAs) and indigenous reserves to rules
about how contacts should take place. She also suggests ways to handle contacts once
they have occurred and outlines some useful proposals involving emergency health
plans, land zoning, and contingency plans.
Castillo notes that national Peruvian indigenous organizations such as AIDESEP
(Associacio´n Intere´tnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana, meaning ‘‘inter-ethnic
association for the development of the Peruvian jungle’’) have played important roles
in addressing the issue of isolated indigenous peoples. AIDESEP’s National Assembly
created a National Program for Indigenous Peoples in Isolation and Initial Contact at
its Nineteenth Congress in December 2002. AIDESEP, FENAMAD, and other
organizations have pressed the Peruvian government to create territorial reserves
for indigenous peoples who prefer to remain isolated. They have also sought to
persuade the government to establish state policies on the rights of isolated indigenous
groups. Castillo emphasizes, however, that there are legal loopholes in the national
legislation on land titling and a lack of clarity with respect to institutional
responsibilities and mechanisms for protecting small-scale indigenous groups from
outside intrusion.
Interestingly, in the late 1990s oil companies such as Mobil came up with policies
on risk assessment and social behavior, drawing on their experiences with isolated
indigenous peoples. The government of Peru has also considered developing policies
that protect isolated indigenous peoples, though these have yet to be implemented in
any serious way. From the perspective of some isolated indigenous peoples, the
Peruvian government and other institutions, including some (though not all) faith-
based organizations, are pursuing policies aimed at cultural modification, settlement,
and economic and environmental transformation that would ultimately undermine the
cultures of indigenous peoples. It is for this reason that at least some of the indigenous
groups in the Peruvian Amazon prefer to avoid contact with outsiders.
Castillo has much to offer in her descriptions of historical events and of efforts by
indigenous organizations in Peru to create protected territories for isolated groups.
She treats in detail the situations of a number of different indigenous groups,
including Murunahua, Mashco Piro, Isconahua, and Harakmbut. When it comes to
offering concrete proposals for change vis-a`-vis such efforts, however, she becomes very
idealistic. She describes the years of turmoil involved in creating a territorial reserve
against the wishes of the logging companies, yet her proposals do not take into account
the needed shift in ideology. Her suggestions involve making contingency plans for
interacting with isolated groups in the event of contact, preventing outside agents from
interfering with isolated groups, and creating territories strictly for the use of such
groups. Although all these measures are necessary to the survival of the vulnerable
groups, they would be expensive endeavors. In the absence of an ideological shift
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whereby the government begins to feel responsible for isolated indigenous groups,
some sort of incentive would be necessary to entice the Peruvian government into
investing large sums in Castillo’s proposals.
Representing the needs of a group of people who have chosen the survival strategy
of non-contact is difficult. This is especially true when at least some politicians and
government agencies would prefer to follow a policy of purposeful contact and
assimilation, something that some indigenous peoples in the Madre de Dios region and
other parts of Peru would like to avoid. Castillo’s approach, which involves studying
the histories of isolated groups along with the issues they currently face, is a useful
one. Castillo raises important questions for genocide scholars and those interested
in indigenous peoples’ rights and development. In the words of genocide scholar
Leo Kuper,
The varied processes associated with this diversity of annihilatory contexts offer
different possibilities for preventive action. The destruction of hunting and gathering
groups tends to be the least accessible for monitoring and preventive action. They
maintain few, if any, relations with other groups, and their annihilation has little
significance for the wider society. Their habitats are usually remote areas, removed
from contact and visibility, and their victimizers are generally invading groups of
settlers or development agencies.
When governments intervene on behalf of the victims, their intervention tends to be
half-hearted or inept, offering little protection against the undermining of the culture
and the ultimate destruction of the group. The outside world generally reacts with
indifference to the fate of these groups, save where there are broader and more
threatening implications, as in the ecological destruction consequent upon the
deforestation of the Amazon basin.1
Castillo’s recommended strategies attempt to address these kinds of concerns, bringing
together ideas, perspectives, and policies that draw on the viewpoints of indigenous
peoples; the state; non-governmental organizations, including environmental,
indigenous-rights, and community-based organizations; and the private sector. Her
proposals, if subscribed to fully, would go a long way toward resolving the complex
issues facing those contemporary indigenous peoples who choose to remain isolated,
not only in the Peruvian Amazon but in other parts of the world as well.
Note
1. Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1981), 158.
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Book Review
African Rights, Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan. London: African
Rights, 1995. Pp. 252, paper. US$14.95.
Reviewed by Samuel Totten, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
It is unusual to review a book that is more than two or three years old, but Facing
Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan is, unfortunately, timely in its own way. Despite the
significant differences between the attacks by the government of Sudan (GoS) against
the Nuba in South Kordofan from 1985 through the 1990s and those against black
Africans in Darfur in the early 2000s, there are many stunning similarities. That said,
whereas international attention has focused on the ongoing crisis in Darfur, the
genocidal action in the Nuba Mountains was largely ignored—not least because the
GoS systematically and calculatingly sealed off the Nuba Mountains from the outside
world for some six years.
Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan constitutes the first detailed study of the
genocidal activities of the GoS in the Nuba Mountains—a study that the authors assert
is ‘‘the first exposure of the crimes being committed there by the Sudan Government:
all-out assault on the rural Nuba’’ (v). The investigation carried out by African Rights
produced clear and abundant evidence that the GoS was intent on wiping out Nuba
society and culture.
Facing Genocide is composed of the following parts: ‘‘Summary’’ which (includes a
section titled ‘‘Components of Genocide in the Nuba Mountains’’); ‘‘The Nuba in Sudan:
A People Pushed to the Margins’’; ‘‘War in the Nuba Mountains’’; ‘‘The Nuba Today:
Genocide by Attrition’’; ‘‘Attack on Christianity; Attack on Islam’’; ‘‘The SPLA Record’’;
and ‘‘Conclusions.’’ The book provides a solid overview of the history of the war in the
Nuba Mountains and, in doing so, offers a cogent analysis of the causes of the war; the
actions of the GoS, including its scorched-earth policy, which is similar in many ways
to its later actions in Darfur; the actions and reactions of the Nuba; and the
ramifications of the war.
The civil war in the Nuba Mountains, which began during the summer of 1985,
resulted from two related events. First, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)
carried out a raid on a cattle camp of Baggara Arab nomads, located near the north–
south ‘‘internal boundary.’’ In response, the Sudanese government hired the Baggara
as a militia to help fight the SPLA and to punish any civilians believed to be
‘‘sympathetic’’ to the SPLA. The authors assert that,
while the SPLA was not present in force [in the Nuba Mountains] until 1989, militia
attacks became routine and an army crackdown became intense.. . . The first stage of
the war was marked by militia raids, to loot cattle, kill and occasionally to burn villages.
In areas where SPLA units penetrated, the army also undertook mass reprisals, always
targeted at villages and civilians.. . . The war intensified with the arrival of the SPLA . . .
in 1989. It quickly overran large areas of the Nuba Mountains and unleashed
a ferocious response from the militia and army. Between 1989 and 1991 scores of
villages were burned and thousands of villagers killed in joint army and militia
assaults. (7)
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It is important to understand—and the authors do an excellent job of emphasizing
this point—that ‘‘the Nuba’’ do not constitute a monolithic group. In fact, the Nuba
comprise more than fifty tribal groups that reside in the Nuba Mountains. It is thought
that the Nuba may ‘‘represent the remnants of indigenous populations that once lived
far more widely across Sudan’’ (15). Furthermore, as the authors point out, ‘‘the term
‘Nuba’ refers to two very different sets of connotations’’ (5). First, for the Nuba people
themselves, the term ‘‘refers to the myriad cultures and traditions of the more than
fifty different tribal groups in the Nuba Mountains’’ (5). Second, ‘‘for the dominant
class in Sudan, and in particular the ruling National Islamic Front, ‘Nuba’ refers to
second class citizens—‘primitive’ black people, servants and labourers’’ (5). If this
sounds familiar to those conversant with the current crisis in Darfur, it is for good
reason; in fact, most, if not all, of those living in the so-called peripheries of Sudan
(that is, outside the riverine valley where the elites reside and rule) are considered
second-class citizens, or worse—that is, they are perceived by the powers that be as
lesser beings, inferior culturally, educationally, and in just about every other way. In
this respect, the Nuba were perceived and treated in much the same way as the black
Africans of Darfur are treated today. To put it another way, both the Nuba and the
black Africans of Darfur, along with the ‘‘Southerners of Sudan, are the victims of a
racism that pervades life in Northern Sudan’’ (5).
Like any case of genocide, the genocide of the Nuba is complicated. Among the
many factors at work in this case were an extremist Islamic agenda; systemic
racism; ongoing discrimination against the Nuba in the realms of the economy,
education, health, and political representation; and a struggle over land and natural
resources.
In contrast to Darfur, where the vast majority of the people—perpetrators and
victims alike—are Muslim, the Nuba Mountains were, and are, home to both
Christians and Muslims. Tellingly, both groups were targeted for attack. Even
before the war in the Nuba Mountains began, Christians began to be attacked by GoS
security forces, largely as a result of ‘‘a polarized political context, with Islamic
extremism in the ascendant’’ (281). Churches were desecrated or burned down;
Christians were harassed, vilified, beaten, tortured, and even killed by GoS troops and
their proxies. Muslims in the area were told that the Christians were godless and were
out to destroy Sudan.
When Muslims in the Nuba Mountains did not support the government’s actions
against the Christians and refused to take part in the desecration and destruction of
the churches, they too were targeted, and their places of worship were attacked. In
addition, those Muslims who did not adhere to the more extremist version of Islam
were also targeted as infidels. Furthermore,
despite the fact that the SPLA forces in the Nuba Mountains have been very largely led
by Moslems, successive governments have portrayed the guerrillas as fighting against
Islam. In order to do so they have withdrawn the legitimacy of Islam in the SPLA held
areas, in effect declaring all Moslems who are not with them to be infidels, and thus the
legitimate target for a Jihad. (288)
Part and parcel of the attacks on the Nuba was a systematic effort to wipe out both
the educated classes and the leadership of the Nuba. The authors report that
‘‘hundreds of chiefs, teachers merchants, civil servants, priests, lawyers, health
workers—in fact anyone with an education who might be a spokesman for the people—
have been killed’’ (2).
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Once the government troops and militias had looted and destroyed Nuba villages,
the perpetrators abducted the people and forced them into so-called peace camps. In
this way, the government depopulated the rural areas, controlled the actions and
movement of civilians, deprived the Sudanese Liberation Movement of potential
assistance, and undertook an effort to alter the Nuba way of life in fundamental ways.
The ‘‘peace camps’’ were also places of great abuse, where victims were beaten, raped,
and deprived of food. The authors record that
the innocuously named ‘‘peace camps’’ are concentration camps in the true sense of the
word. They are where the rural population is forcibly concentrated so they can be
controlled and their political and cultural identity can be changed. Peace camps are the
location of mass and systematic rape of women. They are where children are separated
from their parents and ‘‘educated’’ to become extremist Moslems in the mold of the
ruling Nationalist Islamic Front, in a process of forced acculturation. (3)
Perhaps the most telling indication that the GoS intended to commit genocide in
the Nuba Mountains is this statement by Khalid Abdel Karim Saleh, former head of
security in the Office of the Governor of Kordofan, quoted on page 137:
The ongoing order given to the troops is to kill anything that is alive, that is to say to
kill anybody, to destroy the area, to implement a scorched earth policy, to destroy
everything, to burn the area, so that nothing can exist there.
There is clear evidence that the government was largely successful in its mission:
not only as a result of the large number of villages its troops utterly destroyed but the
famine they created by destroying crops and stealing and burning foodstuffs stored by
the people for the year to come; the indiscriminate and sporadic killing of civilians; the
forced conversions; the abduction of children and their re-education and enculturation
to a different way of thinking and way of life; and the mass rapes of women and girls.
With respect to the latter, the authors cogently argue that
rape destroys the very basis of the community. It breaks the fundamental bond of the
family, the relationship between husband and wife, and breaks down the trust,
confidence and sense of identity not just of the woman who has been raped, but the
family and community. When women bear children as a result of rape, they do not have
a known, legitimate patrilineage—and so they lack an acceptable social identity. (222)
An especially strong and valuable aspect of this book is the inclusion of scores of
excerpts from first-person testimony by victims. These passages, interspersed
throughout the book, address every facet of the war against the Nuba, the genocidal
actions of the GoS, and the profound ramifications for Nuba society and culture.
Numerous and significant messages for genocide scholars and anti-genocide
activists are inherent in the case of the Nuba. First, once a regime has a taste of
genocide and gets away with it, it is likely to be prepared to carry it out again. In other
words, impunity for major violations of human rights (whether crimes against
humanity or genocide) must not continue unabated. Second, when a nation closes off
an area (as the Khmer Rouge did between 1975 and 1979 while undertaking the
genocide of their own people, as the GoS did while carrying out its genocide by attrition
against the Nuba, and as, to a certain and significant extent, the GoS has operated
during its genocidal attacks on the black Africans of Darfur), there cannot be a much
clearer early warning signal that something grossly wrong is taking place within that
area. Third, there is a need for some sort of international convention and law dealing
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with regimes that seal off parts of their countries. Granted, this is much easier said
than done, as it impinges directly on state sovereignty; but it also brings to the fore the
concept of the Responsibility to Protect, and what this concept means in reality rather
than in theory—particularly for the people on the ground who are destined to be
victimized by such a sealing off.
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Book Review
Don Cheadle and John Prendergast, Not on Our Watch: The Mission to
End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond. New York: Hyperion Books, 2007.
Pp. 252, paper. $14.95 US.
Reviewed by Samuel Totten, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, and Centre for
Conflict Management, National University of Rwanda, Butare
Not on Our Watch: The Mission to End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond is a call to
activism; it is not a scholarly work, and it does not present itself as such. What it does
best is provide a solid overview of the anti-genocide activist movement that has been
created as a result of the ongoing crisis in Darfur, Sudan. What it does not do, though
it tries, is to offer any solid answers as to how genocide can be stopped. This is not
surprising, given that the first author is a Hollywood actor (Don Cheadle starred in the
feature film Hotel Rwanda). That said, a book of greater substance could have been
expected from the second author, John Prendergast, a long-time associate of the
highly regarded International Crisis Group and a former official in the Clinton
Administration (1992–2000). But both authors are obviously concerned and passionate
about the ongoing crisis in Darfur and are intent on doing their utmost to rally citizens
to apply pressure on the United States and the international community to act
whenever genocide’s ugly face appears on the horizon.
The book’s main title—Not on Our Watch—can be interpreted in at least four
different ways. First, it is an assertion that the authors and many of the activists they
write about (for that matter, anyone involved in the anti-genocide movement) will not
remain silent when a genocide-like situation occurs. Second, it is a clarion call to
citizens across the globe to join the current movement to bring an end to the crisis in
Darfur. Third, it is a call to all people, no matter where they reside, to join the larger
anti-genocide effort—an effort to end genocide once and for all.
Fourth, it is a dig at US President George W. Bush, who purportedly wrote—as he
was about to take office, or early in his presidency—the words ‘‘Not on my watch’’ in
the margins of a report about how the Clinton administration totally and callously
ignored the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, allowing between 500,000 and 1 million people to
be murdered by Hutu extremists. It is a dig at the fact that while the Bush
administration declared, on 9 September 2004, that genocide had been perpetrated—
and possibly continued—in Darfur, it simply referred the matter to the United
Nations, and has subsequently done little more than watch as the Darfur crisis
continues to this day (early 2009).
The authors correctly assert that ‘‘throughout American history, social movements
have helped shape our government’s policy on a variety of issues’’ (13), but what they
do not seem to appreciate (or do not want to admit, as it would interfere with their
argument and their agenda) is that such social movements dealt with single self-
contained national issues such as the emancipation of women, the Civil Rights
movement, the anti–Vietnam War movement. Some, such as the anti-nuclear
movement, had an international focus, but one has to question just how much good
the anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s did, given the nuclear arsenals that exist
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around the world today: both the number of weapons in these arsenals and the
number of nations belonging to the so-called nuclear club are slowly but inexorably
growing.
The international anti-apartheid movement, on the other hand, was successful;
but it took many, many years to finally break the spine of apartheid South Africa. The
problem with approaching genocide from this perspective is at least twofold. First,
genocide has the maddening tendency to pop up here, there, and everywhere, under
different guises, in different circumstances, driven by vastly different antecedents, and
undertaken by radically different actors. In other words, it is not the type of stationary
phenomenon that apartheid was, being located solely in South Africa and thus easily
zeroed in on because it was in one place and was largely the responsibility of one group
that could be dealt with in a sustained fashion without Activists having to, time and
again, try to figure out the causes, actions, and major actors involved. Second, by the
time the international community even begins to assess the seriousness of the crimes
being committed by an alleged perpetrator of genocide, hundreds of thousands, if not
millions, may already have died. The point is genocide is radically different from most
of the issues that successful social movements have focused on; and, in light of this, it
is a phenomenon that, seemingly, going to take radically new approaches to bring to its
knees. Thus far, what most scholars and activists have suggested is not radical at all
(not in any sense of the word, including that of ‘‘getting at the roots’’ of the problem)
and thus, not surprisingly, has not been particularly effective in coming up with solid
ways to overcome, for example, realpolitik or the lack of political will on the part of
those with the power to prevent or halt genocide. Ample proof of this, at least as far as
Darfur is concerned, is that the Darfur crisis has only grown more complicated, and
thus more intractable, over the past six years.
Written in a breezy style aimed at a general audience, Not on Our Watch comprises
a preface (‘‘On Our Watch’’), nine chapters, a conclusion, and an appendix. The titles of
the nine chapters provide a good overview of the focus of the book:
1. Challenges and Choices
2. Two Paths Out of Apathy
3. Sudan’s Backdrop to Genocide
4. From the Front Lines of Darfur
5. Citizens v. Government: Knowing What We Are Up Against
6. Activist Beginnings and Success Stories
7. The Upstanders
8. Strategies for Effective Change
9. Stop Mass Atrocities Now: An Agenda for Change
Despite the book’s limitations (which are addressed below), numerous aspects of it
are interesting and informative. First, it is positive that, in certain places at least, the
authors pull no punches with respect to the hesitancy of most presidential
administrations in the United States (and, for that matter, other governments in
the international community) to intervene in genocide. Activists and citizens need to
be well aware of this tendency if they ever hope to develop an effective means
of combating genocide. This is particularly true for those who believe that simply
applying pressure on a US president is sufficient to bring a genocide to a close.
For example, the authors assert that
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The U.S. has . . . claimed that it is loath to interfere in the affairs of a sovereign state, a
fair-weather policy at best, when no matter the possible implications and political
intricacies the West does choose to intervene when a boon can be derived. (33)
Second, chapters three and four provide a quick and dirty overview of the background
of the genocide in Darfur. As presented, the historical information is reader friendly
and easy to understand. It is important for activists to be conversant with key issues of
the crisis they are addressing, and these chapters will provide many with insights that
they may not previously have had. Third, the book is packed with information about
what activists have done thus far to try to address the Darfur crisis, keep it in the
news, and bring it to the attention of an ever-increasing number of citizens.
In chapter five (‘‘Citizens v. Government: Knowing What We Are Up Against’’),
Prendergast and Cheadle assert that,
given the excuses used over the past three and a half years, the truth appears to be that
combating genocide and other mass atrocities is not considered a national security
issue by most elected officials. The United States government does not want to burn its
leverage on confronting genocide. It would rather save it for issues like Iraq, Iran, as
well as keep friendly relations with its counterterrorism pals in Khartoum. The only
antidote to this searing truth—the only way the United States will take the kind of
leadership necessary to end the horrors—is for there to be a political cost for inaction,
the voting booth. We need to make the temperature a little hotter, a little more
uncomfortable for those politicians who would look away. (97–98)
Hitting the politicians where it hurts is a fine idea, and certainly organizations
such as STAND, the student-led division of the Genocide Intervention Network, are
beginning to figure out ways of turning up the temperature on politicians. But Darfur
never really became the heated issue that STAND and others hoped it would
during the 2008 US presidential race. It was, of course, greatly overshadowed by the
current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ongoing search for Osama Bin Laden, the
color of Barack Obama’s skin, the ‘‘Palin factor,’’ and the difficult economic situation.
In fact, Darfur was, for the most part, only perfunctorily touched on by the leading
presidential candidates. With no intention of being flip, one has to ask, Where’s
the heat?
Ultimately, for this reviewer, this book was more irritating than motivating. For
example, in the first chapter, the authors state that
we have identified the Three Ps of ending genocide and other crimes against humanity:
Protect the People, Punish the Perpetrators, and Promote the Peace. . . . If the
government of the world’s sole superpower, the United States, motivated by the will
of its citizens, takes the lead globally in doing these three things, crimes against
humanity can come to an end. (10)
Is it really likely that crimes against humanity (here it appears the authors are
subsuming most human-rights violations, including genocide, under the rubric of
‘‘crimes against humanity’’) will one day come to an end? Are the authors serious?
Apparently so. Again, one expects more from Prendergast, who is known as a wily and
experienced human-rights activist.
Such rhetoric is not helpful. Platitudes go only so far—not far at all, in fact, in
terms of making real progress in the world of international politics—but Not on Our
Watch is rife with platitudes. Granted, the book was written for a general audience,
and thus is perhaps bound to present a somewhat simplified version of reality, but still!
Continuing with their argument that the US government can ostensibly be the
savior of millions across the globe, Cheadle and Prendergast assert that
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the U.S. Government can take a leading role in stopping atrocities, in most cases
without putting U.S. forces on the ground in large numbers. However, the only means
by which U.S policy can change, and thus the only way mass atrocity crimes can end, is
if U.S. citizens raise their voices loud enough to get the attention of the White House
and force our government to change its policy. (14–15)
Many who have actively confronted US policy vis-a`-vis Darfur over the past four years
are bound to question the validity of such an assertion. Or, they are bound to ask, Just
how loud must our voices be? This would be a legitimate question since it is estimated
that well over a million letters have been sent to the White House over the past four
years urging the Bush administration to help put an end to the Darfur crisis. Just how
many more letters are needed? Will 2 million letters have the impact that a million did
not? Do the rallies have to be louder, more frequent, more vociferous? For the most
part, the authors simply urge activists and concerned citizens not to give up the fight,
to stay strong, to forge ahead, to keep their voices loud and persistent. More concrete
suggestions that are truly likely to be efficacious are needed here, but, unfortunately,
they are not forthcoming.
At one point—after listing and briefly discussing the ‘‘Top Ten Current U.S.
Excuses for Inaction’’ (which, in and of themselves, are interesting and worthy of
serious consideration by activists), the authors tell readers, ‘‘Just a few more degrees
[to go]. Just a few thousand more letters. It is frankly, that simple’’ (98). If only that
were true. If it were, genocide scholars, activists, and others alarmed by genocide
would have the answer to preventing and halting genocide. But it is not true; and here,
again, Cheadle and Prendergast are being not a little disingenuous.
At another point, they state that
the U.S. government usually does not respond to cases of mass atrocities—particularly
African—because of the . . . Four Horsemen Enabling the Apocalypse: ignorance,
indifference, policy inertia, and apathy. (89)
Although they touch on the thorny issue of political will, they do not truly address how
the lack of it can be overcome—if, in fact, they believe that it can be overcome. Cheadle
and Prendergast allude to realpolitik early in the book but the fact that they leave it
off the aforementioned list is baffling. Possibly they perceive realpolitik as policy
inertia, but it is hardly that; in fact, realpolitik is an active agent within the world of
politics. Or perhaps they felt compelled to choose four factors in order to use the
metaphor of the original Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. The upshot is that they
largely fail to address the overpowering reality of realpolitik, its ubiquitous presence in
the world of geopolitics, and its adverse impact on efforts to address such issues as the
prevention of and effective intervention in genocide.
Cheadle and Prendergast also make one assertion after another that sound good
in theory but conveniently overlook the role of fear in driving certain agendas.
For example, they assert that in order to win peace in Sudan, we must first win an
ideological battle at home: ‘‘We must show that combating crimes against humanity is
as important as combating terrorism’’ (12–13). Many officials in the US government,
and many US citizens, greatly fear the prospect of terrorism, but most do not fear
genocide—neither its perpetration thousands of miles from their country, nor that it
ever will become a reality in their world, on their soil. So to suggest that there is a real
chance of genocide’s gaining the same traction as the fear of terrorism within the
borders of the United States is wishful thinking.
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Not on Our Watch also includes some howlers. This one is from Prendergast:
Early on, I had been a bit incredulous as to the real possibilities of citizen action in
moving governments to act. Then, as I saw student and religious groups and others
really responding and mobilizing to these different crises [e.g., world hunger,
starvation, and now the crisis in Darfur] and as I started to see policy change [what
changes he saw, he does not say], I began to believe in the power of ordinary people to
make a difference. Perhaps it is too much to hope, but if these students and the
thousands of other new activists on behalf of the defenseless have their way, the first
genocide of the twenty-first century might also be the last, or at least the last one that
doesn’t provoke an appropriately strong response. (47)
The last genocide? Surely he is jesting. And just what is ‘‘an appropriately strong
response’’? The authors speak of organizing, writing and sending letters, and
attending rallies, but just what effect have such activities had thus far?
Unfortunately, not much!
In the case of Darfur, there is a distinct possibility that the window of opportunity
for halting what was genocide has passed—that is, it is certainly possible that, at this
point, the crisis may be morphing from what certainly was a genocide into what may
now be more a case of civil war and internecine fighting among an increasing number
of groups. If that is, in fact, true, then a totally new set of actions is called for.
That said, until that ‘‘if’’ becomes an indisputable fact, anti-genocide groups must forge
ahead with their attempts to halt what may continue to be a genocide. The question
that remains, though, is this: Will their actions truly be effective, or are they, to
paraphrase Shakespeare, going to end up engaging in a lot of sound and fury,
signifying nothing?
Cheadle and Prendergast play rather fast and loose with certain facts. For
example, they write, ‘‘In the fall of 2004, after his visit to Sudan, Secretary Powell
officially invoked the term ‘genocide’’’ (5). Not quite. Powell officially invoked the term
only after he had sent an investigatory team (the US Atrocities Documentation Team,
or ADT) to the Chad/Sudan border to interview refugees from Darfur and then
carefully studied, debated, and weighed the analysis (conducted by an outside agency
as well as by State Department researchers) of the data collected by the team.
On a different note, the authors pile one superlative atop another in describing the
their friend, and their hero, Paul Rusesabagina, the Rwandan played by Cheadle in
Hotel Rwanda. According to the myth portrayed in the film, Rusesabagina, with great
altruism, saved more than 1,000 people from certain death during the 1994 genocide.
Over the years, both those Tutsi who survived as a result of being housed at the Hotel
Mille Collines in Kigali and various Rwandan journalists and scholars, among others,
have decried the bald-faced lies depicted in the film and have revealed Rusesabagina
as little more then an opportunist. They have also accused him of denying the genocide
after the fact. In speeches at various venues Rusesabagina has reportedly played the
‘‘double genocide’’ card in order to malign the current Rwandan government, arguing
that a second genocide was perpetrated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as they
fought the extremist Hutus and ge´nocidaires. (There is no doubt that some RPF troops
did, in fact, carry out massacres against suspected ge´nocidaires, but to call such acts a
genocide seems rather far-fetched, to say the least).
Treating Rusesabagina as the hero and altruist he wishes he were but wasn’t
(and isn’t), and as the sole savior of thousands fleeing genocide in 1994, Cheadle and
Prendergast fall into the trap of blind hero worship. Concomitantly, they buy into a
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myth created largely by Rusesabagina himself and thus end up believing a tangle of
lies and passing them on to thousands of unsuspecting readers. Essentially, the
authors are continuing to do Rusesabagina’s dirty work, if inadvertently, by falsely
portraying him as the epitome of decency, when in fact he was anything but that (some
in Rwanda claim he even forced Tutsis to pay him for water—for drinking, washing,
and cooking—taken from the hotel pool).
Adding insult to injury, they are supporting a man who charges in the
neighborhood of $25,000 per appearance to speak on campuses around the United
States—talks during which he spreads his lies while building his reputation as a
‘‘hero’’ and, in the process, effectively enriches himself by capitalizing on the genocide.
The point is that Rusesabagina hardly seems like the sort of person who should be held
up as a model of caring, decency, and altruism in the face of genocide.
It is important to note that the crisis in Darfur is now well into its sixth year, with
no end in sight. Each year that genocide is allowed to continue unabated means an
ever-increasing death toll—which makes the anti-genocide movement very different
from other movements that attempt to ameliorate other injustices (as terrible as they
may be). Because of this stark fact, there must be urgency in addressing genocide. To
believe that one has four, five, six, seven, or more years to end a genocide is, in many
ways, to blind oneself to the fact that genocide equals death—often in enormous
numbers—and that genocides are often carried out within a relatively short period.
A patient, step-by-step approach that involves beating the bushes to raise concern
within a single nation or around the globe may (and no doubt often does) play into the
hands of the perpetrators. Indeed, it gives perpetrators all the time they may want
(or need) to accomplish their deadly goals.
At the very least, what activists can and should learn from history is that close to 6
million Jews were wiped out in less than eight years; that Pol Pot and his lackeys
killed more than a million people in roughly four years; and, of course, that extremist
Hutus largely accomplished their deadly task of murdering between 500,000 and 1
million people in an astonishingly short 100 days. Time is on the side of the killers, not
the victims. This is an incontrovertible fact that all those who wish to see genocide
prevented need to understand clearly—and then to act upon.
Ultimately, Not on Our Watch is bound to be perceived by the general public and
by genocide scholars with two vastly different sets of eyes. The general public may find
it interesting and informative, possibly even inspiring. Genocide scholars are likely to
find it naı¨ve, full of bluster and self-congratulatory comments and stories. But even
they may find a kernel or nugget here or there that is worth considering as they
continue to think about preventing genocide.
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